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I. INTRODUCTION
Misappropriation of traditional knowledge refers to the unauthorized
exploitation of traditional knowledge' without the consent of its indigenous
1. The World Intellectual Property Organization [hereinafter WIPO] defines traditional
knowledge as "tradition-based literary, artistic or scientific works; performances; inventions;
scientific discoveries; designs; marks, names, and symbols; undisclosed information; and all other
tradition-based innovations and creations resulting from intellectual activity in the industrial,
scientific, literary or artistic fields." See WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY NEEDS AND EXPECTATIONS OF TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE HOLDERS:
WIPO REPORT ON FACT-FINDING MISSIONS ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND TRADITIONAL
KNOWLEDGE (1998-1999) 25 (2000) [hereinafter INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY NEEDS]. In this
context, tradition-based refers to "knowledge systems, creations, innovations and cultural
expressions which: have generally been transmitted from generation to generation; are generally
regarded as pertaining to a particular people or its territory; and are constantly evolving in response
to a changing environment." Id.
Categories of traditional knowledge recognized under the WIPO definition include: (i)
agricultural knowledge; (ii) scientific knowledge; (iii); ecological knowledge; (iv) medicinal
knowledge, including related medicines and remedies; and (v) biodiversity related knowledge. Id.
The definition also includes "'expressions of folklore' in the form of music, dance, song, handicrafts,
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owners. It includes biopiracy, which is defined broadly as the acquisition of
intellectual property rights in indigenous peoples' biological resources 2 or
commercialization of their knowledge on biological resources, often without
appropriate compensation to the communities.3 As one of the major markets
for traditional knowledge, the U.S. has also been the venue for numerous
acts of misappropriation. Notorious examples include: patents awarded to
RiceTec in 1997 on several lines of basmati rice 4 traditionally grown in
India; plant breeder Sally Fox's acquisition in the 1980s of two plant variety
protection certificates over colored cotton derived from identical varieties5
grown by indigenous people in Central and South America; and a patent
granted in 1986 to two University of Mississippi scientists on the use of
turmeric to make open wounds heal faster,6 a use long known to indigenous
groups in India. Other examples are a patent obtained in 1986 by a U.S.
scientist (and president of the International Plant Medicine Corporation) on
the ayahuasca plant7 used for medicinal and ritual purposes throughout the
Amazon basin, and the awards of U.S. patents to two University of
Wisconsin scientists for a protein sweetener isolated from a berry plant
grown in Gabon, Central Africa, and known in the local community for its
sweet taste.8
To the extent the acts of misappropriation occurring in the U.S. have
involved traditional knowledge originating in foreign countries, the national
laws of those countries cannot be expected to provide adequate relief for
these cross-border transgressions.9 The only option available to foreign
designs, stories and artwork; elements of languages, such as names, geographical indications and
symbols; and, movable cultural properties." Id.
2. Biological resources include plants, animals, organs, microorganisms and genes.
3. Michael Woods, Food for Thought: The Biopiracy of Jasmine and Basmati Rice, 13 ALB.
L.J. SC. & TECH. 123, 134 (2002); see also Nuno Pires de Carvalho, Requiring Disclosure of the
Origin of Genetic Resources and Prior Informed Consent in Patent Applications Without Infringing
the TRIPS Agreement: The Problem and the Solution, 2 WASH. U. J. L. & POL'Y 371, 375 (2000).
4. One of the patents even claims that rice produced from this line of rice has "characteristics
similar or superior to those of good quality basmati rice." U.S. Patent No. 5,663,484 (filed July 8,
1994). See Sumathi Subbiah, Reaping What They Sow: The Basmati Rice Controversy and
Strategies for Protecting Traditional Knowledge, 27 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 529, 534-37
(2004).
5. See Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Of Seeds and Shamans: The Appropriation of the Scientific and
Technical Knowledge of Indigenous and Local Communities, 17 MICH. J. INT'L L. 919, 924 (1995).
6. See US. Patent 5,401,504 (filed Dec. 28, 1993).
7. See U.S. Patent 5,751 (filed Sept. 5, 1848).
8. See U.S. Patent No. 5,741,537 (filed Oct. 19, 1995); U.S. Patent No. 5,527,555 (filed Feb.
16, 1993); U.S. Patent No. 5,346,998 (filed June 29, 1993); U.S. Patent No. 5,326,580 (filed May 13,
1994). See Someshwar Singh, Rampant Biopiracy of South's Biodoversity, http://www.twnside.
org.sg /title/ rampant.htm (last visited Jan. 17, 2007).
9. Although a number of foreign countries have adopted regulatory regimes premised on access
indigenous rights holders of the misappropriated traditional knowledge
would be to initiate legal action in the U.S. Under these circumstances, it
becomes critically important to determine the avenues for redress available
in the American legal system to the foreign rights holders or custodians of
such knowledge. This, in turn, requires an assessment of the adequacy of
the regulatory framework for protecting traditional knowledge in the United
States which cannot be understood without reference to government attitudes
towards Native Americans, the main indigenous group in the United States.
The objective of this Article is to evaluate the extent to which traditional
knowledge issues are addressed under U.S. law, and propose the use of
mutual recognition agreements as remedial measures. Part One surveys
various government legislative initiatives on indigenous cultural heritage
and describes the use of Native American tribal courts to control the
exploitation of traditional knowledge. Part Two discusses some
constitutional issues regarding domestic protection, including public
domain, intellectual property rights, free access to information, freedom of
religion, and free speech. After an assessment of the nature of international
commitments (not) assumed by the U.S. in relation to traditional knowledge,
Part Three summarizes the U.S. stance on ongoing debates at various global
fora regarding the adoption of a binding international arrangement for the
protection of traditional knowledge. Part Four proposes mutual recognition
agreements ("MRAs") as alternatives to binding international treaties and
highlights the need for the provision of adequate incentives to ensure U.S.
commitment to protect traditional knowledge. It also suggests that only
through a narrowly tailored approach which targets foreign traditional
knowledge and eschews politics would there be any realistic hope of
overcoming the deep-seated inertia in U.S. government circles regarding
traditional knowledge.
II. PART ONE: PROTECTION OF NATIVE AMERICAN CULTURAL HERITAGE
A. Government Policy Towards Native Americans
As a minority group in the United States, Native Americans over the
years have engaged in a determined struggle with the federal government to
regain a more meaningful form of self-governance after having been
stripped of their powers as sovereign entities and forced to assimilate into
to traditional knowledge resources based on the prior informed consent and the equitable sharing of
benefits among contracting parties, such contract based solutions are of rather limited use in cases
that have international dimensions. For example, the best drafted domestic contract on traditional
knowledge is meaningless where a party moved out of the foreign country to live in the United
States to avoid foreign court jurisdiction or the enforcement of a judgment issued against him in the
foreign country for breach of an access and benefit sharing contract. Without the cooperation of the
U.S., courts in the foreign country cannot acquire jurisdiction over the party or enforce the judgment.
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American culture.'0 Although some form of autonomy has been conceded
to them in the form of tribal governance schemes," it is not as far-reaching
as they would like, forcing them to resort to every plausible avenue to press
their claims for greater independence. Thus, a constant tension has
characterized U.S.-Native American relations. '
2
An area in which this tension has been felt is the matter of government
policy towards indigenous heritage. Native American knowledge, once
marginalized, has become commercially attractive in recent years.'
3
However, because such commercialism has also taken a toll on indigenous
culture, Native Americans have demanded rights of control over the
exploitation of their indigenous knowledge.' 4 While laws exist for the
preservation of important historical and cultural objects, 5 they often are of
limited scope in their application to Native American cultural heritage, and
therefore, ineffective to prevent the disruptive effects of commercial
development, entertainment and other commercial uses of sacred lands by
non-indigenous people. Native Americans have also been concerned about
10. Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution, which grants Congress the power to "regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes" is
viewed as an acknowledgment of the sovereign rights of Indian tribes. See Steven C. Moore,
Managing Across Boundaries: The Rights of Native American Tribes on Federal Lands SF34 ALI-
ABA 65, 67 (2000).
11. Indian groups have been granted powers of "internal self-government including taxation...
civil affairs, and criminal jurisdiction. Rudolph C. Ryser, Between Indigenous Nations and the
State: Self-determination in the Balance, 7 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 129, 141 (1999).
12. In the words of one commentator, "the failure of the U.S. government to enter into a genuine
effort aimed at the elevation of Indian nations to a full level of self-government foreshadows
growing tensions between Indian governments and the United States." Id. at 161.
13. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS FOR INDIGENOUS PEOPLES: A SOURCEBOOK, at ix (Tom
Greaves ed., 1994)
14. The issues may be summarized as follows:
Indigenous societies find themselves poked, probed and examined as never before. The
very cultural heritage that gives indigenous peoples their identity, now far more than in
the past, is under real or potential assault from those who would gather it up, strip away
its honored meanings, convert it to a product, and sell it. Each time that happens the
heritage itself dies a little, and with it its people .... Indigenous communities, indigenous
leaders, and advocates for indigenous rights have sought ways to gain some control in a
rapidly worsening situation. At bottom, intellectual property rights consist of efforts to
assert access to, and control over, cultural knowledge and to things produced through its
application. The most urgent reason to establish that control is to preserve meaning and
due honor for elements of cultural knowledge and to insure that these traditional
universes, and their peoples, maintain their vitality. Subsidiary... goals are to manage
the degree and process by which parts of that cultural knowledge are shared with
outsiders, and in some instances, to be justly compensated for it.
Id.
15. See infra notes 31-88 and accompanying text.
the looting of indigenous grave sites, 16 the sale of culturally significant and
sometimes irreplaceable items,' 7 the misrepresentation of goods as Indian
made,' 8 and the use of Indian names or symbols in a manner perceived to be
degrading. 9
The quest by Native Americans for greater control rights over cultural
heritage has clear political implications. Central to the demands of Native
Americans is access to and preservation of land recognized as an inseparable
component of their religious beliefs. 20  Native Americans also demand the
right to self-determination which will enable them to become the final
arbiters regarding uses of their heritage. Although U.S. domestic policy
affirms unambiguously the government's acceptance of the principle of self-
determination for Native Americans,2' its international policy offers a sharp
contrast. 22 Before the U.N. Commission for Human Rights, for example, the
U.S. has resisted the application of international standards for self-
determination to Indian tribes and other indigenous peoples. 23
This international stance may be attributed to U.S. concerns that the
incorporation into a treaty of what the U.S. has termed "aspirations" of
16. The remains of thousands of indigenous people taken from Indian grave sites have been
stored in museums and scientific institutions, of which the Smithsonian Institution alone is said to
house the remains of 18,500 individuals. Significant numbers of remains are also found in private
collections. See generally Ryan M. Seidemann, Bones of Contention: A Comparative Examination
of Law Governing Human Remains from Archaeological Contexts in Formerly Colonial Countries,
64 LA. L. REv. 545, 545-88 (2004).
17. Some of these items have religious significance and their sale may be contrary to indigenous
law. Where culturally significant items that have been sold are found and agreement is reached to
return them, repatriation efforts can be bogged down by difficult questions regarding tribal
communities' entitlement to the items. With respect to items not culturally significant, and whose
return is not seriously requested, Native American people often insist on having a say as to how they
are held, and demand especially, that the holders exhibit respect for Indian identity and culture.
18. Problems of authenticity arise from the mass production of native goods, often with inferior
materials which reduce the aesthetic quality or religious significance of the goods. Moreover, large-
scale production reduces the novelty and commercial value of goods, to the financial detriment of
indigenous people producing them.
19. In the sports industry, Indian terminology is used to name mascots or identify sports teams.
Prominent examples include the Atlanta Braves and their fan ritual known as Tomahawk Chop; the
Cleveland Indians and their Chief Wahoo mascot; and the Washington Redskins of the National
Football League. Justin G. Blankenship, The Cancellation of Redskins as a Disparaging
Trademark: Is Federal Trademark Law an Appropriate Solution for Words that Offend?, 72 COLO.
L. REv. 415, 423 (2001). The federal trademark register is replete with filings under well known
Indian tribal names such as Cherokee, Navajo, Sioux, Dakota, or Lakota.
20. See infra note 177 and accompanying text.
21. Congress in the 1970s passed various statutes establishing the framework for tribal
government's to govern themselves. See, e.g., Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance
Act of 1975, 25 U.S.C. § 450 (2000).
22. In general, the U.S. has been reluctant to ratify international instruments that guarantee
indigenous rights. Kristen A. Carpenter, Interpreting Indian Country in State of Alaska v. Native
Village of Venetie, 35 TULSA L.J. 73, 124 (1999).
23. Ryser, supra note 11, at 158.
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indigenous peoples, 2 4 could be used to support domestic Native American
agitation for greater self-determination 25 or even secession.26 Indeed, in the
debate on traditional knowledge, the association is frequently made between
cultural heritage protection and the recognition of rights of indigenous
peoples to self-determination. For example, Erica-Irene Daes, former
special rapporteur of the U.N. Sub-Commission on the Prevention of
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities has noted quite forcefully that
"[t]he protection of cultural and intellectual property is connected
fundamentally with the realization of the territorial rights and self-
determination of indigenous peoples.' '2 7 Similarly, it has been observed that
"[i]n numerous statements and declarations, indigenous peoples ...have
stated that they feel that their quest for self-determination is the most
important reason to engage in efforts to protect their knowledge. ' 8
Given these political implications in the international recognition of
cultural rights, it is hardly surprising that the U.S. government has not
approached issues on traditional knowledge with the same detached,
apolitical perspective evident in other countries.2 9 This suspicious attitude
24. The United States representative at a meeting of the Human Rights Commission Working
Group was reported to have cautioned the Working Group against "convert[ing] aspirations and
objectives into 'rights' in order to draw attention to them." U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC],
Human Rights Commission Working Group, Report of the Working Group Established in
Accordance with Commission on Human Rights Resolution 1995/32, 40, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/1999/82, (Jan. 20, 1999) [hereinafter Report of the Working Group].
25. The demands for greater self-determination have been resisted by state governments and
many non-Native Americans. See Dean B. Suagee, The Cultural Heritage of American Indian
Tribes and the Preservation of Biological Diversity, 31 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 483, 498 (1999).
26. The U.S. allegedly initially opposed the term "peoples" in the U.N. Draft Declaration of
Indigenous Peoples because of its association with the right to self-determination suggested by
others to connote independent statehood and secession under international law. Report of the
Working Group, supra note 24, at 40.
27. Erica-Irene A. Daes, Protection of the Heritage of Indigenous People, United Nations
Human Rights Study Series, vol.10, at 1 (1997).
28. CRUCIBLE II GROUP, SEEDING SOLUTIONS VOL. 2: OPTIONS FOR NATIONAL LAWS
GOVERNING CONTROL OVER GENETIC RESOURCES AND BIOLOGICAL INNOVATIONS 35 (2001).
29. In an earlier work, this author noted the following with reference to Africa:
Most Africans belong to tribes and have roots in traditional communities, whether they
live in villages or cities. The lowest rural shepherd boy is no more a traditionalist than is
the President of the country living in the state capital. Also, tribal groups are as much a
part of the national government as any group could possibly be. As such, they are not
minority groups fighting for political power. That central governments in Africa are not
threatened politically may explain why they have readily acknowledged in legislation the
entitlement of traditional groups to their folklore. Consequently political considerations.
. are irrelevant to the debate about protecting folklore in Africa.
Paul Kuruk, Protecting Folklore Under Modern Intellectual Property Regimes: A Reappraisal of the
Tensions Between Individual and Communal Rights in Africa and the United States 769 48 AM. U.
L. REV. 769, 841 (1999).
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appears to have colored the government's definition of the issues and its
preparedness to commit to broad solutions regarding the protection of
traditional knowledge whether at home or abroad.30
B. Legislative Initiatives on Cultural Heritage
Concerned about the increased interest of scientists and art dealers in
Native American skeletal remains and other funerary objects, Congress
passed the Antiquities Act of 190631 ("Antiquities Act") giving the President
power to set aside as national monuments certain historic landmarks,
structures and other objects of historic interest.32 Under the Act, persons
who excavated, appropriated, injured, or caused the destruction of any
historic or prehistoric ruin or antiquity on land owned or under the control of
the federal government, without permission from the federal department
holding jurisdiction over the land,33 could be fined or imprisoned.34 While
the Antiquities Act has facilitated the management of a number of
significant structures,35 by and large, it has been ineffective in protecting
indigenous cultural property due to funding problems, inadequate staff,3 6
vagueness in some of its provisions and a general failure by the National
Park to take indigenous interests into account when selecting which
properties to protect.
37
30. See infra notes 227-69 and accompanying text.
31. 16 U.S.C. §§ 431-33 (2000).
32. Id. §431.
33. Permits for the examination of ruins, excavation of archaeological sites and gathering of
objects of antiquity upon lands under their respective jurisdictions could be obtained from the
Secretaries of the Interior, Agriculture and the Army. However, the permits would only be granted
to institutions deemed qualified to conduct the activity for which permission was sought. In
addition, the activity had to be undertaken for the benefit of reputable museums, universities,
colleges or other scientific or educational institutions with the object of increasing knowledge about
such objects and also permanently preserving them in public institutions. See id. § 432.
34. Id. § 433.
35. Examples of national monuments established under presidential proclamation pursuant to the
terms of the Act are Ackia Battleground National Monument in Mississippi; Andrew Johnson
National Monument in Tennessee, Casa Grande National Monument in Arizona, Grand Canyon
National Museum in Arizona, and the Statue of Liberty National Museum. See id. § 431.
36. Raymond Cross & Elizabeth Brenneman, Devils Tower at the Crossroads: The National
Park Service and the Preservation of Native American Cultural Resources in the 21" Century, 18
PuB. LAND & RESOURCES L. REv. 5, 17 (1997).
37. Jason C. Roberts, The Protection of Indigenous Populations' Cultural Property in Peru,
Mexico and the United States, 4 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 327, 350 (1997).
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To improve the regulatory framework, the Historic Sites, Buildings and
Antiquities Act3" ("Historic Sites Act") was passed in 1935 empowering the
National Park Service to restore, reconstruct, and maintain sites and objects
of historic interest.3 9 Although the Historic Sites Act has facilitated the
protection of noteworthy sites,40 its implementation, like that of the
Antiquities Act before it, reflected a bias towards the preservation of
structures associated with European colonization, and not much use was
made of the Historic Sites Act to protect the interests of indigenous peoples
in their cultural property. The next effort towards the protection of historic
sites occurred in 1966 under the National Historic Preservation Act
4
'
("NHPA"), which established a federal policy of cooperation with Indian
tribes, private organizations and individuals on the subject.42 NHPA
provided for the maintenance of a National Register of Historic Places
43
composed of "districts, sites, buildings, and objects significant in American
history, architecture, archaeology, engineering and culture" 44 and required
the Secretary of the Interior to establish a program to help Indian tribes
preserve their particular properties, 45 taking into account tribal values.
46
Around the time the Historic Sites Act was passed in 1935, the federal
government also responded to concerns regarding the misrepresentation of
Indian artifacts 47 and promulgated the Native American Arts and Crafts
38. 16 U.S.C. §§ 461-67.
39. Id. § 462(d).
40. See generally Marilyn Phelan, A Synopsis of the Laws Protecting Our Cultural Heritage, 28
NEW ENG. L. REv. 63 (1993).
41. 16 U.S.C. § 470.
42. The National Historic Preservation Act was passed in recognition of the significance of the
national heritage as the foundation for the "spirit and direction of the Nation" and the need to
preserve it as part of "community life and development in order to give a sense of orientation to the
American people" as well as maintain "its vital legacy of cultural, educational, aesthetic,
inspirational, economic and energy benefits" for future generations of Americans. Id. § 470(b).
Under the Act, it was envisaged that the government would inter alia, "provide leadership in the
preservation of the prehistoric and historic resources of the United States," "administer federally
owned, administered or controlled prehistoric or historic resources in a spirit of stewardship for the
inspiration and benefit of present and future generations," and assist Indian groups to "expand and
accelerate" their preservation activities. Id. § 470-1.
43. Significantly, the National Historic Preservation Act also provides that properties of
traditional religious and cultural importance to Indian tribes or Native Hawaiian organizations are
eligible for inclusion in the National Register, and calls for consultations with the relevant Indian
groups in connection with the determination of the eligibility of tribal religions and cultural
properties for inclusion in the register. Id. § 470a(d)(6)(A)-(B).
44. Id. § 470a(a)(1)(A).
45. Id. § 470a(d)(l)(A).
46. Id. § 470a(d)(l)(B).
47. It is not uncommon in the United States to find art and craft produced by non-Indians being
marketed as genuine "Indian" products.
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Act 48 to assure the authenticity of Indian artifacts. The law created the
Indian Arts and Crafts Board 49 to "promote the economic welfare of the
Indian tribes and Indian individuals through the development of Indian arts
and crafts and the expansion of the market for the products of Indian art and
craftsmanship."5 °  The Board was authorized to create "trademarks of
genuineness and quality for Indian products"'" which could be registered
with the Patent and Trademark Office and assigned to Native Indians
without charge.2 Under the Act, it was an offense to counterfeit the Board's
marks5 3 or misrepresent a good as Indian made by falsely suggesting that it
is "Indian produced, an Indian product, or the product of a particular Indian
or Indian tribe or Indian arts and crafts organization .. .. 4 In addition to
basic civil and criminal sanctions against persons caught making such
misrepresentations,55 the Act authorized suits for injunctive relief and
damages 56 by native Indians or by the Attorney General on behalf of native
48. 25 U.S.C. § 305 (2000).
49. The Board consists of five commissioners appointed by the Secretary of the Interior. Id.
50. Id. § 305a.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. The Act provides:
Whoever counterfeits or colorably imitates any Government trade mark used or devised
by the Indian Arts and Crafts Board in the Department of the Interior as provided in
section 305a of Title 25, or, except as authorized by the Board, affixes any such
Government trade mark, or knowingly, willfully, and corruptly affixes any reproduction,
counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation thereof upon any products, or to any labels,
signs, prints, packages, wrappers, or receptacles intended to be used upon or in
connection with the sale of such products; or
Whoever knowingly makes any false statement for the purpose of obtaining the use of
any such Government trade mark-
Shall (1) in the case of a first violation, if an individual, be fined under this title or
imprisoned not more than five years, or both, and, if a person other than an individual, be
fined not more than $1,000,000; and (2) in the case of subsequent violations, if an
individual, be fined not more than $1,000,000 or imprisoned not more than fifteen years,
or both, and, if a person other than an individual, be fined not more than $5,000,000; and
(3) shall be enjoined from further carrying on the act or acts complained of.
18 U.S.C. § 1158 (2000).
54. Id. § 1159(a).
55. The Act provided:
(a) It is unlawful to offer or display for sale or sell any good, with or without a
Government trademark, in a manner that falsely suggests it is Indian produced, an Indian
product, or the product of a particular Indian or Indian tribe or Indian arts and crafts
organization, resident within the United States.
(b) Whoever knowingly violates subsection (a) shall-
(1) in the case of a first violation, if an individual, be fined not more than $250,000 or
imprisoned not more than five years, or both, and, if a person other than an individual, be
fined not more than $1,000,000; and (2) in the case of subsequent violations, if an
individual, be fined not more than $1,000,000 or imprisoned not more than fifteen years,
or both, and, if a person other than an individual, be fined not more than $5,000,000.
Id. § 1159(a)-(b).
56. 25 U.S.C. § 305e(a) (2000).
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Indians." Despite its laudable goals, the Native American Arts and Crafts
Act has not been effective. So far, it appears no person has been prosecuted
under the Act and the Department of the Interior has yet to adopt relevant
implementing regulations.5" In any event, the Act is unduly narrow in scope
and would not apply in cases where indigenous crafts are copied but not
represented as Indian craft. 9
Besides the measures on trade in Indian arts and craft, Congress has
regulated the commercial exploitation of archaeological resources in an
effort to prevent the destruction of a vital component of the national
heritage. 60 Under the Archaeological Resources Protection Act 6' ("ARPA")
of 1979, permission of the Native American community was required before
objects could be excavated or removed from federal and Indian lands.62
ARPA also prohibited the sale, purchase, transport, exchange, or receipt of
archaeological resources 63 excavated or removed from such lands without
proper permission. 64
To facilitate the return of native property held in public institutions,
Congress passed in 1990 the Native American Graves Protection and
Repatriation Act 65 ("NAGPRA") which provided that the ownership or
control of Native American cultural items 66 excavated or discovered on
57. Id. § 305e(c).
58. Christine Haight Farley, Protecting Folklore of Indigenous Peoples: Is Intellectual Property
the Answer?, 30 CONN. L. REv. 1, 51 (1997) (calling the act a "paper tiger" and saying "there has
never been a single prosecution in the history of the Act.").
59. Id. at 23, 51-52.
60. 16 U.S.C. § 470aa(a) (2000).
61. Id. § 470aa-mm.
62. Id. § 470ee(a).
63. The Archaeological Resources Protection Act defined an archaeological resource as:
any material remains of past human life or activities which are of archaeological interest
[including, but not limited to] pottery, basketry, bottles, weapons, weapon projectiles,
tools, structures or portions of structures, pit houses, rock paintings, rock carvings,
intaglios, graves, human skeletal materials .... No item shall be treated as an
archaeological resource ... unless such item is at least 100 years of age.
Id. § 479bb(1).
64. Id. § 470ee(a)
65. 25 U.S.C. § 3001(l)-(13) (2000).
66. The term "cultural items" is used in the Act to refer to human remains, "associated" and
"unassociated funerary objects," "sacred objects" and "cultural patrimony." Id. § 3001(3). The term
"associated funerary objects" is defined as:
objects that, as a part of the death rite or ceremony of a culture, are reasonably believed
to have been placed with individual human remains either at the time of death or later,
and both the human remains and associated funerary objects are presently in the
possession or control of a Federal agency or museum, except that other items exclusively
made for burial purposes or to contain human remains shall be considered as associated
funerary objects.
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federal or tribal lands remained with lineal descendants, Native American
tribes or Hawaiian Organizations. When the cultural affiliation 67 of an
inventoried item could not be established, an indigenous group could recover
it merely by showing through a preponderance of the evidence based on
"geographical, kinship, biological, archaeological, anthropological,
linguistic, folkloric, oral traditional, historical, or other relevant information
or expert opinion" 61 that it has a cultural affiliation with the human remains
and cultural property. Failure to return cultural items upon proper request
subjected offending museums to civil penalties 69 assessed according to the
archaeological, historical or commercial value of the item involved, the
damage suffered by the aggrieved party or the number of violations
involved.70
Criticisms of NAGPRA include its limitation to only cultural items
found on federal or tribal land or held by federally funded agencies and
museums, 7 1 as well as its burden of proof, which has proved to be a hurdle
in some cases. 7 2  However, in United States v. Carrow,73 the Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit rejected a void-for-vagueness challenge to
NAGPRA, holding the Act not to be "infirm" by its failure "to list examples
of cultural items. ' ' 74 Predictably, NAGPRA has had a profound effect on the
Id. § 3001(3)(A).
The term "unassociated funerary objects" refers to
objects that, as a part of the death rite or ceremony of a culture, are reasonably believed
to have been placed with individual human remains either at the time of death or later,
where the remains are not in the possession or control of the Federal agency or museum
and the objects can be identified by a preponderance of the evidence as related to specific
individuals or families or to known human remains or, by a preponderance of the
evidence, as having been removed from a specific burial site of an individual culturally
affiliated with a particular Indian tribe.
Id. § 3001(3)(B).
67. The term "cultural affiliation" denotes "a relationship of shared group identity which can be
reasonably traced historically or prehistorically between a present day Indian tribe or Native
Hawaiian organization and an identifiable earlier group." Id. § 3001(2).
68. Id. § 3005(a)(4).
69. Id. § 3007(a).
70. Id. § 3007(b).
71. Perhaps in order to avoid violating the Fifth Amendment's proscription of the federal
government taking property without due compensation, the Act was made inapplicable to items in
institutions that do not receive federal money or to museums or archaeologists able to establish
good-faith purchase of the items. Daniel J. Hurtado, Native American Graves Protection and
Repatriation Act: Does it Subject Museums to Unconstitutional "'Taking"?, 6 HOFSTRA PROP. L. J.
1, 7, 14 (1993); see also Michelle Hibbert, Galileos or Grave Robbers? Science, the Native
American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act, and the First Amendment, 23 AM. INDIAN L.
REV. 425 (1999).
72. The obligation to return items was not triggered where federal agencies demonstrated a legal
right of possession and the tribe requesting them is unable to carry its burden of proving through a
preponderance of the evidence that they are the closest living culturally affiliated group. See
Hibbert, supra note 71, at 430.
73. 119 F.3d 796 (10th Cir. 1997).
74. Id. at 804.
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debate about the rights of Indians to their cultural property and has
emboldened them to seek return of numerous items, including those that
may be perceived as falling beyond the scope of the Act. 7
An important milestone in the protection of Native American cultural
heritage was reached in 1976 with the establishment of the American
Folklife Center in the Library of Congress to "preserve and present
American folklife. ' 76 Under the American Folklife Preservation Act,77 the
Center is authorized to enter into contracts with individuals and groups for
the promotion of folklife,75 to maintain a national archive and center for
American folklife79 and to purchase for preservation purposes certain
representations of American folklife. 8° The Center can also display and
disseminate to the public folklife forms preserved by the Center or found in
the national archive. 1 Regrettably, despite these broad and laudable goals,
the Center should not be expected to play a far reaching role in the
protection of indigenous knowledge given the restriction of its authority to
75. For example, the Hopi tribe asked for the return of "notes, drawings, and photographs...
dealing with religious matters" while the requests of the Apache tribe focused on "all images, text,
ceremonies, music, songs, stories, symbols, beliefs, customs, ideas and other physical and spiritual
objects and concepts." Michael F. Brown, Can Culture Be Copyrighted 39(2) CURRENT
ANTHROPOLOGY 193, 194 (1998).
76. 20 U.S.C. § 2101(b) (2000).
77. 20 U.S.C. §§ 2101-44 (2000).
78. The scope of the contracts is described to include the following:
(A) initiation, encouragement, support, organization, and promotion of research,
scholarship, and training in American folklife;
(B) initiation, promotion, support, organization, and production of live performances,
festivals, exhibits, and workshops related to American folklife;
(C) purchase, receipt, production, arrangement for, and support of the production of
exhibitions, displays, publications, and presentations (including presentations by still and
motion picture films, and audio and visual magnetic tape recordings) which represent or
illustrate some aspect of American folklife; and
(D) purchase, production, arrangement for, and support of the production of exhibitions,
projects, presentations, and materials specially designed for classroom use representing or
illustrating some aspect of American folklife.
Id. § 2104(1).
79. Id. § 2104(2).
80. Under the Act, the Center may
procure, receive, purchase, and collect for preservation or retention in an appropriate
archive creative works, exhibitions, presentations, objects, materials, artifacts,
manuscripts, publications, and audio and visual records (including still and motion
picture film records, audio and visual magnetic tape recordings, written records, and
manuscripts) which represent or illustrate some aspect of American folklife.
Id. § 2104(3).
81. Id. § 2104(5). In discharging its obligations, the Center was given the discretion to "develop
and implement other appropriate programs to preserve, support, revitalize, and disseminate
American folklife." Id. § 2104(7).
the relatively limited number of items that may come within the Center's
control. Indeed, Native American interests may not even be a priority to the
extent the American Folklife Preservation Act makes no mention of the
rights of indigenous communities.
Besides these legislative measures focused mainly on Native American
cultural property, there are other initiatives which could apply to the
protection of traditional knowledge of foreign origin. Under the Pre-
Columbian Art Act 82 of 1972, for example, Congress prohibited the import
into the United States of any pre-Columbian monumental or architectural
sculpture or mural 83 without a certificate from the country of origin stating
that the exported antiquity was not removed in violation of its laws. 84
Protected items include any immobile structures or parts of a structure which
are subject to export control of the country of origin. 5 Complementing the
Pre-Colombian Art Act is the National Stolen Property Act 86 which provides
criminal penalties for trafficking in stolen cultural property. 7 The National
Stolen Property Act makes it a felony to knowingly sell or receive stolen
goods worth five thousand dollars or more in interstate or foreign
commerce. 88
C. Tribal Courts' Control of Indigenous Heritage
Historically, United States relations with tribes and bands of Indians
were governed through various treaties providing for limited federal
prosecution of crimes involving non-Indians. However, beginning with the
Indian Appropriation Act of 1871,89 the U.S. government progressively
expanded its jurisdiction over the Indian communities and sought to
maintain order through the system of tribal courts established by the federal
government's Bureau of Indian Affairs ("BIA"). The tribal courts were
82. 19 U.S.C. § 2092 (2000).
83. The term "pre-Colombian monumental or architectural sculpture or mural" is defined to
include "any stone carving or wall or art which is the product of a pre-Colombian Indian culture of
Mexico, Central America, South America or the Caribbean Islands, was an immobile monument or
architectural structure or was part of, or affixed to, any such monument or structure." Id. § 2095(3).
84. Id. § 2092(a).
85. See id. § 2095(3).
86. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2314-15 (2000).
87. Id. § 2314.
88. Id. § 2315.
89. The Indian Appropriation Act of 1871 effectively ended the treaty arrangements by providing
that:
[H]ereafter no Indian nation or tribe within the territory of the United States shall be
acknowledged or recognized as an independent nation, tribe or power with whom the
United States may contract by treaty; Provided... [t]hat nothing herein contained shall
be construed to invalidate or impair the obligation of any treaty heretofore lawfully made
and ratified with any such Indian nation or tribe.
Indian Department Appropriations Act of March 3, 1871, ch. 120, 16 Stat. 544, 566.
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created as part of an effort to assimilate Indians under a detribalization
process9" also pursued through the government's land tenure policy9' and
system of education. 92
In the early part of the twentieth century, however, the federal
government began to move away from its policy of assimilation and passed
the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 ("IRA") to allow tribal groups to set
up their own systems of governance. 93  The BIA was authorized to draft
standard constitutions for the tribes which could be changed only with the
approval of the Secretary of the Interior. A Code of Indian Offenses was
published the following year by the BIA allowing the tribes to create their
own courts and enact their own laws. 94 At first, the government controlled
the courts that were set up under the IRA process.95 But not every tribe
chose to go with the IRA scheme, some preferring to rely on traditional
systems. Even for those utilizing the IRA procedures, a conscious effort was
made to encourage the use of traditional systems as well.96 Tribes that did
not have traditional adjudication systems and did not want to operate under
the IRA framework went on to develop new systems of tribal courts and
laws. 9'
90. Thus, the federal government created the Courts of Indian Offenses in 1883 "to civilize the
Indians" by compelling them "to desist from the savage and barbarous practices that are calculated
to continue them in savagery, no matter what exterior influences are brought to bear on them." Nell
Jessup Newton, Memory and Misrepresentation: Representing Crazy Horse, 27 CoNN. L. REV.
1003, 1033 (1995). Prohibited acts included participating in dances or feasts, entering into plural or
polygamous marriages, acting as medicine men, destroying property of other Indians, and engaging
in immorality, intoxication, and misdemeanors and vagrancy. Presiding over the courts were Indians
selected by the BIA for demonstrating an affinity to Euro-American practices such as hairstyle,
clothing, monogamy, and individual holdings of land. Robert J. McCarthy, Civil Rights in Tribal
Courts: The Indian Bill of Rights at Thirty Years, 34 IDAHo L. REV. 465,484 (1998).
91. Separate land allotments in favor of individuals were authorized as an encroachment upon
traditional ideas of communal land ownership.
92. According to one commentator,
[e]ducation of children was also seen as a sure way to create a generation of assimilated
Indians. Congress entrusted various Christian denominations with control over education
on specific reservations; conversion of Indian children to Christianity was seen as a first
step to assimilation . . . Toward the end of the nineteenth century, Indian boarding
schools were preferred. Youngsters would be taken by force, if necessary, and sent away
to schools, such as the Carlisle Indian School in Pennsylvania, founded in 1879, whose
headmaster, Richard Pratt, promised to "Kill the Indian in him, and save the man."
Newton, supra note 90, at 1033 (1995).
93. Indian Reorganization Act (Wheeler-Howard Act), 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-79 (2000).
94. 25 C.F.R. § 11.100(c).
95. Newton, supra note 90, at 1035. See generally Fredric Brandfon, Comment, Tradition and
Judicial Review in the American Indian Tribal Court System, 38 UCLA L. REV. 991, 991-1018.
96. Newton, supra note 90, at 1035.
97. For example, the Pueblos have settled on procedures that involve the governor and the
council in the dispute resolution process.
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Affirming the significance of tribal courts,98 the United States Supreme
Court has referred to tribal courts as "appropriate forums for the exclusive
adjudication of disputes affecting important personal and property interests
of both Indians and non-Indians." 99  It has also acknowledged the wide
jurisdiction of the tribal courts, emphasizing for instance, that "[i]f state-
court jurisdiction over Indians or activities on Indian lands would interfere
with tribal sovereignty and self-government, the state courts are generally
divested of jurisdiction as a matter of federal law."' 00
Generally, Indian tribal courts are required to apply tribal law first,'0 '
and to resort to federal and state law only to fill in the gaps. 102 However,
perhaps due to lack of resources1°3 or in deference to hints from federal
courts, a disturbing pattern has been reported where some courts seem to
apply state law regardless of its relevance to tribal culture. 104 Reflecting the
nature of their historical development, the tribal courts tend to be
preoccupied with criminal matters although there is a noticeable trend in
their use for civil litigation. 105 Although subject to review by federal courts,
tribal court decisions are given deference 1 6 especially as to the tribal courts'
findings on what constitutes tribal law. 107
The authorization to apply indigenous laws has emboldened tribal courts
to enforce tribal values even where that may amount to adoption of concepts
uncommon to the basic English system, such as the notion of group property
98. Tribal courts have become popular among, and are resorted to in an unprecedented manner
by, Native Americans. The wide appeal of tribal courts has been attributed to "[t]he pan-Indian
movement, the struggles of other racial minorities in changing the boundaries of the acceptable, the
increasing number of Native-American attorneys,... the critical legal jurisprudence that has
questioned the foundations of Federal Indian law, and the concomitant flowering of tribal court
systems." Newton, supra note 90, at 1036.
99. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 65 (1978).
100. Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 15 (1987).
101. Robert Odawi Porter, The Inapplicability ofAmerican Law to the Indian Nations, 89 IOWA L.
REV. 1595, 1611 (2004).
102. Newton, supra note 90, at 1038.
103. The courts are said to be constrained financially, operate with inadequate staff and can barely
afford more than the tribal code and some state reporters. Id.
104. The Supreme Court's tough approach to jurisdictional matters involving tribal courts may
have forced some of the tribal courts resort to notions of state law as way of preserving a respectable
degree of jurisdiction. See Robert A. Williams, The Algebra of the Federal Indian: the Hard Trail of
Decolonizing and Americanizing the White Man's Indian Jurisprudence, 1986 WIS, L. REV. 219,
274, 288 (1986); see also Brandfon, supra note 95, at 1006-09; Porter, supra note 101, at 1610-12.
105. Newton, supra note 90, at 1037.
106. Such deference is based on the notion of full faith and credit generally extended by a court to
a judgment made by another court from a different state. See generally Robert Laurence, Full Faith
and Credit in Tribal Courts: An Essay on Tribal Sovereignty, Cross-Boundary Reciprocity and the
Unlikely Case of Eberhard v. Eberhard, 28 N. M. L. REV. 19, 19-57 (1998).
107. Robert D. Cooter & Wolfgang Fikentscher, Indian Common Law: The Role of Custom in
American Indian Tribal Courts, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 509, 558-61 (1998); Lona N. Laymon, Note,
Valid- Where-Consummated: The Intersection of Customary Law Marriages and Formal
Adjudication, 10 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 353, 365 (2001).
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rights. Thus, in Chilkat Indian Village v. Johnson,0 8 a tribal court ordered
the return of artifacts and carvings on grounds that they constituted the
property of an Alaskan village. The tribal court's claim was based, in part,
on an ordinance adopted by the Indian tribe (the Chilkat Indian Village)
pursuant to the tribe's IRA-authorized constitution prohibiting the removal
of artifacts from the village. 109 In an action by the tribe seeking return of the
artifacts and monetary damages, the Ninth Circuit upheld the power of tribal
courts to act pursuant to local authority conferred on them, especially as it
related to members of the tribe. As the Court noted, "[in the overwhelming
majority of instances, a tribe's enforcement of its ordinances against its
members will raise no federal questions at all. Such cases primarily raise
issues of tribal law, and they are the staple of the tribal courts." 11 0
However, this should not be taken as an indication that the tribal court's
ability to apply tribal law is unlimited. While its authority over local matters
is respected by the state and federal courts, its jurisdictional bases continue
to be scrutinized by the superior courts, especially where non-Indians are
involved."' Some commentators suggest that the degree to which tribal
decisions are immune from interference by the federal courts should depend
on a balancing approach implicating individual rights, on the one hand, and
tribal sovereignty on the other. " 2
108. 870 F.2d 1469 (9th Cir. 1989).
109. As quoted in the Court's decision, the ordinance provided:
No person shall enter on to the property of the Chilkat Indian Village for the purpose of
buying, trading for, soliciting the purchase of, or otherwise seeking to arrange the
removal of artifacts, clan crests, or other traditional Indian art work owned or held by
members of the Chilkat Indian Village or kept within the boundaries of the real property
owned by the Chilkat Indian Village, without first requesting and obtaining permission to
do so from the Chilkat Indian Village Council.
No traditional Indian artifacts, clan crests, or other Indian art works of any kind may be
removed from the Chilkat Indian Village without the prior notification of and approval
by, the Chilkat Indian Village Council.
Id. at 1471 (quoting Chilkat Indian Village Ordinance of May 12, 1976).
110. Id. at 1475-76 (citations omitted).
11l. For example, in Chilkat, the Ninth Circuit determined that federal questions implicated in
actions of tribal authorities against non-Indians apparently warranted closer scrutiny of such actions.
Id. at 1476.
112. As one commentator notes,
[T]ribal court jurisprudence takes place against a field of potential federal court
interference. The Supreme Court's decisions stripping authority from tribal courts have
been impelled by a stated concern for individual rights. Decisions upholding tribal court
authority have been premised on the overriding importance of tribal sovereignty in the
particular case. In short, the weight given to tribal sovereignty can be expected to be a
decisive factor in federal court review of a tribal decision involving a non-Indian.
Acknowledging the existence of some measure of sovereignty is simple, however; the
real issue is the extent of sovereign powers. On this issue, policymakers, including
III. PART Two: CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES IN THE QUEST FOR BETTER
PROTECTION OF NATIVE AMERICAN CULTURAL HERITAGE
A. Traditional Knowledge as Part of the Public Domain
1. Free Access to Information
The perceived relegation of traditional knowledge to the public domain
is frequently cited as justification for opposing Native American demands
for exclusive rights to their traditional knowledge."' Used in this context,
the term "public domain" would include "the body of knowledge and
innovation (especially creative works such as writing, art, music, and
inventions) in relation to which no person or other legal entity can establish
or maintain proprietary interests.""' 4 Thus, public domain has come to be
viewed as "part of the common cultural and intellectual heritage of
humanity, which in general anyone may use or exploit."'" 5
Although works protected by proprietary rights, such as copyright or
patents, are not in the public domain, upon the expiration of the intellectual
property rights, the works become part of the public domain and may be
freely used by any one for any purpose. 116 Thus, the concept of public
domain furthers an important societal objective of facilitating access to
creative ideas in aid of national development.' Indeed, the objective is
members of the Supreme Court, have very different positions.
The most frequently stated rationale for tribal sovereignty has been the role of tribal
sovereignty as preservative of tribal cultures. Although this rationale may seem to hold
great promise... the meaning of the phrase "tribal culture" is highly contested, though
rarely acknowledged. For example, whether a particular tribal practice has been
traditionally followed by a tribe has been treated as nearly dispositive by some Court
members in deciding the level of protection accorded to tribal sovereignty. The extent to
which a reviewing court claims the power to decide what is or is not tribal culture is itself
an intrusion into tribal sovereignty, even if this privileged position is claimed in the
context of a decision protecting tribal authority. Although I agree that tribal sovereignty
is essential to protecting tribes' cultures, I would not require a tribe either to demonstrate
that any aspect of its cultural practice is unique, traditional, or unchanged, in order to give
credence to its sovereignty. The fact that a tribal system has appropriated elements of a
system originally imposed upon it is a sign of the vitality of Indian tribes, not an excuse
for diluting their authority.
Newton, supra note 90, at 1044.
113. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 75, at 206.
114. Wikipedia: The Free Encyclopedia, Public Domain, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Public-
domain (last visited Mar. 12, 2006).
115. Id. See generally Edward Samuels, The Public Domain Revisited, 36 Loy. L.A. L. REV 389
(2002); Edward Samuels, The Public Domain in Copyright Law, 41 J. CoPYRIGHT SOC'Y 137, 137
(1993).
116. Wikipedia: The Free Encyclopedia, Public Domain, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Public_
domain (last visited Mar. 12, 2006).
117. According to WIPO,
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recognized in relation to copyright under a constitutional provision granting
the U.S. Congress power to "promote the progress of Science and useful
Arts by securing for limited Times to Authors... the exclusive Right to their
Writings . . . .""' Significantly, this Copyright Clause has been held to
promote society's interest in the "free flow of ideas, information and
commerce." 119
At a general level, the desire to preserve public access to information in
the public domain has figured prominently in the debate regarding the
protection of cultural rights of indigenous people. °20  Allowing indigenous
communities to maintain a shroud of secrecy with regard to the use of
certain cultural items, it has been argued, would be an affront to the
cherished "political ideals of liberal democracy."' 2' There is also a concern
that enabling those communities to recover items already in the possession
[t]he primary purpose of most branches of the IP system (excluding trademarks and
geographical indications) is to promote and protect human intellectual creativity and
innovation. IP law and policy does so by striking a careful balance between the rights
and interests of innovators and creators, on the one hand, and of the public at large, on the
other. Thus, by granting exclusive rights in an invention, for example, the IP system
encourages further innovation, rewards creative effort, and protects the (often substantial)
investment necessary to make and commercialize the invention. The patent system also
encourages people to disclose inventions, rather than retain them as trade secrets, thus
enriching the store of publicly-available knowledge and promoting further innovation by
other inventors. Thus, public dissemination of information is an important IP objective.
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY NEEDS, supra note 1, at 32.
118. U.S. CONST. art. I.
119. Sony Corp. of America v. Universal Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984).
120. Brown, supra note 75, at 195.
121. As Brown explains,
In the United States, secrecy has long been regarded as inherently inimical to democratic
process and to personal freedom. There are, of course, circumstances in which secrecy is
warranted: in matters of national security, in deliberations on sensitive administrative or
legislative matters, in certain kinds of law-enforcement activities, and so forth. We also
recognize that institutionalized secrecy nearly always leads to abuses of power. For this
reason, we have implemented a wide range of "sunshine laws" that require government
officials to conduct deliberations in public and to make administrative documents
available to citizens on demand. There is also a strong presumption that once
information enters the public domain, it should stay there. Secrecy, in other words, is
inherently threatening to democratic process and to the public good except in a sharply
circumscribed range of situations. We demand that our educational, religious, and
political institutions practice openness whenever possible. Although archives routinely
impose restrictions on access-when, for instance, they abide by a donor's request that
documents be closed to researchers for a stated period, usually to protect the privacy of
living individuals-I know of no cases in which U.S. public repositories deny access to
archived materials on the basis of a potential user's ethnicity, gender, age, or religious




of museums would impede use of material now subject to general
exploitation. As one commentator has put it, "removal of information from
the public domain in response to the demands of third parties asserting a
right to determine when, where, and by whom this information is accessed..
. conflict[s] directly with the majority's commitment to the sacredness of
public knowledge."' 2
However, these arguments appear to overlook the significant role
secrecy plays in traditional societies, especially in maintaining the integrity
of traditional institutions 123  and protecting "rituals and customs from
external forces."' 124 With reference to western practices, it has been argued
that liberal democratic societies should "be able in good conscience to
acknowledge the appropriateness of secrecy in certain limited contexts
without undermining their basic governing principles."'' 2 5  The accepted
justification for secrecy in the context of national security,"' it is contended,
is equally applicable to traditional knowledge since "secrecy is also essential
in maintaining a certain structure within indigenous societies, and thus some
semblance of continuity and stability in the evolution of an indigenous
culture, [and therefore, is] a security measure."'127 Moreover, situating the
debate regarding the protection of traditional knowledge in terms of rights of
private property and absolute rights of access may be subject to challenge as
being unduly narrow in scope and reflective of an essentially Eurocentric
perspective without regard to equally important relationships that traditional
communities have in their traditional knowledge such as trust and
obligations to relatives and ancestors. 12 8  In any event, a rigid dichotomy
122. Id.
123. Elizabeth A. Brandt, On Secrecy and the Control of Knowledge: Taos Pueblo, in SECRECY:
A CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVE 123-146 (Stanton K. Tefft ed., 1980).
124. According to Harding,
Many indigenous peoples consider certain objects, as well as certain knowledge, limited
goods that cannot be shared and disseminated without a corresponding loss in power,
significance, and meaning. Thus, certain objects and information must remain concealed
from the uninitiated either within or outside the cultural group. In this sense, secrecy is
an integral part of the sacredness of certain objects, stories, songs or rituals, and as such,
instrumental in maintaining a certain social structure within the cultural group.
Additionally, secrecy helps protect rituals and customs from destructive external forces.
It is a defensive tactic aimed at preventing such things as the "Smoki snake dance," a
New Age parody of a Hopi ritual.
Sarah Harding, Value, Obligation and Cultural Heritage, 31 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 291, 313-14 (1999).
125. Id. at 314.
126. See Brown, supra note 75, at 198.
127. Harding, supra note 124, at 314-15.
128. As Professor Coombe explains, "[p]eoples have other relationships to cultural forms-trust,
secrecy, guardianship, stewardship, initiation, sacralization-and obligations to relatives, ancestors,
spirits, and future generations which make models of access and ownership appear extremely
impoverished. Such knowledge is not adequately understood as information, nor may its circulation
be properly understood as speech." Rosemary J. Coombe, Michael F. Brown's Can Culture be
Copyrighted?, 39 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY 207, 208 (1998).
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between rights of property and right of access may be unwarranted even
under western norms. 1 29
2. Intellectual Property Rights
Besides the expiration of intellectual property rights, another reason
why a work would fall in the public domain is the author's failure to satisfy
the statutory formalities to protect the work in the first place.' 30 U.S. law
does not provide specifically for proprietary rights in traditional knowledge.
Although the similarities between intellectual property rights ("IPRs") and
traditional knowledge suggest the relevance of intellectual property for
tackling the misappropriation of traditional knowledge, as a practical matter,
it may be difficult to protect traditional knowledge through IPRs due to
problems with fitting traditional knowledge into "certain accepted notions of
intellectual property relating to ownership, originality, duration, fixation,
inventiveness and uniqueness,"'' among others. This section elaborates on
some of the difficulties with the use in relation to traditional knowledge of
U.S. copyright, patent, and trademark law.
a. Copyright
In order to qualify for copyright protection under US. law, a work must
satisfy the requirements of originality, authorship and tangibility. 32 The
Supreme Court held that to satisfy the test of originality, the work must have
been independently created and not copied from other works. 3 3 Although
129. Professor Coombe further notes that "Western notions of property are themselves not nearly
as narrow as this dichotomy between exclusivity of possession and an unrestricted public commons
would suggest. Western juridical traditions recognize relations of trust (express and constructive),
fiduciary obligation, implicit license, breach of confidence, stewardship, and local observances of
negotiated customs and ethics." Id.
130. Lolly Gasaway, When US. Works Pass Into the Public Domain, http://www.unc.edul
-unclng /public-d.htm (last visited Mar. 12, 2006).
131. See Kuruk, supra note 29, at 793.
132. As provided in the Copyright Act, "[c]opyright protection subsists, in accordance with this
title, in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later
developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either
directly or with the aid of a machine or device." 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000) (emphasis added).
133. In the opinion of the Court,
The sine qua non of copyright is originality. To qualify for copyright protection, a work
must be original to the author ... Original, as the term is used in copyright, means only
that the work was independently created by the author (as opposed to copied from other
works) and that it possesses at least some minimal degree of creativity.
Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991).
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absolute novelty is not required, 134 the work must demonstrate the unique
thought, skill or labor of the artist.'35 Significantly, works based on pre-
existing work do not necessarily fall out of the ambit of the copyright law, as
they may qualify for protection as derivative works 13 6 to the extent they
demonstrate substantial but not trivial improvements. 37
Regarding the authorship requirement, the Copyright Act provides that
copyright in a work "vests initially in the author or authors of the work" and
that "the authors of a joint work are coowners of copyright in the work."'138
The term "author" has been defined as "he to whom anything owes its
origin; originator; maker"'' 39 and except for joint applications, is taken to
refer to individuals but not groups.140  As to the third requirement
conceming tangibility, protected works must be "fixed in any tangible
medium of expression"' 41 which for practical purposes, involves recording
or reducing works to writing. 1
42
The manner in which traditional knowledge is developed prevents it
from satisfying these copyright criteria. Because traditional knowledge has
evolved slowly through many generations of people who have continually
modified it as they adapted it to suit their needs, it will be difficult to
establish the "independent efforts" of a creator to justify copyright
protection since a work of traditional knowledge invariably would have been
built upon and be substantially similar to existing works of traditional
134. Alfred v. Bell & Co., 191 F.2d 99, 102 (1951).
135. L. Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486, 491 (2d Cir. 1976) (en banc).
136. Under the Copyright Act, a derivative work is defined as:
A work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a translation, musical
arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture version, sound recording, art
reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other form in which a work may be
recast, transformed, or adapted. A work consisting of editorial revisions, annotations,
elaborations, or other modifications which, as a whole, represent an original work of
authorship, is a "derivative work."
17 USC § 101 (2000).
137. Eden Toys, Inc. v. Florelee Undergarment Co., 697 F.2d 27, 34 (2d Cir. 1982); Chamberlin
v. Uris Sales Corp., 150 F.2d 512, 513 (2d Cir. 1945).
138. Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (2000).
139. Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 58 (1884).
140. As one commentator observes, "our laws of intellectual property are rooted in the century-
long reconceptualization of the creative process which culminated in high Romantic
pronouncements like Wordsworth's to the effect that this process ought to be solitary, or individual,
and introduce 'a new element into the intellectual universe."' Martha Woodmanse, On the Author
Effect: Recovering Collectivity, 10 CARDOZo ARTS & ENT. L.J 279, 291 (1992).
141. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000).
142. Apparently, this condition for copyright protection is derived from the constitutional
requirement that Congress protect only "writings." Under the Constitution, Congress is authorized
to "promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8,
cl. 8. Generally, the courts have taken the position that for a work to constitute a "writing," it must
be embodied in some tangible form. 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.08.
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knowledge. 143  In addition, the copyright statute's emphasis on individual
rights is equally problematic since traditional knowledge focuses on
communal rather than individual rights.'44 Furthermore, given the passage
of traditional knowledge through generations of people in the community,
identifying an author of the work for purposes of copyright protection can
prove to be a daunting task. While an item of traditional knowledge may
have resulted from the creative efforts of one individual, it eventually would
have been acquired and used by the society at large 145 and gradually, with
the passage of time, lost its individualistic traits. 146
Although the concept of "joint work" assures copyright protection to co-
owners, it is not amenable to the protection of works of indigenous groups.
Under the copyright statute, the term "joint work" refers to "a work prepared
by two or more authors with the intention that their contributions be merged
into inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole."' 147 As applied
to items of traditional knowledge, there is the obvious problem of
identifying all indigenous people who may have contributed over the years
to those forms of traditional knowledge. Moreover, since these indigenous
contributors lived at various times during the development, modification and
adaptation of the relevant item of traditional knowledge, it is clearly absurd
to talk of them having an intent at one fixed point in time to create a joint
product as required by the Copyright Act. Finally, to the extent the fixation
requirement protects the form of the expression rather than the expression
itself, it disqualifies categories of traditional knowledge 48 which for the
143. See Farley, supra note 58, at 22.
144. For instance, Ghanaian legislation defines folklore as "all literary, artistic and scientific work
belonging to the cultural heritage of Ghana which were created, preserved and developed by ethnic
communities of Ghana or by unidentified Ghanaian authors, and any such works designated under
this Law to be works of Ghanaian folklore." Copyright Law (Ghana) § 53 (Mar. 21, 1985),
reprinted in 21 COPYRIGHT: MONTHLY REV. WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG. 423,435 (1985).
145. See Mamie Harmon, Definitions of Folklore, in FUNK AND WAGNALL'S STANDARD
DICTIONARY OF FOLKLORE, 258-59 (Maria Leach ed., 1959) [hereinafter DICTIONARY OF
FOLKLORE].
146. As has been noted, "all aspects of [traditional knowledge], probably originally the product of
individuals, [we]re taken by the folk and put through a process of re-creation, which through
constant variations and repetition become a group product." MacEdward Leach, Definitions of
Folklore, in DICTIONARY OF FOLKLORE, supra note 145, at 261.
147. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
148. Although technically indigenous groups could seek to protect traditional knowledge by
recording or otherwise reducing it into writing, that would constitute a marked departure from oral
tradition as the principal method of transmitting knowledge and also as "the very essence of Native
life." Angela R. Riley, Recovering Collectivity: Group Rights to Intellectual Property in Indigenous
Communities. 18 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 175, 195 (2000). For some forms of traditional
knowledge such as languages, it would prove a daunting task to reduce them to writing. Even where
this is possible in other cases, fixation could be fraught with undesirable consequences of translation,
most part are expressed orally and rarely are reduced to writing by
traditional groups.
b. Patents
Under the Patent Act, inventions are patentable if they are novel,
useful 149 and nonobvious. 150 The Act exempts from patent protection all
products of nature, printed matter, mathematical formulae and business
methods. 5' Regarding the first requirement of novelty, it is provided that an
invention must not have been "known or used by others"'112 or "patented or
described in a printed publication.., more than one year prior to the date of
the application for patent in the United States."'5 Furthermore, a patent
application is to be rejected where before the applicant's "invention thereof,
the invention was made in [the United States] by another inventor who had
not abandoned, suppressed, or concealed it.' 54 The utility criterion requires
the invention to be of some benefit qualitatively although no particular
quantum of benefit is required.' 55 Thus, knowledge itself is not patentable,
but useful products and processes are.
With respect to the third requirement of nonobviousness, a patent
application is to be rejected
if the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented
and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole, would
have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person
having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter
pertains. 15
6
interpretation and distortion. As Riley notes:
(M]any indigenous languages have never been recorded in print. This was often done to
maintain the secrecy of the language's vibrance as a means of insulating the group from
increased prejudice and violence. Thus, unwritten Indian languages would have to be
transcribed in a written form, then most likely, translated into the language of the
colonizer.
In reality, many Native peoples reject the written model altogether, contending that the
written form simply cannot capture the nuances of a spoken text. These stories often defy
being "captured" in one form. Leaders in the American Indian Movement ("AIM") have
spoken out against the discrimination and "mainstreaming" of Indian cultures, arguing
such practices diffuse and weaken ancient traditions.
Id. at 196-97.
149. Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1984).
150. Id. § 103.
151. Id. § 101.
152. Id. § 102.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. See Anderson v. Attah, 480 F. 2d 1392, 1395 (C.C.P.A. 1973).
156. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2000). In Graham v. Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1966), the United
States Supreme Court explained the standard for determining non-obviousness with reference to the
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In addition, the exclusion based on the product of nature doctrine prohibits
patents for discoveries except for new processes developed following such
discovery. 15 7 Under the doctrine, unless "a product which is the subject of a
patent application is substantially different from the product as found in
nature, that is, unless it is in a form not found in nature and thus the product
of human invention, the product is unpatentable." 
158
As they relate to the novelty requirement and for reasons noted earlier,
the collective nature of traditional knowledge and its mode of transmission
will frustrate efforts to identify an individual inventor who can claim to have
first invented a particular indigenous product or process. Besides, the mere
common knowledge and use of the invention by members of the indigenous
group will invalidate it as a patent on grounds of "prior publication" and
"public use."' 5 9 Furthermore, many types of traditional knowledge may not
prior art as follows:
Under § 103, the scope and content of the prior art are to be determined; differences
between the prior art and the claims at issue are to be ascertained; and the level of
ordinary skill in the pertinent art resolved. Against this background, the obviousness or
nonobviousness of the subject matter is determined. Such secondary considerations as
commercial success, long felt but unsolved needs, failure of others [to make the
invention], etc., might be utilized to give light to the circumstances surrounding the origin
of the subject matter sought to be patented. As indicia of obviousness or
nonobviousness, these inquiries may have relevancy.
157. For example, in Dennis v. Pitner, 106 F.2d 142, 146 (7th Cir. 1939), the Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit held an insecticide not to be barred from protection as a product of nature
where the insecticide was produced by grinding certain roots, dissolving the powdered matter in a
solvent, and then filtering the solvent to remove the fibrous parts of the root, leaving a concentrated
powdered extract. In that case, the court noted that the "discovery in the field of science of a new
quality or phenomenon of an old product may be ... the proper subject of a patent."
In Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Innoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127 (1948), the United States
Supreme Court denied patent protection for mixtures of several strains of Rhizobia on grounds that
they constituted works of nature. At that time the strains were generally recognized as having an
inoculant effect on certain plants but could only be packaged separately to avoid the inhibitory effect
they had on each other. Discovering that certain strains were mutually non-inhibitive, the patentee
mixed them together and sought patent protection for the mixtures. However, the Supreme Court
disallowed the patent on the grounds that "patents cannot issue for the discovery of the phenomena
of nature.... The qualities of these bacteria. . . are part of the storehouse of knowledge of all men."
Id. at 130 (citation omitted). While the Court observed that patent protection would be granted for
new uses of products of nature, it held that the mixtures were not patentable because they had no
new use beyond the prior art other than providing more convenient packaging.
158. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, BIOTECHNOLOGY, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, AND INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS 48 (1993).
159. Interestingly, while the requirement of novelty operates to bar patent protection of traditional
knowledge, it could be used by the indigenous communities to bar others from obtaining patents in
aspects of traditional knowledge. Thus, in the Dennis v. Pitner case, the court invalidated a patent
for the use of powdered root because of prior study of the root by scientists, and its use by Chinese
gardeners as an insecticide, and by the inhabitants of Peru for fishing. See generally Dennis v.
Pitner, 106 F.2d 142.
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pass muster under the tests of utility that incorporate western, but not
traditional, standards. 60  Moreover, the product of nature doctrine is also
problematic to the extent it suggests that the use by indigenous people of
items of traditional knowledge in their natural state alone is not sufficient for
purposes of patent protection. 161 Since indigenous people may find it
difficult to come up with new uses for aspects of traditional knowledge, they
are not likely to be given patents for much of their traditional knowledge
which as products of nature will continue to fall outside the realm of
patentable inventions.
c. Trademarks
The Lanham Act provides that "[n]o trademark by which the goods of
the applicant may be distinguished from the goods of others shall be refused
registration."1 62 In this context, a trademark must be distinctive to serve its
function of identifying the origin of goods and thereby avoid confusion,
deception or mistake. For some types of traditional knowledge, such as art
and craft, it may be possible to label them with marks that qualify for
registration under the trademark statute and thereby distinguish them as
coming from a particular indigenous group. Indeed, the certification
procedure established under the Native American Arts and Crafts Act
163
assumes the feasibility of distinguishing genuine and authentic creations of
indigenous communities from other products that may be falsely represented
as Indian made. In this sense, trademark protection for Native American
goods could help solve problems of misrepresentation regarding indigenous
products, although it may not be of practical economic benefit to indigenous
communities in the absence of strong proof that consumers will refuse to
buy fake products in preference for trademarked indigenous goods.
160. To the extent they are commercially useful, biological resources of traditional communities
could satisfy the utility requirement under U.S. law. Gelvina Rodriguez Stevenson, Note, Trade
Secrets: The Secret to Protecting Indigenous Ethnobiological (Medicinal) Knowledge, 32 N.Y.U. J.
INT'L L. & POL. 1119, 1143 (2000). For instance, traditional knowledge used in the development of
pharmaceutical products and processes later patented could be said to have proven utility. Id. at
1144. But this may not be true for other types of traditional knowledge, such as rituals and potions
which may not have captured the same degree of interest from biotechnology companies and
scientists. Id. at 1143. While indigenous peoples no doubt consider traditional knowledge to be
very useful, their views are generally not taken into account to the extent the determination of utility
by the patent office is guided by western standards. Id.
161. Under the doctrine, alterations of the plant by boiling or other processing to produce a
medicinal substance could improve its chances of protection, as the resulting product could then be
recognized as a new composition obtained from a product of nature using knowledge of the laws of
nature.
162. 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (2000) (emphasis added).
163. 35 U.S.C. § 305 (2000).
654
[Vol. 34: 629, 2007] Goading a Reluctant Dinosaur
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
d. Duration and Costs
In addition to the specific problems discussed above, the following more
general problems regarding duration and costs should be noted. To begin
with, intellectual property law offers protection for limited periods only.
The general copyright term is seventy years after the death of the author,' 1
and twenty years for patents, 165 while trademarks are subject to renewable
ten year terms. 166 It will be difficult to protect traditional knowledge under
these statutory periods not only because of the problem of identifying an
author by whose life the relevant term would be measured, but, more
fundamentally, the reality that such finite periods are ill-suited for traditional
knowledge. As a rule, this knowledge has been passed down for centuries
through generations, and is therefore of unlimited duration. Moreover,
intellectual property rights are expensive to obtain and the costs of
enforcement are high as well. Long and costly administrative and judicial
procedures would render the intellectual property rights option unattractive
for many indigenous people. 1
67
B. Freedom of Religion and Free Speech
1. Free Exercise Clause
The First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution forbids Congress from
making laws "respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof."'168 The latter part of this provision, often referred to as the
Free Exercise Clause, has been invoked frequently by Native Americans in
an effort to protect various cultural interests' 69 including access to sacred
sites, 170 use of peyote, 171 use of protected species for religious purposes,
172
164. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2000).
165. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2000).
166. Id. § 1059.
167. For example, the average cost of about S20,000 in the U.S. to prepare and prosecute a patent
application, including legal and filing fees, is well beyond the means of many local communities.
UNCTAD/ICTSD, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT: POLICY DIscusSION
PAPER 53 (2001) [hereinafter INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT].
168. U.S. CONST. amend. I (emphasis added).
169. See generally Sharon L. O'Brien, Freedom of Religion in Indian Country, 56 MONT. L. REV.
451 (1995).
170. See, e.g., Badoni v. Higginson, 638 F.2d 172 (10th Cir. 1980) (refusing to protect sacred site
from adverse effects of dam construction because the court found the government's compelling
interest in the federal land construction to be superior to Native Americans' interests).
171. See, e.g., Peyote Way Church of God, Inc. v. Thomburgh, 922 F.2d 1210, 1217 (5th Cir.
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and prisoners' rights to engage in religious practices. 173 To succeed in an
action based on the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, however,
Native American plaintiffs must establish: first, that the restricted practice is
religious in nature; second, that the challenged government action burdens
the practice; and third, that there is no compelling government interest
justifying the action.174 The need to demonstrate that the practice allegedly
burdened is central or indispensable to their religion 175 has proven to be
particularly troubling for the Native American litigants to the extent the
courts tended to apply the test in a discriminatory manner 176 and ignored the
holistic philosophy of native practices where religion, culture, spirituality,
history, and tradition are all intertwined.
One area where this disconnect is readily apparent has been the failure
of the courts to appreciate the inextricable link between land and native
religion. 77 For example, in Sequoyah v. Tennessee Valley Authority,7 the
1991). See generally Ann E. Beeson, Dances with Justice: Peyotism in the Courts, 41 EMORY L.J.
1121 (1992); John Thomas Bannon, Jr., The Legality of the Religious Use of Peyote by the Native
American Church: A Commentary on the Free exercise, Equal Protection, and Establishment Issues
Raised by the Peyote Way Church of God Case, 22 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 475 (1998).
172. See, e.g., United States v. Dion, 762 F.2d 674, 679-80 (8th Cir. 1985); United States v. Top
Sky, 547 F.2d 483, 488 (9th Cir. 1976) (per curiam); United States v. Abeyta, 632 F. Supp. 1301,
1307 (D.N.M. 1986).
173. See Pollock v. Marshall, 845 F.2d 656 (6th Cir. 1988).
174. See Sherbert v. Vemer, 374 U.S. 398, 403, 406 (1963); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205
(1972).
175. See Mary Christina Wood, Protecting the Attributes of Native Sovereignty: A New Trust
Paradigm for Federal Actions Affecting Tribal Lands and Resources, 1995 UTAH L. REV. 109, 208
(1995).
176. Regarding inconsistent application of the standards, it has been noted that:
In the sacred-site cases however, the substantial burden standard was heightened. Courts
required Native Americans to come forward with factual proof that the sites were central
and indispensable to their religions, that is, that their religions would not be practiced
without them. However, as applied to Western religions, the centrality test had been
rejected and claimants were protected from even indirect burdens on their religious
practices.
Anastasia P. Winslow, Sacred Standards: Honoring the Establishment Clause in Protecting Native
American Sacred Sites, 38 ARIz. L. REV. 1291, 1313 (1996).
177. One commentator explains the significance of land to the religious concepts of tribal
communities as follows:
Traditional Native American religious practices are inseparably bound to natural land
formations. According to Native Americans, spirits, which function as the medium
between Native Americans and the Great Spirit, dwell within natural resources. Native
Americans consider sites where spirits most often reveal themselves to be sacred and, for
this reason, utilize the sites for religious ceremonies.
The efficacy of Native American worship depends on the physical conditions of a sacred
site's natural environment. Acts such as logging trees, altering the terrain, building new
roads, and the presence of tourists and vandals damage the sacred nature of a site and
negatively impact the Native American religion. Accordingly, the destruction or
degrading of sacred ground is believed to cause the death and disappearance of spirits.
Once the sacred site is destroyed, there is no alternate place of worship because a
different sacred site cannot be substituted.
Shawna Lee, Note, Government Managed Shrines: Protection of Native American Sacred Site
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Sixth Circuit rejected a First Amendment claim by members of the Cherokee
Indian Nation 79 to enjoin completion of the Tellico Dam on the Little
Tennessee River on grounds that the dam would flood their "sacred
homeland" and destroy "sacred sites, medicine gathering sites, holy places
and cemeteries, [and] will disturb the sacred balance of the land." 80 The
Sixth Circuit determined the claims not to be protected under the First
Amendment because they related to "cultural history and tradition" rather
than religion."'8 Similarly, in Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective
Ass'n, 182 after noting that the First Amendment only protected against
government actions which coerce an individual into violating religious
beliefs, the Supreme Court went on to hold that a Forest Service timber
harvest project, which damaged tribal sacred sites and would "'virtually
destroy the... Indians' ability to practice their religion,"' could go forward
because it did not punish the Indians for practicing their religion. 83
Worship, 35 VAL. U. L. REV. 265, 267-68 (2000).
178. 620 F.2d 1159 (6th Cir. 1980).
179. The plaintiffs stated their claim of a constitutional violation based on the Free Exercise
clause as follows: "[T]he individual named Plaintiffs will suffer injury by the infringement of their
right to worship the religion of their choice in the manner of their choosing by the destruction of
sites which they hold in reverence and in denial of access to such sites by the Defendant." Id. at
1160.
180. Id.
181. In the words of the court,
When the affidavits are... indulgently treated" . . . at most they establish a feeling by
the individual affiants that the general location of the dam and impoundment has a
religious significance which will be destroyed by the flooding. The claim of centrality of
the Valley to the practice of the traditional Cherokee religion, as required by Yoder,
Woody and Frank, is missing from this case. The overwhelming concern of the affiants
appears to be related to the historical beginnings of the Cherokees and their cultural
development. It is damage to tribal and family folklore and traditions, more than
particular religious observances, which appears to be at stake. The complaint asserts an
"irreversible loss to the culture and history of the plaintiffs." Though cultural history and
tradition are vitally important to any group of people, these are not interests protected by
the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.
Id. at 1164-65 (citation omitted).
182. 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
183. In that case, various organizations and individuals had contested the Forest Service's plans to
permit timber harvesting and road construction in part of a national forest that traditionally was used
by Native Americans for religious rituals that depend upon privacy, silence, and an undisturbed
natural setting. The plaintiffs had argued that
disruption of the natural environment caused by the [road construction would] diminish
the sacredness of the area in question and create distractions that will interfere with
"training and ongoing religious experience of individuals using [sites within] the area for
personal medicine and growth ... as integrated parts of a system of religious beliefts]
and practice which correlates ascending degrees of personal power with a geographic
hierarchy of power."
Id. at 448.
2. The Establishment Clause
The First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution also contains the
Establishment Clause, 184 which prohibits the government from designating a
national or state church or giving preference to a particular religion or to
religion in general. Although aimed at ensuring the equality of all religions
and the freedom of each citizen from government imposed religion, the
Establishment Clause does not require total separation of the government
and permits governmental action designed to accommodate the public
religious needs of citizens.' 8' Under the test articulated in Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 186 "a government action violates the Establishment Clause unless
(1) it has a secular purpose; (2) its principal effect neither advances nor
inhibits religion; and (3) it does not foster an 'excessive government
entanglement with religion. ,,187
However, despite acknowledging the harmful effects of the timber harvest and road construction, the
Supreme Court went on to hold that the relief sought was unavailable under the Constitution:
Even if we assume that [road construction] will "virtually destroy the ... Indians' ability
to practice their religion," the Constitution simply does not provide a principle that could
justify upholding respondents' legal claims. However much we might wish that it were
otherwise, government simply could not operate if it were required to satisfy every
citizen's religious needs and desires. A broad range of government activities-from
social welfare programs to foreign aid to conservation projects-will always be
considered essential to the spiritual well-being of some citizens, often on the basis of
sincerely held religious beliefs. Others will find the very same activities deeply
offensive, and perhaps incompatible with their own search for spiritual fulfillment and
with the tenets of their religion. The First Amendment must apply to all citizens alike,
and it can give to none of them a veto over public programs that do not prohibit the free
exercise of religion. The Constitution does not, and courts cannot, offer to reconcile the
various competing demands on government, many of them rooted in sincere religious
belief, that inevitably arise in so diverse a society as ours. That task, to the extent that it
is feasible, is for the legislatures and other institutions.
Id. at 451-52 (citations omitted).
184. The First Amendment provides that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof .. " U.S. CONST. amend I.
185. Thus, in the early case of Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952), it was held that the
government had to respect the religious nature of citizens and to accommodate their public needs.
More recently, in Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703, 711 (1985) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring), the Supreme Court mandated the accommodation of religious practices so long as it did
not impose an undue hardship.
186. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
187. Lydia T. Grimm, Sacred Lands and the Establishment Clause: Indian Religious Practices on
Federal Lands, 12 NAT. RESOURCES & ENVT'L 19, 21 (1997) (quoting Lemon, 403 U.S. at 613).
The requirement of a "secular purpose" under the first prong can be satisfied by government policies
which seek to serve the goal of accommodation. The second prong, the so-called "coercion test," is
concerned with "whether or not the accommodation [of religion] has the effect of coercing persons
into conforming their practices with those of a particular religion." Id. Applying the coercion test,
the Supreme Court has found a prayer read by a chaplain at the beginning of a state legislature
session not to violate the Establishment Clause, Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 786-95 (1983),
but found a violation in connection with prayer read at a state-sponsored high school graduation
ceremony. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 596-99 (1992).
The third approach, the so-called "endorsement test," is said to proscribe government actions
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Native Americans have invoked the Establishment Clause to defend
governmental policies that positively impact indigenous religious practices.
This use of the Establishment Clause is illustrated by the procedural history
in Bear Lodge Multiple Use Ass 'n v. Babbitt,'8 8 where a federal district court
rejected a challenge by professional climbers of a June voluntary ban
imposed under a National Park Service Final Climbing Management Plan
("FCMP") out of deference to Native American religious practices. 89
However, like the Exercise Clause, reliance by Native Americans on the
Establishment Clause to protect their religious practices has also proved to
be quite a challenge, particularly with respect to the standard of neutrality
which is noted to be "difficult... to adhere to when the accommodation is
for specific Indian sacred sites and practices on federal land."
1 90
which send messages "to nonadherents that they are outsiders," and "to adherents that they are
insiders." Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 69 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring). Aimed at limiting
government support of religions, the third prong has been interpreted to invalidate "only those
governmental acts that actively promote or advantage particular religious organizations or politically
privilege a particular set of religious beliefs." Cross & Brenneman, supra note 36, at 33 (1997).
188. 2 F. Supp. 2d 1448 (D. Wyo. 1998).
189. The district court determined the ban to be an accommodation with a secular purpose. Id. at
1455. Although the court found the objective of the FCMP to be the removal of barriers to the
Native Americans' right to worship given that their sacred land was on government property, and
that the purpose of the plan was therefore related to religion, it held nevertheless that the real
purpose of the ban was to accommodate rather than advance or promote religion. Id. at 1454-55.
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit dismissed the professional climbers' challenge on grounds that
the appellants suffered no injury in fact and therefore lacked standing. Bear Lodge Multiple Use
Ass'n v. Babbitt, 175 F. 3d 814, 822 (10th Cir. 1999). The Tenth Circuit case is very important
because it recognized the significance of native sacred sites and endorsed the application of the
accommodation principle to Native American claims. For example, at the beginning of its opinion,
the Circuit Court referred to Devil Tower as "the place of creation and religious practice for many
American Indians." Id. at 815. It noted further that the Tower was a "'sacred site' to indigenous
peoples of the northern plains who travel to the monument to perform 'traditional cultural
activities'.. . . [However in] recent years, the Tower has been increasingly used by recreational and
commercial rock climbers. Devils' Tower, therefore, implicates interests of several American Indian
tribes .... Id. at 816. Later, the court also referred to the Tower as "central to [the Indians']
etiological explanation of the universe" and its prominence "in other religiously relevant traditional
stories of the Sioux [Indian tribe], as well in the cosmology of numerous other northern plains
tribes." Id. Furthermore, the court noted the importance of the Tower as a pilgrimage site where
important liturgical functions are performed, including Sun Dances and Vision Quests. It pointed
out that:
The Sun Dance is a group ceremony of fasting and sacrifice which leads to spiritual renewal of
the individual and group as a whole. Sun Dances are performed around the summer solstice. Vision
Quests are intense periods of prayer, fasting, sweat lodge purification, and solitude designed to
connect with the spiritual world and gain insight. Sun Dances and Vision Quests, as well as
individualized prayer offerings and sweat lodge ceremonies, require solemnity and solitude.
Id.
Significantly, certiorari to the Supreme Court was denied in March 2000, further enhancing the
precedential value of the case. Bear Lodge Multiple Use Ass'n v. Babbitt, 529 U.S. 1037 (2000).
190. Grimm, supra note 187, at 21.
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3. Freedom of Religion
To clarify the scope of the constitutional right of Native Americans to
practice their religion, Congress passed the American Indian Religious
Freedom Act 191 ("AIRFA") in 1978 to
protect and preserve for American Indians their inherent right of
freedom to believe, express, and exercise the traditional religions of
the American Indian, Eskimo, Aleut, and Native Hawaiians,
including but not limited to access to sites, use and possession of
sacred objects, and the freedom to worship through ceremonials and
traditional rites. 1
92
Hoping to use the statute to improve their religious interests in land and
related resources, Native Americans have brought lawsuits under AIRFA to
tackle matters as diverse as water quality standards,' 93 access to religious
sites, 194 mining of uranium on sacred lands, 95 development of ski resorts on
sacred lands, 196 and restrictions of tourist traffic levels on sacred lands.' 97
These efforts, for the most part, failed, with courts frequently taking the
position that the AIRFA created no independent cause of action, but merely
recommended consultations between Indian leaders and federal agencies
where proposed government projects could impact religious practices. 9 8
For example, affirming the view of the lower courts, the Supreme Court in
1988 stated quite categorically in Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery
Protective Ass 'n, that "[n]owhere in [AIRFA] is there so much as a hint of
any intent to create a cause of action or any judicially enforceable individual
rights."' 99 As further noted in Conservation Law Foundation v. Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission,0 0 under AIRFA, "[f]ederal agencies are to
consider, 'but not necessarily to defer to, Indian religious values.' 20 ' Thus,
contrary to stated broad policy, AIRFA has not been applied in a manner
conducive to an effective protection of Indian religious practices.
191. 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (1978).
192. Id.
193. See City of Albuquerque v. Browner, 97 F.3d 415, 428 (10th Cir. 1996).
194. Attakai v. United States, 746 F. Supp. 1395, 1403-05 (D. Ariz. 1990).
195. Havasupai Tribe v. United States, 752 F. Supp. 1471, 1487 (D. Ariz. 1990).
196. Wilson v. Block, 708 F.2d 735, 745 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
197. Badoni v. Higginson, 638 F.2d 172, 180 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 954 (1981).
198. See, e.g., Lockhart v. Kenops, 927 F.2d 1028, 1036 (8th Cir. 1991).
199. 485 U.S. 439, 455 (1988).
200. 216 F.3d 41, 50 (D.C. Cir. 2000). It was held in this case that the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (FERC) did not violate AIRFA when it chose not to increase stream flows that may
have enabled tribal members of the Penobscot Indian Nation to access religious sites by canoe. Id.
201. Id. at 50 (citing Wilson v. Block, 708 F.2d 735, 747 (D.C. Cir. 1983)).
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4. Trademark Law and Free Speech
Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act provides that a mark is to be refused
registration if it "[c]onsists of or comprises immoral, deceptive, or
scandalous matter; or matter which may disparage or falsely suggest a
connection with persons, living or dead, institutions, beliefs, or national
symbols, or bring them into contempt, or disrepute .... , 20 2  In their bid to
curb the widespread commercial use of Indian imagery,2 0 3 Native Americans
have filed lawsuits under this provision seeking to revoke registration of
marks considered to be offensive, derogatory, and racially discriminatory.
0 4
Typically, the defendants in these trademark actions opposed the relief
sought on the ground, inter alia, that trademarks are constitutionally
protected free speech 20 5 which could not be revoked as urged by the Native
American activists.20 6 While the U.S. Supreme Court has held trademarks to
constitute commercial speech2 0 7 entitled only to limited protection under the
First Amendment,20 8  no court has addressed substantively the
constitutionality of Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act.20 9 In trademark actions
202. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (2000).
203. Paul E. Loving, Native American Team Names in Athletics: It's Time to Trade These Marks,
13 LoY. L.A. ENT. L. REv. 1, 14-16 (1992); Kristin E. Berendt, Cancellation of the Washington
Redskins' Federal Trademark Registrations: Should Sports Team Names, Mascots and Logos
Contain Native American Symbolism?, 10 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 389, 392-98 (2000).
204. For example, in 1992 a group of Native Americans filed a petition before the Trademark
Trial and Appeal Board of the Patent and Trademark Office to cancel the federal registration of the
Washington Redskins trademark, and related trademarks registered in favor of Pro Football, Inc.
The group argued that the term "Redskins" is a "pejorative, derogatory, denigrating, offensive,
scandalous, contemptuous, disreputable, disparaging and racist designation for a Native American
person." Harjo v. Pro-Football, Inc., 50 U.S.P.Q.2d 1705 (T.T.A.B. 1999), rev'd by Pro-Football,
Inc. v. Harjo, 284 F. Supp. 2d 96, 145 (D.D.C. 2003), ajfd, 415 F.3d 44 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
205. The First Amendment provides in relevant part, "Congress shall make no law.., abridging
the freedom of speech." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
206. Harjo, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d 1705.
207. Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 11-13 (1979), reh "g denied, 441 U.S. 917 (1979).
208. Id. at 12-13.
209.In Haro, because the Board declined on jurisdictional grounds to rule on the issue, an
opportunity was lost to pronounce on the constitutionality of the section. The only case known to
have tackled the issue regarding the constitutionality of Section 2(a) was In re McGinley, 660 F.2d
481, 482 (C.C.P.A. 1981), where the Trademark Board refused registration of a mark comprised of a
photograph of a nude man and woman kissing and embracing in a manner appearing to expose the
male genitalia. On appeal, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals rejected the applicant's
argument that his First Amendment rights had been violated. Id. at 484. In the words of the court:
With respect to appellant's First Amendment rights, it is clear that the PTO's refusal to
register appellant's mark does not affect his right to use it. No conduct is proscribed and
no tangible form of expression is suppressed. Consequently, appellant's First
Amendment rights would not be abridged by the refusal to register his mark.
Id. at 484 (citations omitted).
involving use of Native American indigenous knowledge the courts have
tended to sidestep the constitutional arguments and ruled against Native
Americans on alternate grounds of laches and failure to prove
disparagement.
However, there are two general approaches against which scholars have
examined the constitutionality of Section 2(a): the commercial speech
balancing test and the unconstitutional conditions test. The commercial
speech balancing approach requires inter alia, that the government establish
a substantial interest in regulating free speech to survive a constitutional
challenge.211 In support of Native American claims, some commentators
have argued that the denial of trademark registration reflects a substantial
interest of the government in not stamping its approval or providing for
funding for the registration of trademarks deemed to be disparaging of
The McGinley decision has been criticized by commentators who have decried the court's
omission to "expound upon its conclusion." Bruce C. Kelber, "Scalping the Redskins: " Can
Trademark Law Start Athletic Teams Bearing Native American Nicknames and Images on the Road
to Racial Reform?, 17 HAMUNE L. REV. 533, 556 (1994). Such omission, it is argued, relegates the
decision to a blind precedent that does little to establish conclusively that discouraging owners from
using scandalous, immoral, or disparaging trademarks impinges upon First Amendment guarantees.
Stephen R. Baird, Moral Intervention in the Trademark Arena: Banning the Registration of
Scandalous and Immoral Trademarks, 83 TRADEMARK REP. 661, 684-87 (1993). On a more
substantive note, it is also observed:
The court in McGinley held that because the denial of registration of the applicant's mark
will not affect its use there could be no First Amendment violation. However, it is a
well-established principle of First Amendment jurisprudence that speech does not have to
be proscribed, but merely abridged, or sufficiently chilled, in order for there to be a
violation. "[A]n 'abridgment' may result from regulations that do not 'ban,' 'forbid,' or
'prohibit.' Instead, an 'abridgment' may result from regulations that merely 'restrict,'
'limit,' 'impinge, or burden.' Therefore, the analysis in McGinley is flawed, and cannot
be determinative of whether section 2(a) of the Lanham Act violates the First
Amendment."
Michelle B. Lee, Section 2(A) of the Lanham Act as a Restriction on Sports Team Names: Has
Political Correctness Gone Too Far?, 4 SPORTS L.J. 65, 66-67 (1997). Therefore, the McGinley
case does not provide a clear authoritative ruling on the constitutionality of Section 2(a).
210. After considering the evidence presented at trial, the Trademark and Trial Appeal Board on
April 2, 1999 ordered the cancellation of the Redskin trademark on the grounds that it disparaged
Native Americans. Harjo v. Pro-Football Inc., 50 U.S.P.Q.2d 1705, 1749 (T.T.A.B. 1999).
However, the Board's decision was reversed four years later by the U.S. District Court which held
the Board's finding of disparagement not to supported by the evidence and further, that the suit was
barred by laches. Pro-Football Inc. v. Harjo, 284 F. Supp. 2d 96, 145 (D.D.C. 2003). On appeal by
the petitioners, the Court of Appeal in April 2005 remanded the case back to the District Court on
the issue of laches. Pro-Football Inc. v. Harjo, 415 F.3d 44, 50 (D.C. Cir. 2005). In its ruling the
Court of Appeal noted that the defense of laches had to be assessed to one individual petitioner, and
could not be assessed from time that first mark was registered where petitioner had not yet reached
the age of majority at time of registration. Id.
211. The courts have developed a four-part balancing test for determining when commercial
speech would generally be protected under the First Amendment. See Central Hudson Gas & Elec.
Corp. v. Pub. Serv. ComA'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980). First, the speech must concern lawful
activity and not be misleading. Id. Second, the government must establish a substantial interest in
regulating the speech. Id. Third, the regulation must directly advance the governmental interest
asserted and fourth, the regulation must be no more extensive than necessary to serve the interest
asserted. Id.
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certain groups.212  Substantial interests can also be found in the
government's desire to avoid encouraging offensive speech by granting
exclusive ownership rights,2 13 or in the government's duty to protect health,
safety and the welfare of the public.214 A variant of the public health and
welfare interest in denying registration is related to the government's interest
in ensuring the cultural survival of Native Americans to the extent that the
undue exploitation of Native American symbols and mythology for products
and sports teams would relegate Native Americans to the status of
vanquished people and a vanished culture.215
Opponents discount these alleged governmental interests, pointing to
explicit statements by the courts that granting registration of a trademark is
not the same as the government's stamp of approval.2 16 On the matter of
funding, it is also pointed out that registration is not funded by the
government but rather by trademark holders. 217 Besides, to the extent every
government administrative action involves spending of funds, an interest in
prohibiting the use of public funds becomes unconvincing since it could be
used as justification for nearly every type of government regulation.2 18
Similarly, the concerns about encouraging exclusive ownership and also of
protecting the public health and welfare have been dismissed as circular
219
and weak,220 respectively.
212. Baird, supra note 209, at 674.
213. Stephen R. Baird, Review of the 1999 Trademark Decisions of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 49 AM. U. L. REv. 1321, 1334 (2000).
214. Id.
215. Terence Dougherty, Group Rights to Cultural Survival: Intellectual Property Rights in
Native American Cultural Symbols 29 COLUM. HUM. RTs L. REv. 355, 372 (1988).
216. See, e.g., In re Old Glory Condom Corp., 26 U.S.P.Q.2d 1216, 1220 n.3 (T.T.A.B. 1993).
217. See 37 C.F.R. § 2.206 (2005).
218. Jeffrey Lefstin, Does the First Amendment Bar Cancellation of Redskins?, 52 STAN. L. REv.
665 (2000).
219. Lefstin notes:
[The government interest in] prohibiting offensive marks from being the subject of
exclusive ownership, is obscure. There is no apparent reason why offensive marks are
less suitable for exclusive ownership than others; to the extent that exclusive ownership
restricts use of the mark in commerce, government might want to promote exclusive
ownership. Moreover, denial of exclusive ownership is merely the effect of the
challenged statute, section 2(a) of the Lanham Act. A statute cannot be justified solely
by asserting its effect as an important government interest. As the Supreme Court noted
in Simon & Schuster: ....
If accepted, this sort of circular defense can sidestep judicial review of almost any statute,
because it makes all statutes look narrowly tailored .... [S]uch an argument "eliminates
the entire inquiry concerning the validity of content-based discriminations. Every
content-based discrimination could be upheld by simply observing that the state is
anxious to regulate the designated category of speech.... Allowing the government to
assert "denial of exclusive ownership" as an interest supporting section 2(a) would
663
With respect to the unconstitutional conditions approach, the second
basis for attacking the Lanham Act, "the federal government may not make
the granting of a benefit contingent on the waiving of a constitutional
privilege. 22 1 With reference to free speech, the Supreme Court has offered
the following guideline as to when the doctrine is applicable:
[E]ven though a person has no "right" to a valuable governmental
benefit and even though the government may deny him the benefit
for any number of reasons, there are some reasons upon which the
government may not rely. It may not deny a benefit to a person on
a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected interests-
especially, his interest in freedom of speech. For if the government
could deny a benefit to a person because of his constitutionally
protected speech or associations, his exercise of those freedoms
would in effect be penalized and inhibited. This would allow the
government to "produce a result which [it] could not command
directly.222
Proponents of the view that Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act does not
violate the unconstitutional conditions doctrine point out that while the
statutory provision places restrictions on a potential applicant from
registering certain marks, federal registration is not a required condition for
use of the marks in commerce. They argue for instance, that trademark use
is not conditional upon registration, noting that by enacting Section 2(a),
Congress merely placed conditions "on a governmental program (system of
trademark registration), not the would-be recipient (trademark applicant) of
the program benefit (trademark registration)" who is "free to engage in the
protected conduct (adopting and using scandalous, immoral, and disparaging
trademarks). 2 23  In contrast, others have argued that while the denial of
registration of a trademark does not preclude use outright, such denial
"interferes with and discourages use of a mark to such an extent that it is
similarly eviscerate meaningful review under Central Hudson's second and third prongs.
Id. at 685 (citing Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Fischetti, 916 F.2d 777, 785 (2d Cir. 1990) (Newman, J.,
dissenting).
220. Lefstin finds this to be a "noble goal," but reiterates that "something more specific is required
to survive First Amendment scrutiny." Id. at 686.
221. Dougherty, supra note 215, at 384.
222. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972) (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513,
526 (1958)). Elaborating on this doctrine in Rust v. Sullivan, the Supreme Court noted the test to
involve situations where the "[g]ovemment has placed a condition on the recipient of the subsidy
rather than on the particular program or service, thus effectively prohibiting the recipient from
engaging in the protected conduct outside the scope of the federally funded program." 500 U.S 173,
197 (1991).
223. Baird, supra note 209, at 695.
664
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clearly a violation of the First Amendment. '224  These negative
consequences, evident even from the intent of parties seeking to cancel the
registration of trademarks, 22  are said to include the loss of significant
federal benefits.
2 26
Therefore, it emerges from the above analysis of the pertinent
constitutional issues that plausible arguments could be made under either the
unconstitutional conditions or commercial speech balancing tests to either
support or reject the free speech arguments raised in the context of the
Lanham Act. Given these mixed reviews, it is still unclear how far
constitutional arguments based on free speech may limit the usefulness of
Section 2(a) as an ally in the battle against unauthorized uses of Native
American names.
IV. PART THREE: UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL POLICY ON
TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE
A. International Obligations
The United States has ratified the Convention on Means of Prohibiting
and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Diversity of
Cultural Property of 1970 ("Illicit Trade Convention"), 227 the Convention
Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage
221
224. Lee, supra note 209, at 70.
225. As Lee notes,
The individuals who argue for the cancellation of the registration of team names have
said they want the registrations canceled so that the value of the trademarks will be so
dramatically reduced that the owners will voluntarily cancel the marks. Their own
statements blatantly recognize that even though cancellation of the registration of these
marks does not directly prohibit use, the cancellation is specifically intended to
discourage use, and that is an infringement.
Id. at 68-69.
226. The relevant federal benefits
include nationwide constructive notice, which allows a mark owner to enforce his mark
anywhere in the country regardless of how extensive or limited his use has been. It also
provides original jurisdiction in federal courts, prima facie evidence of the validity of a
mark, and incontestability of the mark once it has been registered for five years, but only
under particular circumstances.
Id. at 69.
227. Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and
Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property, Apr. 24, 1972, 823 U.N.T.S. 231 [hereinafter Illicit
Trade Convention].
228. UNESCO, Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage
(1972), available at http://whc.unesco.org/world-he.htm.
665
("World Heritage Convention"), as well as the World Intellectual Property
Organization's ("WIPO's") Performances and Phonograms Treaty
("WPPT"). However, it has not ratified other important international
instruments relevant to the protection of traditional knowledge, including the
Convention on Biological Diversity ("CBD"),22 9 the International Treaty on
Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture ("FAO Treaty"),23 ° and
the Convention for the Safeguarding of Intangible Cultural Heritage.231
Neither is the U.S. a party to the main regional instrument for the protection
of cultural heritage adopted by the Organization of American States, the
Convention on the Protection of the Archaeological, Historical and Artistic
Heritage of the American Nations.2 32
229. Convention on Biological Diversity art. 16(2), June 5, 1992, 1993 U.N.T.S. 143 [hereinafter
CBD]. The CBD, which was adopted under the auspices of the United Nations Environmental
Programme in 1992, requires signatory parties to
respect, preserve and maintain knowledge, innovations and practices of indigenous and
local communities embodying traditional lifestyles relevant for the conservation and
sustainable use of biological diversity and promote their wider application with the
approval and involvement of the holders of such knowledge, innovations and practices
and encourage the equitable sharing of the benefits arising from the utilization of such
knowledge, innovations and practices.
Id. art. 8(j). Article 15 recognizes "the sovereign right of States over their natural resources," and
provides that "the authority to determine access to genetic resources rests with the national
governments." Id. art. 15. Furthermore, it stipulates that access be on "mutually agreed terms" and
"subject to the prior informed consent of the party providing the resource, unless otherwise
determined by that party." Id. The CBD also calls upon parties to share, in a fair and equitable way,
the results of research and development and the benefits arising from the commercial and other
utilization of genetic resources with the party providing the resources. Id.
230. International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture, Nov. 3, 2001,
http://www.fao.org/Legal/treaties/033t-e.htm [hereinafter FAO Treaty]. The FAO Treaty, adopted
by the Food and Agriculture Organization in November 2001, is concerned with the conservation
and sustainable use of plant genetic resources for food and agriculture and calls on signatories to
support farmers and local communities' efforts to manage and conserve on-farm their plant genetic
resources. Id. art. 5. The FAO Treaty provides for the promotion of farmers rights in recognition of
the enormous contribution of farmers to the conservation and development of plant genetic resources
and in particular, affirms the rights of farmers to save, use, exchange and sell farm-saved
seed/propagating material. Id. Regrettably, responsibility for realizing Farmers' Rights is imposed
solely on national governments who are to protect such rights "in accordance with their needs and
priorities" and subject to national legislation. Id. art. 9.
The FAO Treaty establishes a multilateral system to facilitate access to plant genetic resources
under clearly specified conditions with benefits accruing from such access to be shared fairly and
equitably through "exchange of information, access to and transfer of technology, capacity-building,
and the sharing of [the monetary benefits] and . . . other benefits arising from commercialization."
Id. art. 13-14. Resources subject to the multilateral system are identified in a list annexed to the
Convention which is subject to periodic review. See id. art 12.
231. See Convention for the Safeguarding of Intangible Cultural Heritage, Oct. 16, 2003, http://
unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0013/001321/132141 e.pdf#page= 16 (last visited March 30, 2006).
232. Convention on the Protection of the Archaeological, Historical, and Artistic Heritage of the
American Nations, June 16, 1976, O.A.S.T.S. No. 47 [hereinafter San Salvador Convention]. In
June 16, 1976, the Organization of American States adopted the San Salvador Convention "to
prevent illegal exports or imports of cultural property; and promote cooperation among the
American states for mutual awareness and appreciation of their cultural heritage." Id. art 1. It is
illegal under the San Salvador Convention to import or export cultural property except where
666
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The Illicit Trade Convention was adopted in 1970 in recognition of the
importance of cultural property as "one of the basic elements of civilization
and national culture," which makes it "incumbent upon every State to
protect the cultural property existing within its territory against the dangers
of theft, clandestine excavation, and illicit export." '233 Cultural property is
defined under the convention as "property which on religious or secular
grounds, is specifically designated by each State as being of importance for
archaeology, prehistory, history, literature, art or science and which belongs
to [certain] categories. 234 To ensure the protection of such property against
authorized by the state for the purpose of promoting national culture. Id. art. 3. Measures to curb
unlawful trade in cultural property at the domestic level include registration of collections, transfers,
and transactions involving cultural property, as well as the banning of imported cultural property
with regards to which proper certificate or authorization has not been issued or authorized. Id. art. 7.
The San Salvador Convention also provides procedures for the return of illegally exported
cultural objects. Id. art. 11. Significantly, the costs of returning the items are borne initially by the
state petitioned without prejudice to its right to seek reimbursement. Id. art. 12. In general, states
are prohibited from assessing taxes or charges on returned items, but where necessary, can seek the
extradition of persons responsible for crimes arising from illegal imports or exports or for crimes
against the integrity of cultural property. Id. art. 13-14.
To fulfill their treaty obligations, member states are urged to adopt suitable legislation, create
inventories, establish museums, and protect archaeological sites. Id. art. 8. In addition, they are
required to cooperate in the promotion of their cultural values by exchanging information on cultural
property, archeological excavations and discoveries. Id. art. 15. Furthermore, they are to refrain
from seizing as part of legal proceedings "[a]rticles on loan to museums, exhibitions, or scientific
institutions that are outside the state to whose cultural heritage they belong." Id. art. 16.
233. Illicit Trade Convention, supra note 227, at pmbl.
234. Id. art. 1. These categories include:
(a) Rare collections and specimens of fauna, flora, minerals and anatomy, and objects of
palaeontological interest;
(b) property relating to history, including the history of science and technology and
military and social history, to the life of national leaders, thinkers, scientists and artists
and to events of national importance;
(c) products of archaeological excavations (including regular and clandestine) or of
archaeological discoveries;
(d) elements of artistic or historical monuments or archaeological sites which have been
dismembered;
(e) antiquities more than one hundred years old, such as inscriptions, coins and engraved
seals;
(f) objects of ethnological interest;
(g) property of artistic interest, such as: .. . pictures, paintings and drawings produced
entirely by hand... , works of statuary art and sculpture . . . , engravings, prints and
lithographs... ; original artistic assemblages and montages... ;
(h) rare manuscripts and incunabula, old books, documents and publications of special
interest (historical, artistic, scientific, literary, etc.) singly or in collections;
(i) postage, revenue and similar stamps, singly or in collections;
(j) archives, including sound, photographic and cinematographic archives;
(k) articles of furniture more than one hundred years old and old musical instruments.
Id.
illicit import, export and transfer of ownership, contracting states are
obligated to set up appropriate national services, 23 ' require export
certificates, 23 6 and prevent the acquisition by museums of illegally imported
21 238property.   They are also to prohibit the importation of stolen property,
and at the request of the country from which the property was removed,
"take appropriate steps to recover and return" the property. 239 The
convention envisages international cooperation in tackling the problems
posed by illicit trade in cultural property.
240
Although the U.S. has ratified the Illicit Trade Convention, it has not
fully implemented Article 6 of the convention requiring signatories to
enforce restrictions on cultural property imposed by the other signatories.24'
The U.S. has limited its application of the article to cases where there were
bilateral agreements to enforce such restrictions, and also "to cases of
emergency where looting had reached crisis proportions. 242  Besides the
narrow scope of its implementation in the U.S., other more general
criticisms of the domestic application of the Illicit Trade Convention include
its narrow definition of cultural property,243 and disregard for ethnic origins
in making or evaluating restitution claims. 2"
235. Id. art. 5. The functions of the national services include:
(a) contributing to the formation of draft laws and regulations designed to secure the
protection of the cultural heritage and particularly prevention of the illicit import, export
and transfer of ownership of important cultural property;
(b) establishing and keeping up to date, on the basis of a national inventory of protected
property, a list of important public and private cultural property whose export would
constitute an appreciable impoverishment of the national cultural heritage;
(c) promoting the development or the establishment of scientific and technical institutions
(museums, Libraries, archives, laboratories, workshops ... ) required to ensure the
preservation and presentation of cultural property;
(d) organizing the supervision of archaeological excavations, ensuring the preservation
"in situ" of certain cultural property, and protecting certain areas reserved for future
archaeological research;
(e) establishing, for the benefit of those concerned (curators, collectors, antique dealers,
etc.) rules in conformity with the ethical principles set forth in this Convention; and
taking steps to ensure the observance of those rules;
(f) taking educational measures to stimulate and develop respect for the cultural heritage
of all States, and spreading knowledge of the provisions of this Convention;
(g) seeing that appropriate publicity is given to the disappearance of any items of cultural
property.
Id.
236. Id. art. 6.
237. Id. art. 7(a).
238. Id. art. 7(b)(i).
239. Id. art. 7(b)(ii).
240. Id. art. 9.
241. These restrictions include the denial of entry of cultural property exported from signatory
nations without proof of certificates permitting such exportation. See id. art. 6.
242. Andrea Cunning, U.S. Policy on the Enforcement of Foreign Export Restrictions on Cultural
Property and Destructive Aspects of Retention Schemes, 26 Hous. J. INT'L L. 449, 452-53 (2004).
243. Id. at 464. The definition of cultural property in the Convention includes objects valuable for
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The World Heritage Convention, the other major United Nations
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization ("UNESCO") convention
ratified by the U.S., was adopted in 1972 to encourage international
cooperation for the protection of the cultural and natural heritage of
mankind.245 Subject matter included within the scope of the World Heritage
Convention as cultural heritage are monuments, 246 groups of buildings
247
and sites, 248 and as natural heritage, certain natural features, 249 geological
and physiographical formations areas25 0 and natural sites. 251  Under the
World Heritage Convention, each contracting state is primarily responsible
for identifying, protecting, conserving and transmitting to future generations
the cultural and natural heritage found within its territory. 52 To this end, the
state must apply "the utmost of its own resources and, where appropriate,
[seek] international assistance and co-operation, [including] financial,
artistic, scientific and technical [assistance] ... ,,253 The state is also
several reasons (most frequently their antiquity), but not for their direct relevance to present-day
lives. Illicit Trade Convention, supra note 227, art. 1.
244. While the geographical origins and locations of cultural properties are of great importance,
there is no requirement that ethnic origins be taken into account when making or considering
restitution claims. See DARRELL POSEY, TRADITIONAL RESOURCE RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL
INSTRUMENTS FOR PROTECTION AND COMPENSATION FOR INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND LOCAL
COMMUNITIES 82 (1996).
245. Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, Nov. 16,
1972, 27 U.S.T. 37, pmbl. [hereinafter World Heritage Convention]. This was necessitated by
concerns that cultural heritage and the natural heritage were "increasingly threatened with
destruction not only by the traditional causes of decay, but also by changing social and economic
conditions which aggravate the situation with even more formidable phenomena of damage or
destruction" and that "the deterioration or disappearance of any item of the cultural or natural
heritage constitutes a harmful impoverishment of the heritage of all the nations of the world." Id.
246. The World Heritage Convention describes monuments as "architectural works, works of
monumental sculpture and painting, elements or structures of an archaeological nature, inscriptions,
cave dwellings and combinations of features, which are of outstanding universal value from the
point of view of history, art or science." Id. art I.
247. Th'e World Heritage Convention refers to groups of buildings as "groups of separate or
connected buildings which, because of their architecture, their homogeneity or their place in the
landscape, are of outstanding universal value from the point of view of history, art or science." Id.
248. Sites are described to include "works of man or the combined works of nature and of man,
and areas including archaeological sites which are of outstanding universal value from the historical,
aesthetic, ethnological or anthropological points of view." Id.
249. Natural features consist of "physical and biological formations or groups of such formations,
which are of outstanding universal value from the aesthetic or scientific point of view." Id. art. 2.
250. Geological and physiographical formations areas are those "which constitute the habitat of
threatened species of animals and plants of outstanding universal value from the point of view of
science or conservation." Id.
251. Natural sites are those determined to be "of outstanding universal value from the point of
view of science, conservation or natural beauty." Id.
252. Id. art. 4.
253. Id.
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required to identify and delineate matter eligible for protection, and adopt
policies and programs for the "protection, conservation and presentation of
cultural and natural heritage. 255
To facilitate international cooperation in the protection of cultural
heritage, the convention established a World Heritage Committee2 56 charged
with preparing and publishing a World Heritage List 257  comprising
properties it considers to have "outstanding universal value., 258  However,
the World Heritage Convention's endorsement of the principle of state
consent to the preparation of the World Heritage List 259 may adversely affect
indigenous interests where a government is reluctant to recommend the
inclusion of a site in the list despite pressure from indigenous groups.26°
254. Id. art. 3.
255. Id. art. 5. Under Article 5, each state was required:
(a) to adopt a general policy which aims to give the cultural and natural heritage a
function in the life of the community and to integrate the protection of that heritage into
comprehensive planning programmes; (b) to set up within its territories, where such
services do not exist, one or more services for the protection, conservation and
presentation of the cultural and natural heritage with an appropriate staff and possessing
the means to discharge their functions: (c) to develop scientific and technical studies and
research and to work out such operating methods as will make the State capable of
counteracting the dangers that threaten its cultural or natural heritage; (d) to take the
appropriate legal, scientific, technical, administrative and financial measures necessary
for the identification, protection, conservation, presentation and rehabilitation of this
heritage; and (e) to foster the establishment or development of national or regional
centres for training in the protection, conservation and presentation of the cultural and
natural heritage and to encourage scientific research in this field.
Id.
256. Id. art. 8(1).
257. Id. art. 11(1). The list is compiled from information on local natural and cultural heritage
that each state is required to submit to the Heritage Committee.
258. Id. art. 11(2).
259. Id. art. 11(3) ("The inclusion of a property in the World Heritage List requires the consent of
the State concerned.").
260. The World Heritage Convention could enable states to refuse to protect otherwise eligible
cultural heritage purely for improper reasons:
Of concern is the Convention's definition of cultural property which provides that host
states alone determine which property is important to the cultural heritage. The
Convention goes on to give an extensive, yet not exhaustive, list of categories of objects
that are covered by the treaty. The generality in the category descriptions allows each
state to subjectively specify the content and scope of which cultural objects are to be
subject to the Convention's protective terms. As a result, there is great diversity among
the various national legal systems in establishing their respective criteria for determining
which objects, if any, are to be protected.
While this theory might recognize the unique contribution of each state to the cultural
heritage of mankind, granting each state the right to subjectively specify the scope and
content of cultural property includes the right to exclude property from protection that
others outside the state might find more culturally valuable. It also permits an exclusion
from protection on grounds of domestic budget concerns-i.e. if not designated, no funds
need be allocated to that artifact for protective efforts. A nationally controlled, self-
designated cultural property framework cannot truly promote common outside cultural
property interests.
M. Catherine Vernon, Common Cultural Property: The Search for Rights of Protective Intervention,
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Provision in the instrument for significant indigenous group initiative in the
development of the list of protected sites could have bolstered the efforts of
Native Americans for better protection of their sacred lands, the commercial
development of which they have been relatively powerless to prevent in the
courts.
2 6 1
The WPPT, which the U.S. ratified in 2002, extends neighboring rights
to "actors, singers, musicians, dancers, and other persons who act, sing,
deliver, play in, interpret, or otherwise perform literary or artistic works or
expressions of folklore. 262 Because folk tales, poetry, songs, instrumental
music, dance and plays actually live in regular performances of such
expressions, the rights recognized for performers of expressions of folklore
potentially could be used to protect the associated expressions of traditional
knowledge. However, the significance of the instrument appears to be rather
limited to the extent neighboring rights are recognized under the WPPT only
for a period of only fifty years and do not prohibit what is not performed,
broadcast, or contained in phonograms.263
Another relevant international instrument is the Recommendation on the
Safeguarding of Traditional Culture and Folklore adopted by the General
Conference of UNESCO in 1989, and which called upon member states to
take the necessary legislative steps to give effect to various identification,
conservation, preservation, dissemination, protection and international
cooperation measures outlined therein. 264 As a recommendation, however,
26 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 435, 466-67 (1994).
261. See, e.g., Crow v. Gullet, 706 F.2d 856 (8th Cir. 1983) (unsuccessful attempt of Native
Americans to enjoin the development of their most sacred mountain, Bear Butte in South Dakota, as
a public park on grounds that it could desecrate the site and lead to the exploitation of their religious
practices as a tourist attraction).
262. WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty, Dec. 20 1996, http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/
ip/wppt/trtdocs wo034.html.
263. The WPPT came into force only on May 6, 2002, and its impact on the protection of
traditional knowledge is yet to be determined.
264. Recommendation on the Safeguarding of Traditional Culture and Folklore. Nov. 15 1989,
http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.phpURLID= 13141 &URLDO=DOPRINTPAGE&URLSECTION
=201.html. For example, the Recommendation suggests as identification methods the creation of
national inventories of institutions concerned with folklore, and the development of recording
systems and comprehensive registries. Conservation measures could center on the establishment of
national archives and museums, harmonization of collection and archiving methods, duplication of
folklore materials and training of specialists in conservation work while preservation measures
include the teaching and study of folklore, guarantees of access of cultural communities to their
folklore, and establishment of a national coordination bodies and promotion of scientific research on
folklore. Dissemination of folklore could be ensured through such events as fairs, festivals, films,
exhibitions and workshops, coverage of folklore in the media, creation of job opportunities for
folklorists, and exchanges of persons and groups concerned with folklore. Mindful of the
complementary nature of the intellectual property related aspects of protection available under the
WIPO framework, the Recommendation urges enhanced privacy and confidentiality rights for
the instrument does not impose binding obligations on any UNESCO
member and therefore, was not binding on the United States after it rejoined
UNESCO in 2003.265
The human rights instruments to which the United States adheres or has
ratified have implications for the protection of traditional knowledge. For
example, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides for the
protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific,
literary or artistic production and for the right to own collective property and
not to be deprived of that property.266  In addition, the Declaration
guarantees the right to just and favorable remuneration for work and
mandates equal protection for all under the law. 267  Similarly, both the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 268 and the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights269 establish the right of
self-determination. All these provisions would be relevant to the claims of
indigenous communities inasmuch as the provisions recognize collective
rights to property, could be used to require compensation for work relating
to traditional knowledge, and prohibit discriminatory tendencies reflected in
the deliberate failure to protect traditional knowledge. Nevertheless, human
rights provisions in general remain of limited utility in the protection of
traditional knowledge to the extent they are directed mainly toward state
governments and establish no clear basis for application to corporations and
individuals engaged in the unauthorized use of traditional knowledge.
B. Agenda of International Organizations
1. UNESCO
Since the 1970s, the U.S. has participated in various UNESCO
sponsored initiatives relevant to folklore including the preparation of the
Tunis Model Law, and the Model Provisions for National Laws on the
Protection of Expressions of Folklore Against Illicit Exploitation and Other
informants as the transmitters of tradition, and also for collectors through proper archiving and
safeguarding of materials against misuse.
265. The terms of the Recommendation may not even be applicable to the United States given that
the United States had withdrawn from UNESCO five years prior to the adoption of the
Recommendation. American Library Association, United States Withdrawal from UNESCO (2006),
http://www.ala.org/ala/godort/godortresolutions/19850109125.htm.
266. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, at 71, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., I'
plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948).
267. Id.
268. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 993
U.N.T.S. 4. The United States has signed but not ratified this Convention.
269. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 172.
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Prejudicial Actions.27° When UNESCO again took up the issue of folklore
by co-sponsoring with WIPO a World Forum for the Protection of Folklore
in Phuket, Thailand, the U.S. participated in its capacity as a WIPO
member. 271 However, it dissented from the Plan of Action adopted at the
conference which called inter alia, for the drafting of a new international
agreement on the sui generis protection of folklore.272
With regards to UNESCO's work program on cultural heritage, the
United States took part in the negotiation of both the World Heritage
Convention and the Illicit Trade Convention, eventually ratifying both
though drastically reducing the scope of implementation of the latter in the
U.S. Although it had withdrawn from UNESCO membership when formal
deliberations on the Intangible Cultural Heritage Convention began in 2002,
the U.S. was still able to influence the process indirectly through pressures
exerted on UNESCO officials. For example, in response to subtle hints from
the U.S. government that the development of an instrument with strong
protections for indigenous communities could jeopardize U.S. plans to
return to the organization, the Director General of UNESCO requested that
the Committee of Experts convened to work on a preliminary draft
instrument on intangible cultural heritage not make direct references to
indigenous peoples in the proposed instrument.2 73 When a significantly
toned down instrument was presented to the UNESCO General Assembly
for adoption in September 2003, the U.S. neither voted for, nor opposed, its
adoption as the Convention on the Safeguarding of Intangible Cultural
Heritage.
270. See Committee of Governmental Experts on the Intellectual Property Aspects of the
Protection of Expressions of Folklore, Model Provisions on National Laws on the Protection of
Expressions of Folklore Against Illicit Exploitation and Other Prejudicial Actions reprinted in 16
COPYRIGHT BULL 62 (1982) [hereinafter Draft Model Provisions].
271. UNESCO/WIPO World Forum on the Protection of Folklore (1997).
272. This fact was noted poignantly in the plan itself as follows: "The participants from the
Governments of the United States of America and the United Kingdom expressly stated that they
could not associate themselves with the Plan of Action." Id. at 235.
273. This is a personal observation. The author was a member of the Committee of Experts
appointed by the Director General of UNESCO. For a discussion of the evolution of the Convention
for the Safeguarding of Intangible Cultural Heritage, see Paul Kuruk, Cultural Heritage, Traditional
Knowledge and Indigenous Rights: An Analysis of the Convention for the Safeguarding of Intangible
Cultural Heritage, I MACQUARIE J. INT'L & COMP. L. 111 (2004).
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2. UNEP
The history surrounding the negotiations and subsequent adoption of the
CBD 27 4 under the auspices of the United Nations Environmental Program
("UNEP") does not reveal much enthusiasm by the U.S. government for
matters of interest to indigenous communities. The CBD's chief
significance for the protection of traditional knowledge is Article 8(j), which
requires member states to
respect, preserve and maintain knowledge, innovations and
practices of indigenous and local communities embodying
traditional lifestyles relevant for the conservation and sustainable
use of biological diversity and promote their wider application with
the approval and involvement of the holders of such knowledge,
innovations and practices and encourage the equitable sharing of the
benefits arising from the utilization of such knowledge, innovations
and practices.
Despite good-faith efforts by other nations to accommodate U.S. objections
to various drafts of the CBD during the negotiating process, 275 the U.S.
refused to sign it when it was adopted in 1992. Even though President
Clinton subsequently signed it in 1993, Congress has yet to accede to it.276
The official reasons for the initial refusal of the U.S. to sign the CBD
were cited as U.S. objections to certain patent provisions in the CBD, 27 7 its
concern that "the article on funding of conservation projects in developing
countries would not leave sufficient control in the hands of donors," and its
conviction that there was "scientific uncertainty surrounding loss of
diversity. 278
As to the latter objection about scientific uncertainty, some critics have
viewed it simply as a pretext used by the U.S. to derail the convention by
creating an unnecessary obstacle in the form of discord about the scope of
274. United Nations Conference on Environment & Development, Convention on Biological
Diversity, June 5, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 818.
275. Kal Raustiala & David G. Victor, Biodiversity Since Rio: The Future of the Convention on
Biological Diversity, ENVIRONMENT, May 1996, at 16, 19.
276. Id. at 19-20. For a discussion of the politics surrounding the scuttling of the Senate vote on
ratification, see Sovereignty International Inc., How the Biodiversity Convention Was Defeated
(1998), http://sovereignty.net/p/land/biotreatystop.htm.
277. Curtis M. Horton, Protecting Biodiversity and Cultural Diversity Under Intellectual Property
Law: Toward a New International System, 10 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 1, 21-24 (1995); see also, Gary
D. Meyers, The UN Biodiversity Convention, Biotechnology, and Intellectual Property Rights, 3
BIO-SCIENCE L. REV. 131, 142-144 (1999-2000).
278. Kristin Rosendal, Implications of the US "No" in Rio, in BIODIPLOMACY: GENETIC
RESOURCES AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 87, 89 (Vicente Sanchez & Calestous Juma eds.,
1994).
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the problem. 2 79 The concern for high-contributing donors has also been
dismissed as insufficient justification for withdrawal from a treaty because
donors always retain "the option of withholding funds until they are satisfied
with the way things are running. 28 °
However, the objection regarding intellectual property is far more
substantive. Significantly, the provisions in the CBD dealing with patents
require that the access to genetic resources and transfer of associated
technology involving patents and other intellectual property rights be
provided on terms which "recognize and are consistent with the adequate
and effective protection of intellectual property rights. 281  From the U.S.
perspective, this provision potentially conflicts with another provision
calling on Contracting States to "cooperate ... subject to national legislation
and international law in order to ensure that [patents and other intellectual
property] rights are supportive of and do not run counter to [the
Convention's] objectives. 282 Conceivably, a State could rely on the latter
provision to limit patent rights deemed to contradict local rules governing
access to genetic resources. Having fought so hard both at bilateral and
multilateral levels to promote intellectual property rights worldwide, the
U.S. fears that such restrictions on the patent rights would constitute a
serious drawback and it therefore refrained from ratifying an instrument that
it believes endorses limitations on patent rights.
Even as a non-party to the CBD, the U.S. has participated in
international meetings where various provisions of the CBD were discussed.
At such meetings, the U.S. has not hesitated to caution against the attempts
of the international community to transform the principles endorsed in the
279. As one commentator pointed out:
Even though scientists are obviously at a loss in estimating the exact number of species
and the exact rates of species extinction on the planet, the fact that extinction is taking
place at an alarming rate is hardly controversial. Moreover the recourse to a scientific
uncertainty did not prevent the Bush Administration from once again trying to advocate
the establishment of a forest convention .... It is also clear that the U.S. authorities
intend to come up with their own suggestions for biodiversity conservation projects. The
United States Agency for International Development (USAID) has increased spending on
biodiversity projects by 400 per cent since 1989; to the sum of US$79 million in 1991.
This leads to the assumption that to the extent that the U.S. used the uncertainty
argument, it was mainly as a way of strengthening their reason for turning down the
Treaty.
Id. at 89.
280. Id. It is a standard feature of U.S. foreign policy to threaten to withhold funds from
international organizations as a way of securing desired reforms or the adoption of certain programs.
281. CBD, supra note 229, art. 16(2).
282. Id. art. 16(5) (emphasis added).
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convention into "legally binding" obligations.283 In light of these warnings,
it is hard to take seriously continuing U.S assurances to the global
community of the plans of Congress to take up the issue of ratification of
the CBD.8
3. WIPO
The U.S. has also not warmed up to the current work of WIPO on
traditional knowledge and has even made known its opposition to the
development by WIPO of a new instrument on the subject. Indeed, as one
commentator has noted, American support for WIPO's new program on
traditional knowledge was provided after assurances from WIPO that it was
"not 'on a norm setting track'; that is to say, that its work is not intended to
feed into a process which would end with the creation of a treaty or
recommendations. 2 85
At the very first session of WIPO's Intergovernmental Committee on
Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and
Folklore ("IGC"), the U.S. delegation released a statement which left no
doubts about the U.S. position on the WIPO agenda. Referring to the
283. See, e.g., Herbert Traub, Advisor, U.S. Mission to the United Nations, Statement During the
Fifty-seventh Session of the U.N. General Assembly, in the Second Committee (Dec. 10, 2002),
available at http://www.state.gov/p/io/rls/rm/2002/15914.htm.
The U.S. joins consensus on this resolution, but must take a reservation on OP 8. These
are the same concerns we expressed in Johannesburg and we would like to state these
reservations here for the record.
While joining the consensus on the Plan of Implementation, the United States reserves its
position with respect to paragraph 44(o). This paragraph envisages the negotiation
"within the framework of the Convention on Biological Diversity, bearing in mind the
Bonn Guidelines, an international regime to promote and safeguard the fair and equitable
sharing of benefits arising out of the utilization of genetic resources." In the context of
the final negotiations on this paragraph, the words "legally binding" were deleted before
the word "regime" at the request of numerous delegations.
In the light of this negotiating history, the United States understands that the undertaking
envisaged in this paragraph would not entail the development of a legally binding
instrument.
Id.
284. Jeffry Burnam, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for the Environment made the
following observation at a CBD meeting at The Hague in 2002:
We appreciate the opportunity to participate in this Conference of the Parties, as we have
in previous CBD deliberations, with the aim of furthering our shared goals related to
biological diversity. As you may remember, the U.S. signed the Convention in 1993 and
it was sent to the United States Senate for its advice and consent. The Senate has not yet
acted upon the CBD. In this regard, I wish to note that the Department of State informed
members of the Senate in February of this year that U.S. ratification of the Convention is
being reviewed by this Administration.
Jeffly Burnam, Statement to the Ministerial Roundtable, Sixth Conference of the Parties to the
Convention on Biological Diversity (Apr. 17, 2002), available at http://www.state.gov/g/oes/rls/rm/
2002/9577.htm.
285. Michael Halewood, Indigenous and Local Knowledge in International Law: A Preface to Sui
Generis Intellectual Property Protection, 44 MCGILL L.J. 953, 986 (1999).
676
[Vol. 34: 629, 2007] Goading a Reluctant Dinosaur
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
complex and diverse nature of,286 as well as the lack of national experience
with traditional knowledge, the U.S. questioned the feasibility of an
international treaty on the subject.287 It also pointed to the apparent absence
of "an incentive mechanism for innovation" in traditional knowledge as
another reason why such knowledge, in contrast to the newer generation of
intellectual property laws such as integrated circuits, plant varieties, and
databases, could not be accommodated within the older generation of
intellectual property laws of copyright, patents and trademarks.288 However,
286. The U.S. Statement noted:
[T]here are vast differences among indigenous communities across valleys, let alone
across continents, in the types of folklore and traditional knowledge developed over the
generations. There are also diverse interests in ownership/exclusion on the one hand and
openness to all on the other hand, the local rules concerning rights to use/own traditional
knowledge, and the differing desires to commercialize versus maintain secrecy of such
knowledge.
General Declaration of the United States of America to the First Session of the WIPO
Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources, Traditional
Knowledge and Folklore, May 1, 2001 para. 2 [hereinafter U.S. Statement].
287. The U.S. Statement noted:
All these facts lead to one question: [Is] it possible, or even desirable, to establish a
comprehensive, uniform set of rules at the international level to govern the use of genetic
resources, traditional knowledge and folklore? At the very least, we wonder whether it is
advisable to undertake such activity before individual countries have, in conjunction with
the communities within their borders, established their own regimes for protection within
their own territories and have gained experience in the application of that protection and
its effect on the communities involved.
.... Moreover, there are so many different expectations, goals and native systems, for
approaching ownership and the transgression of ownership that a useful, enforceable
global system would be virtually impossible to create. Indeed a "one size fits all"
approach might be interpreted as demonstrating a lack of respect for local customs and
traditions. Questions have been raised as to the definitions of beneficiaries, economic
valuation and other critical terms of reference. We also note with interest the variety of
local rules and procedures that have developed within certain indigenous communities.
Clearly these local rules must be respected and care must be taken to avoid their
preemption.
Id. at para. 3, 6.
288. The U.S. Statement provided:
[l]t must be noted that the newer generation of intellectual property laws all share a
certain characteristic with the older generation of intellectual property laws of copyright,
patents, trademarks: namely that of an incentive mechanism for innovation. As forward-
looking systems that seek to encourage the development of new forms of expression and
invention, the newer types of intellectual property still are based on this basic principle
and share characteristics such as a date of creation, the known identity of one more
creators, defined parameters of the relevant product and limited duration of protection.
A regime to protect traditional knowledge, as many of the participants in WIPO's Fact
Finding Missions pointed out, cannot by definition adhere to these principles. Thus,
developing a new intellectual property-type regime in this area does not appear to be the
best fit even for the holders of such knowledge.
Id. at para. 4-5.
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a more revealing, and perhaps most significant reason for U.S. discomfort
with international initiatives on traditional knowledge is found in another
part of the U.S. submission:
All in all, as the United States has noted on various occasions, many
of the goals of indigenous and local communities in "protecting"
their traditional knowledge, medicine, folklore, etc., stems from
their concern for self-determination, health, justice, cultural heritage
and land issues. These are serious interests that must be examined
fully within the appropriate national contexts; but these are not
issues with which WIPO or intellectual property offices have
competence. While important in and of themselves, the answers do
not involve intellectual property questions.289
Presumably, the U.S. considers traditional knowledge to implicate
political rights of indigenous peoples and sees any attempts to deal with
them in international fora as unacceptable intrusions on the prerogative of
the U.S. to address these issues at a national level. Thus, it cautions WIPO
and national intellectual property offices to be concerned instead with "the
provision of technical and legal assistance .. .to holders of commercially-
valuable traditional knowledge [to enable them to] develop means of
exploiting traditional knowledge through applying current intellectual
property tools such as certification marks, collective marks, licensing,...
and the law of copyright... . 290
4. WTO
Within the Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights ("TRIPS")
Council of the World Trade Organization ("WTO"), the U.S. initially
opposed efforts by developing countries to use the review mechanism
contained in Article 27.3(b) of the TRIPS Agreement as an opportunity to
revise it 291 to provide for the protection of traditional knowledge. 292
However, beginning with its session in July 1999, the Council demonstrated
289. Id. at para. 7.
290. Id. at para. 8.
291. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade-Multilateral Trade Negotiations (The Uruguay
Round): Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Including Trade in
Counterfeit Goods, Dec. 15, 1993, 33 I.L.M. 81.
292. As early as December 1998, when the Council met to draw up the agenda for review of the
TRIPS Agreement the U.S. urged that the review focus only on how State parties were actually
implementing Article 27.3(b), and not on how to conduct a substantive review of the Article as
advocated by India and the African Group. During the next two meetings of the Council in February
1999 and April 1999, the U.S. view held sway and the Council on both occasions requested member
states to provide information regarding implementation to assist in the review. GRAIN, For a Full
Review of TRIPS 27.3(b): An Update on Where Developing Countries Stand with the Push to Patent
Life at the WTO, at 3 (2000), http://www.grain.org/briefings/?id=139.
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an openness to a substantive review of Article 27.3(b) by entertaining a
proposal submitted by India.293 Immediately preceding the 1999 Seattle
Ministerial Conference, the Council discussed, but due to U.S. opposition
did not act on, a proposal of the African Group to amend Article 27.3(b) to
provide for "the protection of the innovations of indigenous and local
farming communities in developing countries,' 294 and "the continuation of
the traditional farming practices including the right to save, exchange and
save seeds, and sell their harvest.
' 29s
The Doha Ministerial Conference breathed new life into efforts to
protect traditional knowledge when it adopted a declaration authorizing the
TRIPS Council to examine such issues.296 To assist the TRIPS Council in
the discharge of its new mandate, the Africa Group at the WTO again
submitted a proposal on traditional knowledge which stressed the need for
international mechanisms within the framework of the TRIPS Agreement.
The proposal provided for, inter alia, "an obligation on Members
collectively and individually to prohibit, and to take measures to prevent, the
misappropriation of genetic resources and traditional knowledge. 297
Similarly, another group of countries, including Brazil, Cuba, Ecuador,
India, Peru, Thailand and Venezuela, called for the TRIPS Agreement to be
amended to provide that an applicant for a patent relating to biological
materials or to traditional knowledge provide, as a condition of patent rights,
"(i) disclosure of the source and country of origin of the biological resource
and of the traditional knowledge used in the invention; (ii) evidence of prior
informed consent through approval of authorities under the relevant national
293. Id.
294. Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Taking Forward the
Review of Article 27.3(b) of the TRIPS Agreement, IP/C/W404 (June 26, 2003), available at
http://docsonline.wto.org/DDFDocuments/IP/C/W404.doc [hereinafter Proposal of the African
Group].
295. Id.
296. As the noted in the Doha Declaration:
[I]n pursuing its work programme including under the review of Article 27.3(b), the
review of the implementation of the TRIPS Agreement under Article 71.1 and the work
foreseen pursuant to paragraph 12 of this Declaration, [the TRIPS Council should]
examine, inter alia, the relationship between the TRIPS Agreement and the Convention
on Biological Diversity, the protection of traditional knowledge and folklore, and other
relevant new developments raised by members pursuant to Article 71.1. In undertaking
this work, the TRIPS Council shall be guided by the objectives and principles set out in
Articles 7 and 8 of the TRIPS Agreement and shall take fully into account the
development dimension.
World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of November 14, 2001, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/I, 41
I.L.M. 746, 749 (2002) [hereinafter Doha Declaration].
297. Proposal of the African Group, supra note 294, at 2.
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regime; and (iii) evidence of fair and equitable benefit sharing under the
relevant national regime."'2 98
Proponents of the disclosure requirement 299 contend that such disclosure
would promote the objectives of the patent system by "reducing instances of
bad patents," enabling patent examiners to "ascertain more effectively the
'inventive' step claimed in a particular patent application," and enhancing
the ability of countries to track down and challenge instances of bad
patents.30 0  However, these claims are strenuously opposed by the U.S.,
which argues that the "most effective means" to achieving the international
community's goals regarding access, benefit sharing and the prevention of
the issuance of erroneously issued patents is rather "through tailored,
national solutions to meet practical concerns and actual needs ... [and that
the] introduction of new patent disclosure requirements will not achieve
those important objectives and may have significant negative
consequences.
30 1
Specifically, the U.S. points out that a new disclosure requirement
would not, per se, ensure that benefits are equitably shared, as "such a
requirement would merely convey the information requested but would have
no mechanism to transfer benefits between parties. ' 30 2  On the matter of
preventing erroneously granted patents, the U.S. notes as well that
"[i]nformation indicating country of origin, ex situ collection sites, etc.,
would do little to ensure ascertainment of appropriate inventorship, novelty
or inventive step, because such information does not generally address the
considerations underlying these requirements, such as acts of invention or
the state of the relevant art., 30 3 A negative consequence of the disclosure
requirement, "particularly where the sanctions for non-compliance include
invalidation of a patent," the U.S. argues, would be the creation of"a 'cloud'
of uncertainty over the patent right by opening a new avenue for litigation
and other uncertainties that would undermine the role of the patent system in
promoting innovation and technological development." 3°4  Moreover, the
298. Council for Trace-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, The Relationship Between
the TRIPS Agreement and the Convention on Biological Diversity and the Protection of Traditional
Knowledge, IP/CIW/403 (June 24, 2003), 1, available at http://docsonline.wto.org/
DDFDocuments/t/IP/C/V403.doc [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement and the CBD].
299. For an analysis of the debate surrounding the disclosure requirement, see generally Nuno
Pires Carvalho, Requiring Disclosure of the Origin of Genetic Resources and Prior Informed
Consent in Patent Applications Without Infringing the TRIPS Agreement: The Problem and the
Solution, 2 WASH, U. J.L. & POL'Y 371 (2000).
300. TRIPS Agreement and the CBD, supra note 298, 7.
301. Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Article 27.3(b),
Relationship Between the TRIPS Agreement and the CBD, and the Protection of Traditional
Knowledge and Folklore, IP/C/W/434 (Nov. 26, 2004), 6, available at http://docsonline.wto.org/
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patent disclosure requirement would impose "significant administrative
burdens for the patent offices of members that would in turn create
additional costs, particularly with respect to those requirements that would
demand compliance with foreign laws."30 5
Developing countries have countered the arguments of the United States
regarding uncertainties,3 0 6 administrative costs, 30 7 monitoring difficulties
30 8
and relevance to patent protection.30 9 While recognizing the usefulness of
well-functioning national systems, the developing countries stress that an
international solution is desirable to complement the national systems.3"0
Both national and international mechanisms, in their opinion, are critical to
provide the cooperation required to tackle cases of biopiracy that have
significant international dimension and need international solutions and
305. Id. 15.
306. Brazil and India argue that rather than creating uncertainties regarding patent rights, the
establishment of clear international rules on disclosure, prior informed consent and benefit sharing
would create certainties and facilitate access by researchers to biological resources and/or traditional
knowledge which the United States has identified to be of significance to researchers and bio-
prospectors that use the patent system. Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights, The Relationship Between the TRIPS Agreement and the Convention on Biological Diversity
(CBD) and the Protection of Traditional Knowledge: Technical Observations on Issues Raised in a
Communication by the United States (IP/C/W/434), IP/C/W/443 (Mar. 18, 2005), 18, available at
http://docsonline.wto.org/DDFDocuments/t/IP/C/443.doc.
307. As to the fear of increased administrative costs, the two countries deny that the requirement
to employ all reasonable measures to determine the country of origin and source of the material
"would be in any way burdensome ... [Sluch a burden would generally be subsumed in, or at least
not be more burdensome than, the usual burden befalling the patent applicant to make out a case for
his claims under current patent procedures and practices." Id. 19.
308. On the issue of monitoring, the two countries respond that
given the enormous number of patents granted worldwide, the disclosure requirement
will facilitate the monitoring of these patents by the owners of the biological material
and/or associated traditional knowledge with a view to check whether prior informed
consent and benefit sharing arrangements are being adhered to by the patent owners upon
commercialization.
Id. 13.
309. Contrary to the assertions of the United States, developing countries contend that the
disclosure requirement would be relevant in determining the existence of prior art, inventorship or
scope of the patent
to the extent that the disclosed information will help determine whether the biological
resources and/or traditional knowledge was used: to form part of the claimed invention;
during the process of developing the claimed inventions; as a necessary prerequisite for
the development of the invention; to facilitate the development of the invention; and/or as
necessary background material and/or information for the development of the invention.
Id. 17.
310. They note that "[sluch an approach would be akin to arguing that in order to ensure the
effective operation of the patent system, for example, only national patent laws are needed and not
international agreements such as the TRIPS Agreement." Id. 6.
enforcement. They also note that the disclosure requirement is not unique,
but is similar to disclosure requirements in patent laws, "including
disclosure of best mode, and in other jurisdictions, such as the United States,
a requirement to disclose all information material to patentability."3"' In this
sense, therefore, "the proposed requirement is no different from these
obligations the fulfillment of which has not been shown to impose any
unnecessary burden on applicants."3 2
5. FAO
In 1983, the Food and Agricultural Organization ("FAO") adopted a
non-binding International Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources
("Undertaking") 3 3 to promote the conservation of genetic resources and
provide for better rights for farmers.314 Early on, the FAO also set up an
intergovernmental Commission on Plant Genetic Resources ("CPGR") to
monitor the implementation of the Undertaking. As it turned out, the
Undertaking was a much scaled down version of a more ambitious project,
authorized by the FAO in 1981 but against strong opposition from the
United States, to draft a binding legal convention on the subject of genetic
resources and farmers' rights.315
In 1985, the U.S. failed in its efforts to discredit the CPGR, which soon
developed into an influential body within the FAO.316 Subsequently, in
1993, the CPGR called for a revision of the Undertaking to realize farmers'
rights,317 harmonize it with the CBD, 318 and provide for access on mutually
311. Id. 20.
312. Id.
313. UNEP, Note by the Interim Secretariat: Ownership of and Access to, Ex-Situ Genetic
Resources Farmer's Rights and Rights of Similar Groups: Progress Report on Resolution 3 of the
Nairobi Final Act. Ex-Situ Collections and Farmers Rights, UNEP Doc. CBD/IC/2/13 (May 1994).
314. Commission on Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture, International Undertaking on
Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture, http://www.fao.org/ag/cgrfa/IU.htm.
315. Graham Dutfield, TRIPS-Related Aspects of Traditional Knowledge, 33 CASE W. RES. J.
INT'L L. 233, 265 (2001).
316. Id.
317. The concept of Farmers' Rights was introduced in the Undertaking to acknowledge "the
enormous contribution that farmers of all regions have made to the conservation and development of
plant genetic resources, which constitute the basis of plant production throughout the world .... "
UNEP, Note by the Interim Secretariat: Progress Report on Resolution 3 of the Nairobi Final Act:
Ex Situ Collections and Farmers' Rights, UNEP/CBD/IC/2/13 (May 3, 1994), available at
http://www.biodiv.org/doc/meetings/iccbd/iccbd-02-13-en.pdf. As defined in FAO Resolution 5/89,
Farmers' Rights are:
rights arising from the past, present and future contributions of farmers in conserving,
improving and making available plant genetic resources, particularly those in the centres
of origin/diversity. These rights are vested in the intemational community, as trustee for
present and future generations of farmers, for the purpose of ensuring full benefits to
farmers, and supporting the continuation of their contributions, as wel [sic] as the
attainment of the overall purposes of the Intemational Undertaking [on Plant Genetic
Resources].
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agreed terms to plant genetic resources, including ex situ collections not
addressed by the CBD. Since then, the CPGR, later renamed Commission
on Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture ("CGRFA"), worked closely
with the CBD to revise the Undertaking to conform to the CBD.
In November 2001, after a period of difficult negotiations, the CGRFA
adopted the FAO Treaty as a binding convention to replace the Undertaking.
The FAO Treaty establishes a multilateral system to facilitate access to plant
genetic resources with benefits accruing from such access to be shared fairly
and equitably through "exchange of information, access to and transfer of
technology, capacity-building, and the sharing of [monetary benefits and
other] benefits from commercialization."31 9  Resources subject to the
multilateral system are identified in a list annexed to the convention which is
subject to periodic review.32
Largely through U.S. pressure, many of the strong proposals originally
tabled by developing countries have been effectively watered down in the
Treaty. For example, while the FAO Treaty provides for Farmers' Rights,
the responsibility for realizing Farmers' Rights is imposed solely on national
governments who are to protect such rights "in accordance with their needs
and priorities" and subject to national legislation. 2 1 Significantly, the U.S.
has signed, but not ratified the FAO Treaty, a move seen by commentators
as calculated to enable the U.S. participate in further talks concerning the
implementation of the Treaty's provisions while avoiding obligations
imposed on contracting State parties.322
C. An Invitation to the Bargaining Table
The preceding discussion has revealed the reluctance of the United
States, eloquently expressed in all major international fora tackling
traditional knowledge issues, to accede to a binding international regime for
Food and Agricultural Organization, Farmers' Right, Res. 5/89, at 1-2 (Nov. 29, 1989), available at
ftp://ftp.fao.org/ag/cgrfa/ResC5-89E.pdf.
318. One of the difficulties with such harmonization is the apparent conflict in the International
Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources' position that genetic resources constitute the "common
heritage of mankind," UNEP, Note by the Interim Secretariat, supra note 313, at 5, with that of the
CBD acknowledging that States have the "sovereign rights of States over their natural resources." Id.
at 2.
319. International Treaty on Plant and Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture art. 13, open
for signature Nov. 3, 2001-Nov. 4, 2002, ftp://ftp.fao.org.ag.cgrfa.it.ITPGRe.pdf.
320. Id. art. 12.
321. Id. art. 9.
322. See ETC Group, News Release, The United States and the Law of Seed: Political "About-
Face" or "Two-Faced" Policy?, Nov. 8, 2002, http://www.etcgroup.org/upload/publication/179/0l1
nrus.treaty.pdf.
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the protection of traditional knowledge. Even if the international
community were to adopt a binding arrangement over U.S. objections, there
is no doubt that as a sovereign, the U.S. will simply refuse to ratify it and, as
a result, will not be bound by the terms of the adopted instrument.
Consequently, the prospects for enhancing the protection of traditional
knowledge in the U.S. through an international legal instrument remain
rather bleak.
However, given the U.S. role as a major user of traditional knowledge,
maintaining the status quo is an unattractive proposition and options must be
found to improve the protective environment in the U.S. while being
sensitive to legitimate U.S. concerns. One possible strategy is to persuade
the U.S. to agree to some form of protection for traditional knowledge on the
basis of reciprocity. 323 The principle of reciprocity in this context would call
for a commitment by the U.S. to protect the creative works of traditional
communities in developing countries as an appropriate response to the
enhanced intellectual property regimes that such countries have now
implemented largely through U.S. pressures in the WTO and which are
viewed to disproportionately benefit firms in developed countries.3 2 4 In this
section, we elaborate on the reciprocity argument and the extent to which it
would be accepted as a principle for protecting traditional knowledge
in the U.S.
1. U.S. Experience with Reciprocity
The term reciprocity may be defined as "a mutual exchange of
privileges.,, 325 As a concept, it is rooted in fundamental moral values.
According to Lawrence C. Becker, "[r]eciprocity is a moral virtue. We
ought to be disposed, as a matter of moral obligation, to return good in
proportion to the good we receive, and to make reparation for the harm we
have done. 326 Underpinning the concept of reciprocity are several
arguments: first, that good received should be returned with good; 327 second,
that restitution be made for wrongs committed; 328 third, that returns and
323. Kuruk, supra note 29, at 774.
324. According to the British Government appointed Commission on Intellectual Property Rights,
"because developing countries are large net importers of technology from the developed world, the
globalisation of IP protection will result in very substantial additional net transfers from developing
to developed countries." COMMISSION ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY: INTEGRATING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT POLICY I I (3d ed.
2003), available at http://www.iprcommission.org/papers/pdfs/final-report/CIPR-Exec-Sumfinal.
pdf [hereinafter CIPR EXECUTIVE SUMMARY].
325. WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 983 (1988).
326. LAWRENCE C. BECKER, RECIPROCITY 3 (1986).
327. This requires that "we ... be disposed to return good for the good we get from agents who
are trying to produce benefits for us." Id. at 89.
328. This may be justified as on the grounds that
684
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reparations should be fitting and proportional; 329 and finally, that the returns
be made by the one who has received the good or done the evil.330  For
purposes of this Article, the core moral arguments of reciprocity may be
summarized as requiring that good be returned in proportion to good
received and that reparations be due for harms caused.3 3
Prior to the adoption of the TRIPS Agreement, the reciprocity argument
was used successfully by the United States to redress perceived imbalances
in its terms of trade.332 In 1985, the United States adopted a controversial
trade tactic termed "aggressive unilateralism" 333 pursuant to which it
demanded that its trading partners reduce real or imagined barriers to United
States exports and investment. The new trade stance was aggressive because
United States demands were often backed by highly publicized threats of
retaliation.3 34 It was also unilateral because the United States frequently on
its own decided when a foreign trade practice was unfair, and also often
[t]he wrongs we do to others typically undermine their dispositions to deal with us freely
and reciprocally. Unrequited love is rare, and beyond a certain point, pathological.
Given the importance of reciprocal exchanges, it is unjustifiable, ceteris paribus, to make
them less likely. It is therefore unjustifiable to undermine people's dispositions to make
them. If a wrong has already been done, however, the problem is to find a way of
repairing, or if possible, avoiding, damage to the victim's reciprocity disposition.
Id. at 101.
329. This requires that "we... be disposed to make returns and reparations that are appropriate as
to type and quantity." Id. at 106. In this case, what counts as appropriate is "any return or reparation
sufficient.., for satisfying the ends of the practice of reciprocating." Id.
330. Id. at 103.
331. The reciprocity argument has been accepted by economists as an important motive for social
conduct that ought not to be excluded from economic analyses. As pointed out,
[m]ost economic models are based on the self-interest hypothesis that assumes that all
people are exclusively motivated by their material self-interest. In recent years,
experimental economists have gathered overwhelming evidence that systematically
refutes the self-interest hypothesis and suggests that many people are strongly motivated
by concerns for fairness and reciprocity.
See Ernst Fehr & Klaus M. Schmidt, Theories of Fairness and Reciprocity-Evidence and Economic
Applications, summary page (Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, University of Zurich,
Working Paper No. 75, 2001), available at http://www.Iew.unizh.ch/wp/iewwp075.pdf. Therefore,
to the extent arguments of developing countries for the protection of traditional knowledge are
based on fairness, they ought not to be dismissed as being out of touch with reality nor subject to
refutation on the ground that they are not based on sound economics.
332. See generally THOMAS 0. BAYARD & KIMBERLY ANN ELLIOTT, RECIPROCITY AND
RETALIATION IN U.S. TRADE POLICY (1994).
333. The term was first coined by an Indian author, Jagdish Bhagwati. See Jagdish Bhagwati,
Aggressive Unilateralism: An Overview, in AGGRESSIVE UNILATERALISM: AMERICA'S 301 TRADE
POLICY AND THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM (Jagdish Bhagwati & Hugh T. Patrick eds., 1990).
334. Id.
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required that its partners unilaterally liberalize without any corresponding
concessions from the United States.335
Pointing to inequities in the terms of market access, 336 the U.S.
administration insisted on reciprocal arrangements in its trade relations.337
Advocates of unilateral aggression argued that as long as trading partners
continued to refuse to give American firms reciprocal access to their
markets, the United States could retaliate by restricting foreign opportunities
in United States markets.338 Because past efforts to address these inequities
through General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT") negotiations
and dispute settlement procedures had failed, they contended, the United
States had no other alternative in enforcing its rights under trade agreements
than to act unilaterally outside the multilateral trade talks framework. 339
The Trade Act of 1974 was the main statute used in making the
reciprocity argument.34 ° Section 301 of the Act authorized the President to
"take all appropriate and feasible steps within his power to obtain the
elimination of' restrictive practices of its trading partners that adversely
affected United States trade.34' Under the Act, a foreign country engages in
a prohibited trade practice if in the opinion of the President it:
[1] maintains unjustifiable or unreasonable tariff or other import
restrictions which impair the value of trade commitments made to
the United States...
335. Id.
336. Several factors were responsible for this change in United States' attitude to trade.
Traditionally, the postwar United States approach to opening foreign markets had been to encourage
multilateral negotiations in which many countries exchanged reciprocal commitments to lower trade
barriers under the auspices of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. However,
notwithstanding significant tariff liberalization under GATT, there was concern in the United States
that past trade negotiations had not resulted in a fair and balanced outcome. Many foreign markets
were seen as substantially more protected than the United States market, with foreign governments
relying relatively more heavily on subsidies, administrative practices, and other nontariff barriers.
Critics of United States trade policy alleged that foreign producers and investors enjoyed easy access
to the relatively open United States market while United States firms were denied equivalent
opportunities abroad. Supporters of aggressive unilateralism demanded the elimination of foreign
trade barriers because they contributed to the trade deficit, undermined American competitiveness,
and cost Americans their jobs. They also pointed out that GATT rules-by ignoring foreign
investment and services-failed to cover an increasing share of world trade that was especially
important to American firms. BAYARD & ELLIOTT, supra note 332, at 2.
337. William R. Cline, Reciprocity: A New Approach to World Trade Policy?, in 2 POLICY
ANALYSES IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS (1982).
338. Id.
339. BAYARD & ELLIOTT, supra note 332, at 10-16.
340. Id.
341. Trade Act of 1974, ch. 1, § 301, 88 Stat. 1978, 2042 (1975) (codified as amended at 19
U.S.C. § 2411 (1988)). For a general discussion on Section 301, see Judith H. Bello and Alan F.
Holmer, Special 301: Its Requirements, Implementation, and Significance, 13 FORDIAM INT'L L.J.
259 (1989-90).
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[2] engages in discriminatory or other acts or policies which are
unjustifiable or unreasonable...
[3] provides subsidies ... on its exports to the United States or to
other foreign markets which have the effect of substantially
reducing sales of the competitive United States product or products
in the United States or in those other foreign markets or
[4] imposes unjustifiable or unreasonable restrictions on access to
supplies of food, raw materials, or manufactured or
semimanufactured products that burden or restrict United States
commerce. 
342
Measures that could be imposed to secure the elimination of the
prohibited trade practices include the suspension or withdrawal of previous
trade concessions, the imposition of duties or other import restrictions only
against the exports of the targeted foreign country, or the imposition of fees
or restrictions only on the services of that country.343 The Act was
subsequently amended to facilitate its use in intellectual property cases.34
342. 19 U.S.C. § 2411(a)(1)-(4) (2000).
343. Id. § 2411.
344. As a major producer and exporter of intellectual property, the United States was motivated to
strengthen the international legal protective regime to curb rampant piracy and other infringement of
intellectual property rights of its citizens flourished abroad. See Theodore H. Davis, Combatting
Piracy of Intellectual Property in International Markets: A Proposed Modification of the Special
301 Action, 24 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 505, 506 & n.1, 508 (1991). However, its efforts to do so
at a multilateral level met with stiff resistance from a number of developing countries including
Brazil and India. Congress and the business community encouraged the President to seek stronger
intellectual property protection abroad by arming the United States Trade Representative (USTR) for
the first time with a number of retaliatory weapons. See id. at 511. For Example, under the
provisions of the 1983 Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act, the President was given discretion
to consider whether participating countries provided adequate protection of intellectual property
rights as a condition for receiving United States tariff preferences. 19 U.S.C. § 2702(c) (2000); see
Davis, supra, at 513. Similarly, the Trade and Tariff Act of 1984 amended the criteria for access to
the Generalized System of Preferences to give the president discretion to deny GSP to countries that
had inadequate protection for intellectual property rights. Thomas Mesevage, The Carrot and Stick:
Protecting United States Intellectual Property in Developing Countries, 17 RUTGERS COMPUTER &
TECH. L.J. 421,423-25 (1991).
Section 301 was amended under the 1984 Trade Act to give the President legal authority for
the first time to retaliate in cases where target countries failed to provide "adequate and effective
protection of intellectual property rights." 19 U.S.C. §2242(1)(A)-(B) (2000). The "special 301"
provisions of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 gave further teeth to the
unilateral pursuit of intellectual property protection, by requiring the USTR to identify, within 30
days of issuing the National Trade Estimates Report, "those foreign countries that deny adequate and
effective protection of intellectual property rights, or deny fair and equitable market access to United
States persons that rely upon intellectual property rights." Id. § 2242(1)(A). Policy makers saw
On numerous occasions, the United States applied Section 301 sanctions
or threats to secure desired reforms in the intellectual property laws and
policies of its trading partners, including Argentina,3 45  South Korea,
3 46
Brazil, 347 China,3 48 Taiwan 349 and Thailand. 350 The pre-TRIPS Section 301
actions brought by the United States demonstrated the determination of the
United States to invoke the principle of reciprocity to resolve difficult
intellectual property issues not satisfactorily dealt with under the existing
legal regime of target states.351 United States demands for reciprocity in
trade were always supported by the notion of fairness.3 52  Because the
United States had opened its market to foreign products, fairness demanded
that the target countries also open their markets to United States goods and
services.3 53  Significantly, all the Section 301 cases resulted in the adoption
of flexible arrangements and there was no form agreement imposed on the
target countries. Each arrangement was unique and was specifically tailored
to address the distinct problems perceived by the United States to exist in
each target country. For example, in China the arrangement took the form of
a memorandum of understanding outlining remedial steps China proposed to
these unilateral initiatives as complementing United States efforts to put intellectual property rights
on the GATT agenda because they demonstrated United States preparedness to act aggressively on
its own if target countries refused to negotiate in a multilateral forum.
345. Assurances by Argentina to improve protection of patents for pharmaceuticals led to the
withdrawal of a Section 301 petition that had been filed by the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers
Association. BAYARD & ELLIOTT, supra note 332, at 443-44.
346. South Korea on its part agreed to enact comprehensive copyright laws, to protect
pharmaceutical and agricultural products under its copyright laws, and to remove performance for
trademarked goods. Id. at 426-27.
347. With respect to Brazil, the United States was concerned about that country's denial of
product and process patent protection for pharmaceuticals and terminated its Section 301 action only
after Brazil adopted legislation that satisfactorily addressed United States concerns. Id. at 196-200.
348. The Section 301 action against China led to an agreement by China to accede to the Berne
and Geneva Conventions, thereby strengthening that country's copyright regime. Id. at 458-59.
349. Taiwan responded to United States concerns by cracking down on piracy and revising its
copyright and patent laws for an improved protection of intellectual property rights. Id. at 462-64.
350. Similarly, Thailand adopted legislation providing patent protection for pharmaceuticals, food
and drinks, biotechnology, and agricultural machinery. Id. at 454-56.
351. As the world's leading exporter of goods and services embodying intellectual property, the
United States could not afford to sit idly by in the face of reports of the weak enforcement of the
intellectual property rights of United States citizens in the target countries. For example, in 1989,
U.S. exports of intellectual property goods amounted to nearly $60 billion, while net receipts from
foreigners of royalties and license fees for technology, patents, and trademarks totaled nearly $9
billion. Keith Maskus, Intellectual Property Rights and the Uruguay Round, 78 EcON. R. 10, 16
(1993). While the United States continued to be involved in efforts at the Uruguay Round to resolve
this issue multilaterally, it nevertheless was prepared to act unilaterally, pending the conclusion of a
satisfactory arrangement at the GATT negotiations. BAYARD & ELLIOTT, supra note 332, at 3.
352. See supra note 336 and accompanying text.
353. For example, the United States found Brazil's denial of product and process patents to be an
unreasonable policy which enabled Brazilian competitors to infringe United States patents. Because
the Brazilians did not incur research and development costs, they could afford to sell their products
at significantly lower prices than United States patent holders who thereby were unfairly denied their
share of the Brazilian market. See Maskus, supra note 354, at 18.
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take,354 while simple assurances in Argentina to address the issue of patent
protection for pharmaceuticals and drug registration procedures were
sufficient for the termination of Section 301 actions.35 5 Similarly, in Brazil
no formal document was signed, but the United States was satisfied with
public announcements by the Brazilian government to amend its patent law
and then carrying out its promises.356
2. Reciprocity and the International Protection of Traditional
Knowledge
Similar to the arguments once made by the United States with respect to
intellectual property, traditional knowledge ("TK") source countries have
insisted on the protection of important national rights like traditional
knowledge on the basis of reciprocity. Consistent with the contours of the
principle of reciprocity outlined earlier,357 the developing countries have
argued on grounds of fairness for the protection of traditional knowledge. A
proposal by the African Group before the TRIPS Council for an amendment
of the TRIPS Agreement echoes this concern by calling for the protection of
genetic resources and traditional knowledge as a matter of "equity and due
recognition for the custodians of the genetic resources and traditional
knowledge. '
The position of the developing countries clearly bears strong overtones
of the reciprocity principle that good be returned in proportion to good
received. To a degree, the good received by the developed countries under
the TRIPS Agreement has included a commitment by the developing
countries to an intellectual property regime premised on the disclosure of
relevant material facts in any patent application. For example, under the
TRIPS Agreement, WTO members are obligated to "require that an
applicant for a patent ...disclose the invention in a manner sufficiently
clear and complete for the invention to be carried out by a person skilled in
the art . . ,,359 A material fact specifically mentioned as worthy of
disclosure in this context is an indication of "the best mode for carrying out
the invention known to the inventor. ' 360 In addition to this requirement of
354. BAYARD & ELLIOTT, supra note 332, at 459.
355. Id. at 444.
356. Id. at 199-200.
357. See supra notes 325-31 and accompanying text.
358. Proposal of the African Group, supra note 294, at 1.
359. Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 29(1), Apr. 15,
1994, 33 I.L.M. 1125 [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
360. Id.
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disclosure to enable use of the invention, the Agreement imposes a second
condition on patent applicants to provide "information concerning the
applicant's corresponding foreign applications and grants."
' 361
In general, the developing countries' submissions also affirm the general
duty of disclosure incorporated in the TRIPS Agreement, and do not deviate
from it except to highlight for emphasis (as done in the TRIPS Agreement
itself) selected material facts regarding source and country of origin
frequently omitted from applications for patents derived from traditional
knowledge. Therefore, the developing countries could be seen as seeking
for traditional knowledge the same beneficial terms currently extended to
western creations.
The developing country demands also reflect sentiments based on the
need for reparations for harms caused, another important element in the
concept of reciprocity. The African Proposal alludes to this by emphasizing
that
for purposes of the review of Article 27.3(b) the issue raised is that
the TRIPS Agreement at the moment has gaps in the sense that it
has not provided adequate and equitable means to prevent patents
mainly in developed Members that have amounted to and resulted
in the misappropriation of genetic resources and traditional
knowledge mainly from the developing Members. 362
According to the African Group, this has occurred "inconsistently with
the will of the custodian communities and the countries that have
sovereignty over the resources. 3 63 As a remedial solution, it is contended
that "[n]otions of equity and good faith mandate that the international
community create an equitable system for the acquisition, maintenance, and
enforcement of intellectual property rights which does not a priori exclude
any section of society."
364
These concerns about inequities in the TRIPS Agreement appear to have
been borne out by the impact of the TRIPS Agreement on developing
countries so far. Compliance with the TRIPS Agreement has required them
to make radical changes in their laws to provide intellectual property rights
not previously recognized or to eliminate provisions inconsistent with the
Agreement. 365 It also has meant the creation of the necessary, but
361. Id. art. 29(2).
362. Id. at. 2.
363. Id. at 6.
364. TRIPS Agreement and the CBD, supra note 298, 8.
365. The TRIPS Agreement imposes on member states of the WTO minimum requirements for
the protection of intellectual property rights, many of which appear to benefit disproportionately the
interests of the developed countries. Under the TRIPS Agreement, copyright protection extends to
computer programs and compilations of data, rental rights and rights of performers, producers, and
broadcasting organizations. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 359, art. 14. Trademarks are protected
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expensive, administrative machinery to assure the enforcement of the rights.
Furthermore, as the report of the Commission on Intellectual Property
Rights makes clear, a harmonized strong IPR environment as envisioned
under the TRIPS Agreement may not be good for all developing countries
given their differences in scientific and technical capabilities, social and
economic structures and inequalities of income and wealth.3 66  Costs to
developing countries adopting a strong intellectual property rights regime
have been shown to include increased prices for medicines, etc. 367
Moreover, benefits promised developing countries under the TRIPS
Agreement have not materialized. Stronger IPR protection for developing
countries was expected to lead to increased technology transfers and
technological diffusion, which would result in increased developing country-
productivity and reduced costs. 368  However, the available evidence
indicates this has not occurred.369 Similarly, the expectation that increased
IPR protection would enhance the efforts of pharmaceutical companies to
develop drugs that are endemic to developing countries is yet to be
realized.370
In a sense, therefore, the "acceptance" of the TRIPS Agreement by
developing countries largely out of U.S. pressure represents a significant
sacrifice made by those countries for the benefit of the developed countries.
Fairness requires that this sacrifice be reciprocated by the voluntary
indefinitely for renewable seven year terms and the compulsory licensing of trademarks is
prohibited. Id. arts. 14, 16(l), 18. Patents are to be granted for "any inventions, whether products or
processes, in all fields of technology, provided that they are new, involve an inventive step and are
capable of industrial application." Id. art. 27. The TRIPS Agreement requires member states to
provide for the protection of plant varieties either by patents or by an effective sui generis system or
by any combination thereof." Id. art. 27(3)(b). To permit effective action against infringement of
intellectual property, the agreement specifies certain minimum procedures to be made available
under national law including rights to notice, competent legal representation, presentation of
evidence and the protection of confidential information. Id. art. 42. Special procedures are also to
be set up to enable right holders, who suspect the importation of counterfeit trademark or pirated
copyright goods, to apply in writing to the relevant authorities for the suspension by the customs
authorities of the release into free circulation of such goods. Id. art. 51-60.
To ensure transparency, each member is required to publish all laws, regulations and judicial
decisions relating to the availability, scope, acquisition, enforcement and prevention of abuse of
intellectual property. Id. art. 63(1). In addition, the member is required to notify the Council of
TRIPS about such laws and regulations to assist the Council in its review of the operation of the
Agreement. Id. art. 61(2). Disputes among member states concerning the rights recognized under
the Agreement are to be resolved following the procedures outlined in the Dispute Settlement
Understanding. Id. art. 64(l).
366. CIPR EXECUTIvE SUMMARY, supra note 324, at 7.
367. Id. at 8.
368. Id. at 9-10.
369. Id. at 9.
370. Id. at 11.
agreement of the United States to protect the related interests of the
developing countries like traditional knowledge which are not adequately
protected in the developed nations.
3. Need for Special Concessions
As noted earlier, the form of the reciprocity argument advocated by
developing countries involving a demand by one party on another to respond
after the fact to a benefit the latter enjoys from the former is not new. It was
used successfully by the U.S. in the pre-TRIPS era to address inequities in
trade relations that the then existing international legal framework did not
appear to regulate. 371 But to the extent the U.S. reciprocity arguments
succeeded due to the ability of the government to back up its demands with
threats or actual application of sanctions, the traditional knowledge source
countries cannot expect to succeed in their demands by arguments based
simply on moral grounds of fairness without credible threats of sanctions.
However, because the WTO system, which the traditional knowledge source
countries are now a part of, discourages unilateral application of trade
sanctions, it is doubtful whether a threatened suspension or withdrawal of
trade concessions as part of a negotiating posture by traditional knowledge
source countries would even be taken seriously. The fact that such unilateral
actions may not be permitted under WTO standards weakens the potential
use of trade sanctions by TK source countries as a negotiating strategy.
In any event, sanctions, even if legal, would be impractical given the
generally weak economic position of many developing countries. For
example, the imposition of sanctions by a traditional knowledge source
country on the world's only superpower might provoke unpleasant
retaliatory action that the developing country would prefer to avoid.
Besides, such sanctions, either through increased duties on imports or
quantitative restrictions on exports from the United States, would always
entail an economic cost in the developing country since the prices of
affected imports would invariably rise.
Perhaps, rather than look to sanctions, the traditional knowledge source
countries would need to evaluate carefully the demands of the United States
at the international level as explained below and be prepared to make
reasonable concessions on those matters in exchange for enhanced
protection of traditional knowledge. If the matter of traditional knowledge
had been brought up during the Uruguay Round negotiations leading up to
the adoption of TRIPS, the developing country arguments for reciprocity
would have been stronger as reflecting a straight forward exchange of
intellectual property protection for traditional knowledge protection.
However, given that the issue of traditional knowledge did not feature in the
371. See supra notes 345-56 and accompanying text.
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negotiations, the opportunity for a reciprocal arrangement under the TRIPS
Agreement was effectively lost. Under these circumstances, and as a
reflection of its current superior bargaining position, the U.S. is less likely to
accede to the request to protect traditional knowledge on reciprocity grounds
without being offered concessions entirely different from those found in the
TRIPS Agreement.
In this context, general matters on which the United States has
concentrated its international negotiating efforts as being important for its
national interests would be useful starting points to identify concessions that
could be offered as incentives to persuade the United States to commit to
improve on the protection of traditional knowledge. Significantly, with
negotiations on intellectual property rights virtually at a stalemate at the
WTO, and developing countries opposed to launching negotiations on an
international treaty on foreign investments, the U.S. has turned to bilateral
trade agreements with other countries to advance its economic interests.3 72
Thus, it has been pushing developing countries to enter into bilateral
investment agreements that include explicit obligations for the protection of
intellectual property rights as investments. In agreements with Cambodia,
Ecuador, Jordan, Korea, Nicaragua, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Trinidad &
Tobago, Vietnam, and the Andean, Caribbean, and Sub-Saharan African
countries, the U.S. has insisted on implementation of the International
Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants ("UPOV")3 7 3 and
Budapest 374 treaties, sought guarantees against exclusions for plants and
animals under patent law, and linked trade benefits to the provision of
intellectual property rights. 375 The agreements go beyond international
norms to the extent they provide for intellectual property rights not covered
by the TRIPS Agreement and incorporate "national treatment" without the
exception provided for under international treaties.376
Such bilateral trade talks constitute logical and appropriate opportunities
to broach the subject of traditional knowledge protection given the
importance the U.S. appears to attach to them. Thus, it would be in the
interest of developing countries to examine further the implications of
372. See United States Trade Representative, Bilateral Trade Agreements, http://www.ustr.gov/
Trade-Agreements/Bilateral/Section Index.html.
373. International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants, Dec. 2, 1961, S.
Treaty Doc. No. 104-17 (1995), 1861 U.N.T.S. 281 [hereinafter UPOV].
374. Budapest Treaty on the International Recognition of the Deposit of Microorganisms for the
Purposes of Patent Procedure, Apr. 28, 1977, 32 U.S.T. 1241, 1861 U.N.T.S. 361.
375. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 167, at 58-60.
376. CARLOS CORREA, BILATERAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS: AGENTS OF NEW GLOBAL
STANDARDS FOR THE PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 2 (2004).
acceding to the terms requested by the U.S. in bilateral trade talks, and if the
risks are acceptable, offer suitable concessions to the U.S. in exchange for
the protection of traditional knowledge.
The history of U.S. participation in bilateral agreements with other
countries concerning the protection of various cultural interests offers some
hope that the U.S. could be persuaded to commit specifically to the
protection of traditional knowledge under terms reasonably calculated to
tackle egregious cases of misappropriation of foreign traditional knowledge.
The policy statement issued in connection with U.S. participation in
UNESCO's Illicit Trade Convention is quite instructive:
The legislation is important to our foreign relations, including our
international cultural relations. The expanding worldwide trade in
objects of archaeological and ethnological interest has led to
wholesale depredations in some countries, resulting in the
mutilation of archaeological complexes of ancient civilizations...
In addition, art objects have been stolen in increasing quantities
from museums, churches, and collections ... the appearance in the
United States of [illicitly exported or stolen] objects has often given
rise to outcries and urgent requests for return by other countries.
The United States considers that on grounds of principle, good
relations and concern for the preservation of the cultural heritage
of mankind, it should render assistance in these situations.3 77
Clearly, the statement underscores important U.S. foreign policy
interests in cooperating with other nations to prevent gross abuses of their
cultural property. In furtherance of this objective, Congress has authorized
the use of bilateral and multilateral agreements to restrict the import into the
U.S. of cultural property illegally exported from countries that are parties to
the agreements.378 Pursuant to this authorization, the U.S. concluded
bilateral agreements with Bolivia,379  Ecuador,38 °  El Salvador, 8
Guatemala,382 Mexico383 and Peru.384 These precedents confirm that in
377. S. REP. NO. 97-564, at 23 (1982) (emphasis added).
378. See Convention on Cultural Property Implementation Act, 19 U.S.C. § 2602 (2000).
379. See Import Restrictions on Cultural Textile Artifacts from Bolivia, 54 Fed. Reg. 10,618-19
(1989).
380. See Agreement Between the United States of America and the Republic of Ecuador for the
Recovery and Return of Stolen Archaeological, Historical, and Cultural Properties, Nov. 17, 1983,
U.S.-Ecuador, T.I.A.S. No. 11,075, 1983.
381. See Import Restrictions on Archaeological Material from El-Salvador, 52 Fed. Reg. 34,614
(1987).
382. See Agreement Between the United States of America and Guatemala for the Recovery and
Return of Stolen Archaeological, Historical, and Cultural Properties, May 21, 1984, U.S.-Guat.,
T.I.A.S. No. 11,075, 1983.
383. See Treaty of Cooperation Between the United States of America and the United Mexican
States Providing for the Recovery and Return of Stolen Archaeological, Historical, and Cultural
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principle, the U.S. would not be opposed to bilateral agreements on
traditional knowledge, although the narrow scope of protection in the
existing agreements suggests that the U.S. would likely seek to limit the
nature of traditional knowledge it may undertake to protect.
V. PART FOUR: MUTUAL RECOGNITION AGREEMENTS AS A POLICY
RESPONSE
A. Mutual Recognition Agreements
From the previous discussion, it has emerged that the prospects of
regulating the use of traditional knowledge in the U.S. under the terms of an
internationally binding instrument are rather remote, and that bilateral
agreements reflecting cooperation between the United States and traditional
knowledge source countries probably offer the best solutions for now.
Indeed, bilateralism has been the U.S.'s preferred approach in resolving
unsatisfactory relations with other countries under the existing international
legal framework. In the context of traditional knowledge, this would entail
the adoption of separate and flexible mechanisms between interested
traditional knowledge source countries and the United States, focusing on
the particular types of traditional knowledge for which protection is
required, as well as the form of protection that makes sense from the
perspective of the participating countries. Such bilateral agreements, unlike
international treaties, are more flexible mechanisms to address specific U.S.
concerns about the protection of traditional knowledge. They can also
accommodate safeguards to satisfy the U.S. and provide incentives to assure
U.S. commitment to the terms of the agreements. In this section we examine
the nature and scope of such bilateral arrangements.
1. Recognition of Foreign Rights
Assuming that the United States is persuaded to enter into negotiations
with a country (or regional group of countries)385 over the terms of
protection for traditional knowledge originating from that country in
Properties, July 17, 1970, U.S.-Mex., 22 U.S.T. 494, 1970.
384. See Agreement Between the United States of America and Peru for the Recovery and Return
of stolen Archaeological, Historical, and Cultural Properties, Sep. 15, 1981, U.S.-Peru, 33 U.S.T.
1607, 1981.
385. Although the preferred approach is for a regional group of countries negotiating with the
U.S., for stylistic reasons, the rest of the paper unless otherwise specified, will use the term
"country" to include the plural.
exchange for some concessions, an issue that must be addressed from the
outset is the appropriate method for recognizing foreign rights in any
bilateral agreement that is eventually reached. The approaches commonly
employed in various international law instruments to recognize the rights of
foreigners are reciprocity, national treatment and most favored treatment.
National treatment, which is a principle of non-discrimination, holds
that an eligible foreign right holder should enjoy the same rights as domestic
nationals. For example, Article 2 of the Paris Convention provides:
"Nationals of any country of the [Paris] Union shall, as regards the
protection of industrial property, enjoy in all the other countries of the Union
the advantages that their respective laws now grant, or may hereafter grant,
to nationals . .,,86 Similarly, Article 5 of the Berne Convention provides:
(1) Authors shall enjoy, in respect of works for which they are
protected under this Convention, in countries of the Union other
than the country of origin, the rights which their respective laws do
now or may hereafter grant to their nationals, as well as the rights
specially granted by this Convention ....
(3) Protection in the country of origin is governed by domestic law.
However, when the author is not a national of the country of origin
of the work for which he is protected under this Convention, he
shall enjoy in that country the same rights as national authors.387
Protection of foreign traditional knowledge on the basis of national
treatment may not necessarily resolve the enforcement problem noted at the
beginning of this Article. 88 Assume Countries A and B have both ratified
an international instrument on traditional knowledge that incorporates the
principle of national treatment for foreign right holders. To the extent that
Country A provides traditional knowledge rights to eligible nationals under
its laws, it must make the same traditional knowledge rights available to
eligible foreigners from Country B residing in Country A. Where Country
A already has an effective national law on traditional knowledge, national
treatment should be an adequate basis for foreigners to protect their rights in
that country. Note, however, that what is protected in Country A is not the
set of rights the foreigners from Country B would be entitled to in Country
B, but rather what Country A provides to its nationals under its law. It
follows that if Country A does not extend rights to traditional knowledge,
386. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property art. 2, Mar. 20, 1883, 25 Star.
1372,21 U.S.T. 1583.
387. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works art. 5, Sept. 9, 1886, 828
U.N.T.S. 221, 249.
388. Supra note 9 and accompanying text.
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the foreigners from Country B in Country A cannot claim rights under a
non-existent national law and their rights in their home country will not be
applicable. Thus, guarantees in any bilateral agreement to protect traditional
knowledge on the basis of national treatment would be meaningless.
Of greater relevance to the protection of traditional knowledge is the
reciprocity principle. "Under reciprocity or reciprocal recognition, whether
a country grants protection to nationals of a foreign country depends on
whether that country in turn extends protection to nationals of the first
country; the duration or nature of protection may also be determined by the
same principle., 38 9 Reciprocity requires Country A to recognize the rights
of nationals from Country B residing in Country A only where Country B
also recognizes the rights of nationals of Country A residing in Country B.
Clearly, the reciprocity principle makes sense where both countries are
interested in protecting the same subject-matter. However, if Country A
does not protect traditional knowledge and has no interest in doing so, the
reciprocity principle cannot be used for the protection of traditional
knowledge unless an incentive is offered in exchange for its commitment to
protect traditional knowledge.
Protection of traditional knowledge on the basis of reciprocity offers the
possibility of fuller protection for TK rights holders in the U.S. than
protection on the basis of national treatment. Under the principle of
reciprocity, Country A may recognize and enforce the traditional knowledge
rights of a person from Country B even where Country A does not recognize
such rights under its domestic (national) laws. This flexibility of the
reciprocity approach makes it suitable for the protection of traditional
knowledge in the U.S., which has been reluctant to sign on to a broad and
binding international scheme that might require changes in its domestic
laws. Under the reciprocity principle, the U.S. could still commit to
protecting foreign traditional knowledge without making such changes.
An implicit endorsement of the principle, one of the early model
intellectual property instruments advocated by both WIPO and UNESCO
emphasized the need to protect traditional knowledge on the basis of
reciprocity. Specifically, the Model Provisions for National Laws on the
Protection of Expressions of Folklore Against Illicit Exploitation and Other
Prejudicial Actions required that "[e]xpressions of folklore developed and
maintained in a foreign country [be] protected ... subject to reciprocity. 390
Similarly, the principle of reciprocity is incorporated in UNESCO's Illicit
389. WIPO, Traditional Knowledge, Traditional Cultural Expressions and Genetic Resources:
The International Dimension, 11, WIPO/GRTKF/IC/6/6 (Nov. 30, 2003).
390. See Draft Model Provisions, supra note 270, § 14.
Trade Convention, which enables an aggrieved signatory party to file claims,
based on its domestic cultural property laws, in another signatory state to
recover cultural property illegally removed from the complainant's
jurisdiction.39' Thus, incorporation of the principle of reciprocity in a
bilateral agreement would be consistent with international practice.
2. Mutual Recognition Agreements as Reciprocal Arrangements
An increasingly popular application of the reciprocity principle is found
in MRAs.392  As defined in relation to consumer goods, MRAs are
"agreements between countries to recognize and accept the results of
conformity assessments performed by conformity assessment bodies
("CABs") of the countries that are parties to the agreement., 393  In this
context, the term "conformity assessment" refers to:
the process by which products are measured against the various
technical, safety, purity, and quality standards that governments
impose on products. Such MRAs allow an exporting country's
CABs to use the tests and standards of the importing country in
evaluating products, thereby potentially reducing the number of
CABs that must evaluate a product destined for multiple markets. 394
Prominent examples of MRAs include arrangements concluded in 1997
between the U.S. and the European Union covering trade in
telecommunications equipment, electromagnetic compatibility, electrical
safety, recreational craft, oil, pharmaceutical good manufacturing practices,
and medical devices.395
Many advocates of MRAs assume that the standards of the importing
country would always form the basis of the MRAs. 3 96 However, that view is
not unanimous. According to Linda Horton,
391. See Illicit Trade Convention, supra note 227, art. 13.
392. Mutual recognition agreements.




396. Linda R. Horton & Kathleen E. Hastings, A Plan that Establishes a Framework for
Achieving Mutual Recognition of Good Manufacturing Practices Inspections, 53 FOOD & DRUG L.J.
527, 530 (1998). The following comment illustrates this view:
I view [MRAs] as contracts for service. The United States enters into an agreement with
a trading partner under the expectation that the trading partner will take steps to help
FDA perform its primary function of applying domestic legal standards to products
imported into the United States. The service contracted for may be the provision of
information, such as the sharing the report of an inspection, or it may be the evaluation of
a medical device by a body recognized by the partner's regulatory authorities. In both
cases, the assumption is that U.S. law provides the standards that ultimately determine the
acceptability of an inspected facility or an imported product. In such an agreement, the
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those who use the term [MRA] do not always use it the same way.
A fundamental question is always: whose requirements are being
met? Is it the 'customer's' requirements that are being met, i.e., the
importing country? . . . The international analogue is that the
conformity assessment be done in accordance with the laws of the
importing country. Or, conversely, is it the supplier's requirements
that are being met, i.e. those of the exporting country's? There is a
widespread desire in industry to be able to export if the
requirements of the exporting country have been met.397
Although by definition an MRA "provides for reciprocal reliance upon
facets of the regulatory systems" in the participating countries,398 which are
recognized as "equivalent, entirely or in part,"' 99 it is not a requirement of
MRAs that the standards be the same in both countries. As one
commentator observes,
when two or more countries pledge to accept each other's standards
as equivalent, a mutual recognition agreement is formed ....
[E]quivalent does not mean 'the same'-it only means functionally
equivalent, or functionally substitutable. In forming an MRA, each
country in essence says that the other's standards and regulatory
system are close enough to its own that it can entrust the protection
of its citizens in that matter to the other country.4"0
Implementation of MRAs often results in significant savings in
administrative and other costs of enforcement, a factor that partly explains
the appeal of MRAs to the Food and Drug Administration in the U.S. 40°
role of the trading partner is not that of law maker but rather that of information source or
service provider.
Richard A. Merrill, The Importance and Challenges of "Mutual Recognition ", 29 SETON HALL L.
REv. 736, 740 (1998).
397. Linda Horton, Mutual Recognition Agreements and Harmonization, 29 SETON HALL L. REv.
692, 724 (1998) (emphasis added).
398. Horton & Hastings, supra note 396, at 529-30.
399. Arvin P. Shroff, FDA Enforcement Initiatives in the United States and Abroad, 49 FOOD &
DRUG L.J. 575, 578 (1994).
400. Alexander M. Donahue, Equivalence: Not Quite Close Enough for the International
Harmonization of Environmental Standards, 30 ENVTL. L. 363, 370 (2000); see also James Mcllroy,
Commonality of Standards-Implications for Sovereignty-A Canadian Perspective, 24 CAN.-U.S.
L.J. 245, 247 (1998) ("The mutual recognition approach does not require Canada and the United
States to adopt the same standards. We must merely agree to agree to recognize each other's
standards, even if they are quite different.").
401. Shroff, supra note 399, at 578 ("The FDA recognizes that it cannot increase its foreign
inspections at the same pace as it has over the past few years. There is a finite amount of resources
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"[MRAs] also address transparency concerns since an MRA would forbid
domestic regulatory regimes from erecting or applying regulatory barriers to
imported products '40 2 and therefore promote bilateral trade.40 3
MRAs have become a useful popular alternative, particularly where
harmonization of different trade international standards have proved
difficult. In general, mutual recognition agreements are easier to negotiate
than efforts to harmonize regulatory regimes.4 °4 Unlike harmonization,
which requires jurisdictions to make their regulations identical or at least
more similar, MRAs "can permit entry and sale of products or services
without requiring fundamental regulatory convergence., 40 5  A potential
benefit of MRAs is that principles agreed upon under MRAs could form the
basis of an international agreement open to other countries. As has been
noted in the context of trade-related MRAs between the U.S. and the
European Union, "an element-by-element approach [involved in an MRA]
could advance liberal multilateralism . .. to the extent that the elements
chosen for negotiation could be embodied in preferential agreements which
could be opened for accession to third countries willing to assume the
agreement's obligations. 4 6 Thus, "the transatlantic powers could negotiate
agreements on important topics not yet fully covered by the WTO and try to
use those agreements as a basis for further liberalization of world trade and
investment.,
40 7
3. Relevance of Mutual Recognition Agreements to Traditional
Knowledge
The African Group at WIPO has advocated the use of mutual
recognition agreements in relation to traditional knowledge.40 8 Certain
features of the MRA make it worth pursuing as a mechanism for the
protection of traditional knowledge. Unlike an agreement based on national
treatment, an MRA can be negotiated and implemented where the regulatory
and foreign inspections are costly, time consuming and resource intensive. As a result the agency
has been looking into [MRAs] with foreign countries.").
402. Merit E. Janow, Assessing APEC's Role in Economic Integration in the Asia-Pacific Region,
17 Nw. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 947, 994 (1997).
403. George A. Bermann, Regulatory Cooperation between the European Commission and U.S.
Administrative Agencies, 9 ADMtN. L.J. AM. U. 933, 972 (1996).
404. Janow, supra note 402, at 994.
405. Id.
406. Richard H. Steinberg, Great Power Management of the World Trading System: A
Transatlantic Strategy for Liberal Multilateralism, 29 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 205, 249 (1998).
407. Id. at 249-50.
408. Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources, Traditional
Knowledge and Folklore, Submission by the African Group: Objectives, Principles and Elements of
an International Instrument, or Instruments, on Intellectual Property in Relation to Genetic
Resources and on the Protection of Traditional Knowledge and Folklore, Annex 2,
WIPO/GRTKF/IC/6/I 2 (March 15, 2004).
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systems differ, as when one country provides for rights not recognized in the
other. Thus, Country A could agree to recognize and protect traditional
knowledge rights from Country B on the basis of an agreement reached
between the two countries, even though the former does not have laws
respecting traditional knowledge.
An MRA between traditional knowledge source countries should be
relatively easy to negotiate because such countries are likely to have well-
developed national regimes which the MRAs would simply incorporate.
However, for MRAs involving traditional knowledge user countries without
such domestic laws, the negotiations are likely to be protracted and would
require the provision of incentives in return for a commitment to protect
traditional knowledge originating from traditional knowledge source
countries. Concerns of traditional knowledge user countries that have
discouraged them from committing to the protection of traditional
knowledge under their laws may also have to be dealt with. Thus, the
reluctance of the U.S. to commit to an international arrangement out of
fears of its possible use to support national claims for self-determination
40 9
could be addressed by limiting the scope of the MRA to foreign
traditional knowledge.
Although many of the MRAs in the trade area incorporate standards of
the importing countries, plausible arguments could be made for applying the
standards of the exporting countries, where appropriate. In the context of
the protection of foreign traditional knowledge (i.e. traditional knowledge
from a traditional knowledge source country that is being misappropriated in
a traditional knowledge user country) one could analogize and consider the
traditional knowledge source countries and the traditional knowledge user
countries as the exporting and importing countries, respectively. With that
view, the misappropriation of traditional knowledge could be treated in the
same manner as other types of trade discrepancies. An MRA setting forth a
commitment by the traditional knowledge user country to protect foreign
traditional knowledge under the standards of the traditional knowledge
source country would provide an effective means of redressing the
imbalance, especially where the traditional knowledge user country like the
U.S., does not provide for the protection of traditional knowledge under its
own laws. In the next section we elaborate on the scope of a mutual
recognition agreement that could be concluded between the United States
and interested traditional knowledge provider countries.
409. See supra notes 24-28 and accompanying text.
B. Scope of Mutual Recognition Agreements on Traditional Knowledge
The principal objective of an MRA with the U.S. on traditional
knowledge would be to create a suitable environment in the United States to
facilitate access to, as well as prevent the misappropriation of, traditional
knowledge originating from the source country or source countries party to
the MRA. To assuage U.S. concerns about difficulties in identifying
traditional knowledge and the appropriate methods of regulating it, the MRA
should carefully delineate the scope of protectible matter and clarify the
general customary law principles that govern access, including prior
informed consent and benefit sharing requirements and other obligations that
could be imposed on users by indigenous rights holders. It will also be
necessary to specify the prohibited acts of misappropriation with respect to
which sanctions would be sought in the United States.
To ensure the effectiveness of the MRA, it is of vital importance that a
central agency is established in the United States to administer the MRA's
provisions. For want of a better term, the agency is referred to in this Article
as the United States Traditional Knowledge Authority ("USTKA"). A
principal role of the USTKA would be to articulate, assert and defend the
traditional knowledge rights of the traditional knowledge source country
subject to exploitation in the United States. 410 A second role of the agency
would be to act as the conduit either for processing requests to use
traditional knowledge received from interested persons in United States, or
passing to the TK source country benefits received from uses of TK in the
United States.
The MRA should provide a general definition as well as an illustrative
list of categories of traditional knowledge to be regulated under the
agreement.4 1' It is equally important to qualify the definition with a
410. In this sense, the USTKA would play a role similar to that played by the Council of
Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) from India and the Coordinating Body for the Indigenous
Organizations of the Amazon Basin (COICA)Amazon countries when they worked successfully for
the revocation of illegally issued patents involving the neem tree and ayahuasca, respectively. See
CARLOS M. CORREA, TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 7, 18 (2001).
411. The Revised Bangui Agreement, which is applicable to some African francophone countries,
generally follows this approach. It defines traditional knowledge as "the literary, artistic, religious,
scientific, technological and other traditions and productions as a whole created by communities and
handed down from generation to generation" in Article 68(1)) and then goes on to provide numerous
examples of the term as follows:
(a) literary works of all kinds, whether in oral or written form, stories, legends, proverbs,
epics, chronicles, myths, riddles;
(b) artistic styles and productions [such as] (i) dances, (ii) musical productions of all
kinds, (iii) dramatic, dramatico-musical, choreographic and pantomime productions, (iv)
styles and productions of fine art and decorative art by any process, (v) architectural
styles;
(c) religious traditions and celebrations [such as] (i) rites and rituals, (ii) objects.
vestments and places of worship, (iii) initiations;
(d) educational traditions [such as] (i) sports, games, (ii) codes of manners and social
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provision that the determination whether a particular item or practice of
traditional knowledge was covered by the MRA for purposes of authorizing
access or enforcing traditional knowledge rights in the United States would
be made by the USTKA in consultation with the TK source country. To
minimize definitional problems in the protection of traditional knowledge
and simplify the process of obtaining prior authorization for use of protected
works, the traditional knowledge source country should, to the extent
possible, specify in an appendix to the MRA information on where particular
types of protected works of traditional knowledge are found in the TK
source country and any restrictions that may exist regarding their
commercial exploitation.
Regarding the principles of protection, there should be a recognition in
the MRA that indigenous groups own or have rights of custodianship over
indigenous resources originating in the traditional knowledge source
countries, 412 which they exercise in accordance with customary practices.
413
Given the diversity of indigenous groups in those countries, it may not be
feasible to identify specific indigenous groups as rights holders in the MRA.
Instead, as proposed in relation to the definition of covered matter, the
identity of such holders for purposes of obtaining access to traditional
knowledge or providing benefits or enforcing rights would be determined by
USTKA in consultation with the traditional knowledge source country.
Furthermore, it should be clarified in the MRA that the right to use
traditional knowledge is not automatic and that access to traditional
knowledge could be denied on account of the sacred nature of an item or
simply out of a desire of the indigenous group not to commercialize it.
Existing regional model laws on traditional knowledge not only recognize
the right to refuse such access, but provide elaborate rules on prior informed
conventions;
(e) scientific knowledge and works [such as] (i) practices and products of medicine and
of the pharmacopoeia, (ii) theoretical and practical attainments in the fields of natural
science, physics, mathematics and astronomy;.
(f) technical knowledge and productions:[such as] (i) metallurgical and textile industries,
(ii) agricultural techniques, (iii) hunting and fishing techniques.
Agreement Revising the Bangui Agreement of March 2, 1977, on the Creation of an African
Intellectual Property Organization art. 68, http://www.oapi.wipo.net/doc/en/bangui-agreement.pdf.
412. In this context, for example, the African Model Law recognizes the rights of communities
over "their innovations, practices, knowledge and technologies acquired through generations."
African Model Legislation for the Protection of the Rights of Local Communities, Farmers and
Breeders, and Regulation of Access to Biological Resources art. 16, http://www.opbw.org/nat-imp/
model-laws/oau-model-law.pdf [hereinafter African Model Legislation].
413. On this point the African Model Law notes, for example, that rights of indigenous groups in
traditional knowledge "are to be protected under the norms [and] practices [of] the concerned local
and indigenous communities .... Id. art. 17.
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consent to ensure that indigenous groups have sufficient information about
proposed uses of traditional knowledge to make an informed decision
whether or not to grant access. 414 Information required to be disclosed under
the African Model law, for example, includes the identity of the applicant,
types and reasons for the resources requested, risks in the use of resources,
benefits to the local communities, and proposed benefit sharing
arrangements.4 15
It would be useful to require in the MRA that applications in the United
States for access to traditional knowledge be directed to the USTKA to be
forwarded to the traditional knowledge source country or source countries
unless the USTKA is also authorized to provide consent for the particular
type of traditional knowledge. Typical uses of the traditional knowledge
requiring prior approval may be spelled out as including but not limited to:
(a) "any publication, reproduction and any distribution of copies" of forms
or practices of traditional knowledge; (b) "any public recitation or
performance, any transmission by wireless means or by wire;" and (c) "any
other form of communication to the public," of forms or practices of
traditional knowledge.4 16
Because exploiters of traditional knowledge have often taken undue
advantage of indigenous groups by not rewarding them appropriately for
uses of traditional knowledge,4 17 it is imperative that the MRA incorporate
some form of benefit-sharing arrangement requiring that a portion of the
benefit obtained in the U.S. from access to traditional knowledge be
allocated to indigenous groups. 418 As has been recommended in relation to
access, benefits due for use of traditional knowledge should be collected by
the USTKA for transmission to the traditional knowledge source country.
The MRA should recognize the right of the traditional knowledge
source countries or the USTKA to impose reasonable obligations or
conditions on applicants for access to traditional knowledge. Such
obligations may include the disclosure to the USTKA of significant
commercial uses of traditional knowledge and any intellectual property
sought or obtained in connection therewith. To help enforce these
obligations as they relate to intellectual property rights, the U.S. could
require patent offices to reject applications for patents derived from
414. See, e.g., id. art. 5.
415. See id. art. 4.
416. Draft Model Provisions, supra note 270, § 3.
417. CORREA, supra note 410, at 5-6.
418. It is instructive in this context that the Pacific Model provides for equitable monetary or non-
monetary compensation. Model Law for the Protection of Traditional Knowledge and Expressions
of Culture art. 12, reprinted in SECRETARIAT OF THE PACIFIC COMMUNITY, PACIFIC REGIONAL
FRAMEWORK FOR THE PROTECTION OF TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE AND EXPRESSIONS OF CULTURE
3-15 (2002). On its part, the African Model law guarantees indigenous groups at least 50 percent of
the benefits gained from the utilization of indigenous resources. African Model Legislation, supra
note 412, art. 22(2).
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traditional knowledge, the transfer of which to the U.S. has not been
certified by the USTKA or traditional knowledge source country as being in
compliance with national requirements governing access and benefit sharing.
The description of prohibited acts of misappropriation of traditional
knowledge should include the unauthorized acquisition and use of traditional
knowledge or obtaining commercial benefits from the acquisition and use of
traditional knowledge, when the person has reason to know or ought to have
known that it was improperly acquired. As an illustration, the MRA might
refer to the following as acts of misappropriation: (a) the acquisition of
protected traditional knowledge by theft, fraud, or other illegal and unfair
means; (b) failure to comply with prior informed consent procedures
governing acquisition and use of traditional knowledge; (c) failure to comply
with benefit sharing arrangements or provide appropriate compensation to
the relevant holders for commercial uses of traditional knowledge, especially
where benefits were realized from such utilization; (d) use of traditional
knowledge in violation of the terms of any contract governing access to
traditional knowledge, executed either in the United States or the source
countries; (e) misrepresentations that a product or service is authentic
traditional knowledge; and (f) distortion or use of an item of traditional
knowledge in a way prejudicial to the honor, dignity or cultural interests of
the community in which it originates.
Effective enforcement systems would be critical to the use of the MRA
for the protection of traditional knowledge. At a minimum, the MRA should
permit rights holders in the traditional knowledge source countries through
the USTKA to file lawsuits in the U.S. to protect their rights. This type of
right is not novel and is found in several cultural heritage instruments.4 19
Considering the general unfamiliarity of the vast number of American
judges with the concept of traditional knowledge, it may be necessary to
create a special court to handle litigation involving traditional knowledge.
Sanctions for unauthorized uses of traditional knowledge whether imposed
by the general courts or the special traditional knowledge court, may include
injunctive relief, seizure and forfeiture of infringing material, accounting for
profits, damages, attorneys' fees, and costs. Criminal penalties such as jail
terms should also be considered for very egregious cases.
419. See, e.g., Illicit Trade Convention, supra note 227, art. 13.
705
C. U.S. and the Proposed MRA
In this section an attempt is made to gauge the likely reaction of
the United States to the proposed MRA. On the basis of evidence
drawn mainly from the official stance of the U.S. on related issues, it is
concluded that there is a good chance of the U.S. signing to the MRA if care
is taken to avoid in the agreement provisions that could be construed as
"political" to the extent the United States may consider such matters as
exclusively domestic issues not susceptible to intrusion by foreign
governments or institutions.
As a general matter, the United States has always advocated national
solutions to the problem of unauthorized uses of traditional knowledge. For
example, in opposing the disclosure requirement proposals before the TRIPS
Council, the U.S. has emphasized that the most effective means of "(1)
ensuring authorized access to genetic resources, i.e., that prior informed
consent is obtained; (2) achieving equitable sharing of the benefits arising
from the use of traditional knowledge and genetic resources; and (3)
preventing the issuance of erroneously issued patents" is "through tailored
national solutions to meet practical concerns and actual needs" 420 Under
this logic, the most appropriate response to the serious problem of
unauthorized use of foreign traditional knowledge in the United States
would appear to be a carefully crafted domestic solution implemented within
the United States. The MRA reflects such a strategy.
As to the specific provisions of the proposed MRA, the United States
has gone on record as expressing a commitment to "repress[ing] the
misappropriation of traditional knowledge" 421 and is therefore not likely to
oppose that as a legitimate goal of the MRA. However, agreeing on what
should be protected would be a different matter with traditional knowledge
source countries probably favoring a broader definition of covered matter
than the U.S. One expects agreement to be easily reached to protect
relatively uncontroversial matters such as handicrafts, textiles, paintings,
drawings, carvings, pottery, sculptures, woodwork, metal ware, etc. In
contrast, for other types of traditional knowledge, such as indigenous genetic
resources in which American biotechnology companies have shown a keen
interest, the negotiations could be complicated and more drawn out as
discussed below. 422 However, if the negotiations are conducted in good
faith, with a genuine commitment by the United States to enhance the
protection of traditional knowledge, the scope of protected matter eventually
agreed upon would be adequate to tackle the most rampant and egregious
420. Communication from the U.S., supra note 301, 11 5-6 (emphasis added).
421. WIPO, The Protection of Traditional Knowledge: Revised Objectives and Principles, Annex
14, WIPO/GRTKF/IC/8/5 (April 8, 2005) [hereinafter Revised Objectives and Principles].
422. See infra notes 428-36 and accompanying text.
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unauthorized uses of traditional knowledge-related genetic resources in the
United States.
Defining indigenous groups as rights holders under the MRA is unlikely
to generate concern on the part of the United States, given its own practice
of identifying Native American beneficiaries of various statutory rights in
federal legislation.423 In light of the U.S. experience with the Native
American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act 4 24 under which parties
requesting repatriation of human remains or objects are required to
substantiate direct descent or prior ownership,425 the imposition of a similar
burden of proof under the MRA for traditional knowledge should prove
acceptable to the U.S. Thus, the MRA may be qualified by language
indicating that determinations by either the USTKA or the national
competent authority in the traditional knowledge source country be taken as
conclusive proof of ownership. Such deference to traditional community
groups would not be unusual, as U.S. courts have regularly deferred to the
decisions of foreign institutions on some customary law issues 426 and to
tribal courts' findings on "tribal law.,
427
The United States is not likely to oppose the principle of prior informed
consent, which it has viewed favorably as a "valuable practice,, 4 2' nor the
principle of benefit sharing, given its professed support for arrangements
that "effectively control the collection of resources and ensure the sharing of
benefits from their use.", 429  Indeed, the practice of benefit sharing is
certainly not unknown in the United States, evidenced by the fact that
"[m]any U.S. government agencies have established policies that embody
the principles of appropriate access and equitable benefit-sharing. 43 °
The proposed disclosure's typical obligations to be imposed on
recipients of traditional knowledge under the MRA should not raise serious
concerns either, as the United States tends to find them to be reasonable. In
423. For example, the Indian Arts and Crafts Act defines the term "Indian" to include:
any Indian tribe, band, nation, Alaska Native village, or any other organized group or
community which is recognized as eligible ... by the United States... ; or (2) any Indian
group that has been formally recognized as an Indian tribe by a State legislature or by a
State commission or similar organization legislatively vested with State tribal recognition
authority.
25 U.S.C. § 305 (2000).
424. 25 U.S.C. § 3005 (2000).
425. Id. § 3005(a)(4).
426. Kuruk, supra note 29, at 843.
427. Cooter & Fikentscher, supra note 107, at 558-61; Laymon, supra note 107, at 363.
428. Revised Objectives and Principles, supra note 421, at Annex 32.
429. Communication from the U.S., supra note 301, 20.
430. Id. 23.
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the context of access and benefit sharing arrangements involving traditional
knowledge, the U.S. has emphasized that such contracts "can also require
mandatory disclosure to appropriate authorities of any future commercial
application utilizing the relevant traditional knowledge or genetic resource,
whether patented or not., 431  This is justified because "[t]his type of
mandatory disclosure requirement can provide for an effective monitoring
system by ensuring specific type of disclosure of the particular commercial
application involved., 432 The acts of misappropriation listed in the proposed
MRA should also not present any difficulties to the extent they are already
prohibited under the general laws of the United States dealing with theft,
misrepresentation and unfair competition. It is worth noting in this context
that the U.S. has expressed "support [for] the protection of TK through the
suppression of unfair competition.,
433
What may prove to be controversial, however, are acts of
misappropriation defined in relation to the acquisition of intellectual
property rights in traditional knowledge resources.
As a leading advocate for global intellectual property rights, the U.S.
has consistently opposed the efforts of developing countries to revise the
international patent regime to enable its use in curbing unauthorized uses of
traditional knowledge, including the issuance of patents for inventions
derived from traditional knowledge.434 It has favored the acquisition of
intellectual property rights in traditional knowledge, and even showcased
U.S. material transfer contracts providing intellectual rights as appropriate
models for the international community. 435 Thus, the U.S. is unlikely to
support broad language in the MRA suggesting that any acquisition of
intellectual property rights in traditional knowledge-related genetic resources
necessarily constitutes an act of misappropriation. However, if more
qualified language is adopted as where the act prohibited is the acquisition
of intellectual property rights in a TK resource in contravention of an
express clause in an access and benefit sharing contract,436 the U.S. would
431. Id. 20.
432. Id.
433. Revised Objectives and Principles, supra note 421, at Annex 37 (quoting United States of
America (WIPO/GRTKF/IC/6/14, para. 76)).
434. See supra notes 299-312 and accompanying text.
435. For example, during the second meeting of the WIPO's IGC on Traditional Knowledge, the
U.S. delegation professed its support for the development of contractual guides governing
concerning access to genetic resources and benefit-sharing to the extent "they were for guidance
only and were not binding." WIPO, Report of the Second Session of the Intergovernmental
Committee on Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and Folklore,
74, WIPO/GRTKF/IC/2/16 (Dec. 10-14, 2001). As examples of such agreements, the U.S.
delegation furnished a compilation titled "Memoranda of Understanding and Letters of Collection of
the National Cancer Institute" to be made available to the general public by the WIPO Secretariat.
Id.
436. The African Model Law, for example, requires applicants to undertake as a condition for
access to traditional knowledge, "not to apply for any form of intellectual property protection over
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probably consent to enforce the prohibition as a reflection of its public
policy favoring the enforcement of legal contracts freely negotiated by the
parties. To enforce the provision as qualified, it would then be necessary to
provide evidence linking the relevant foreign traditional knowledge
transferred under the contract with the intellectual property rights
subsequently acquired in the U.S. Outside these parameters, as where the
intellectual property rights cannot be traced to a traditional knowledge
resource transferred under a particular access contract and the traditional
knowledge resource is therefore alleged to have been obtained without the
consent of the appropriate indigenous rights holders, the U.S. may insist that
the issues concerning intellectual property rights not clearly linked to
contractual arrangements be dealt with instead under its general intellectual
property laws and not under the MRA.
A method of arriving at a compromise on the scope of protectible
traditional knowledge-related genetic resources may involve incorporating
aspects of the certification scheme proposed by the Like-Minded Group of
Megadiverse Countries. 437  Under the group's proposal, the transfer of a
genetic resource from a country that is a signatory to the CBD would need to
be accompanied by a certificate which establishes that access and benefit
sharing and other national requirements had been satisfied prior to the
transfer.438 The certificate could then be used to aid in the acquisition of a
patent abroad relating to the genetic resource. Without such certificate, the
application for a patent relating to the resource would be expected to be
turned down. The proposal would achieve the same effect as the disclosure
of origin requirement advocated at the WT0 4 39 without imposing additional
burdens on patent offices, 440 thereby satisfying a key U.S. objection to the
disclosure requirement. Applying the proposal in the context of the MRA,
the biological resource or parts or derivatives thereof and not to apply for intellectual property rights
protection over a community innovation, practice, knowledge or technology without the prior
informed consent of the original providers." African Model Legislation, supra note 412, art. 8(v).
437. This is a group of the world's most diverse countries, including Bolivia, Brazil, China,
Colombia, Costa Rica, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ecuador, India, Indonesia, Kenya,
Madagascar, Malaysia, Mexico, Peru, Philippines, South Africa and Venezuela. The group was
formed in 2002 at the WTO Ministerial meeting in Cancun to strengthen the bargaining position of
biodiversity countries at international fora. GRAIN, Re-situating the Benefits from Biodiversity: a
Perspective on the CBD Regime on Access and Benefit Sharing, SEEDLING, April 2005, at 5, 8.
438. Id. at 7-8.
439. It would assist in the rejection of patents concerning genetic resources obtained in source
countries without complying with the access and benefit rules and other national requirements for
access.
440. Thus, patent offices would not be involved in investigating whether foreign regulations
governing access and benefit sharing had been complied. Their role would be limited to merely
checking whether a valid certificate existed.
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as indicated above, the U.S. patent office would be required to reject
applications for patents relating to transferred resources unaccompanied by
the requisite certificates from the traditional knowledge source countries.
Conditioning protection of cultural interests in the U.S. on certification
of compliance with foreign national laws is not a novel concept. It has been
a key component of U.S. cultural heritage legislation for many decades. For
example, under the Pre-Colombian Art Act of 1972, certain antiquities could
not be imported into the U.S. without a certificate of compliance. In
addition, the Convention on Cultural Property Implementation Act
authorizes the President to enter into bilateral or multilateral agreements
with other nations under which "no designated archaeological or
ethnological material exported from the requesting nation could be imported
into the United States, unless the requesting nation issued a certificate that
exportation was not in violation of its laws., 441 To date, at least six bilateral
agreements have been concluded by the U.S. with other countries on that
basis.
442
Regarding the proposal on civil and criminal penalties for
misappropriation of traditional knowledge, the official pronouncements of
the U.S. on the subject appear favorable. For example, it has declared that
"countries could establish permit systems that impose civil and/or criminal
penalties for extracting genetic resources without a permit . . . .
Similarly, it has observed that "effective enforcement regimes for access and
benefit-sharing should be part of civil and criminal codes specifically
designed to enforce access and benefit-sharing laws.', 4" Moreover, from
this standpoint, "criminal provisions and/or civil liability for failure to
comply [could] be included in the country's laws for those few who might
take genetic resources without entering into an access agreement with the
required party., 44 5 As examples of appropriate sanctions, the U.S. has noted
that "[c]ontracts can be specifically enforceable [or] .. .damages for breach
of contract can also be specified, including punitive damages.
4 46
However, in sharp contrast to the expected generally positive reception
of the U.S. to parts of the MRA as discussed above, the U.S. would probably
not agree to an MRA on matters it views to be politically sensitive, such as
covering claims of indigenous and local communities for "self-
determination, health, justice, cultural heritage and land ...,,44 As it has
emphasized at international fora, it considers such matters to be "serious
441. Phelan, supra note 40, at 98; see also 19 U.S.C. § 2606 (2000).
442. They include Bolivia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Mexico and Peru. Roberts, supra
note 37, at 337.




447. U.S. Statement, supra note 286, at para. 7.
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interests that must be examined fully within appropriate national
contexts ' '448 and over which international institutions do not have
competence. Consequently, measures that raise these political issues will
most certainly be objected to.
Fortunately, the measures proposed in the MRA do not have such
political implications. First, to the extent the claims under the MRA would
concern tangible or intangible material brought into the United States from
the TK source country, they will not involve land claims which have been
the main source of friction between the government and the Native
Americans. Second, as community groups residing in the traditional
knowledge source country, the parties seeking to protect their traditional
knowledge rights in the United States under the MRA cannot possibly be
viewed as a discriminated class in the United States arguing for self-
determination.
However, while the scope of the MRA in this sense would clearly be
limited to foreign traditional knowledge and, therefore, exclude traditional
knowledge of Native Americans, the long term experience gained from the
successful implementation of the MRA by the U.S. should prove beneficial
to Native American interests. If the USTKA is able to maintain a good track
record, with demonstrable benefits to participants in the MRA process, the
mandate of the USTKA could be extended to include the protection of
Native American traditional knowledge as well. At such future time,
negotiations could be opened under the auspices of the USTKA between
Indian representatives and the U.S. government regarding compromise
approaches for the protection of Native American heritage.
VI. CONCLUSION
The first part of this Article traced the regulation of Indian cultural
heritage under various legislative initiatives and examined some
constitutional arguments frequently raised in the context of traditional
knowledge protection such as public domain, intellectual property rights,
free speech and freedom of religion. Reflecting the deep suspicions of the
U.S. government that a stronger recognition of traditional knowledge could
be used politically by Indian groups to press for rights of self-determination
and greater autonomy from the federal government, no provision is made
under domestic law for protecting traditional knowledge outside the limited
parameters of cultural heritage legislation and the limited jurisdiction of
448. Id.
Indian tribal courts. 449 This suspicion has also colored the government's
definition of the issues and its preparedness to commit to international
solutions regarding the protection of traditional knowledge. The U.S. has
eloquently defended its position at the international level, and judging from
its current stance, the prospects are rather remote that a binding international
treaty on traditional knowledge would be adopted in the very near future
with the support of the U.S.
In the meantime, and as an alternative, this Article has proposed the use
of mutual recognition agreements between the U.S. and traditional
knowledge source countries to tackle persistent problems regarding the
misappropriation of traditional knowledge in the United States. However,
for the U.S. to commit to improving the protection of traditional knowledge,
this Article has pointed out that purely moral arguments are not likely to be
persuasive and that significant concessions would be required from
traditional knowledge source countries. In addition, the agreements must
address U.S. concerns, whether well-founded or not, about potential use of
MRAs for domestic politics, by limiting the scope of protection to foreign
traditional knowledge. The enforcement mechanisms envisaged under
MRAs should not be too intrusive nor require radical changes to U.S. law.
The agency proposed herein to oversee the protection of traditional
knowledge would serve as an effective liaison and assist U.S. courts in
deciding what items of traditional knowledge should be protected. While it
may not be feasible to cover all cases of misappropriation, the MRA would,
at a minimum, provide adequate remedies for biological resources used in
the U.S. in a manner that violates the terms of an access and benefit sharing
contract executed in a traditional knowledge source country. In addition, it
could provide a less burdensome basis than the disclosure requirement 40 for
rejecting patent applications derived from traditional knowledge-related
biological resources, where the applicant is unable to demonstrate
certification by the traditional knowledge source country of compliance with
the national requirements on access and benefit sharing applicable to such
resources.
Under current circumstances, MRAs such as that proposed in relation to
the U.S., should be considered as an alternative to the creation of a binding
international instrument on traditional knowledge, as they allow for the
conclusion of flexible arrangements to facilitate the enforcement of
traditional knowledge rights in foreign countries, taking into account the
specific interests and concerns of signatory parties. Although as a rule,
MRAs do not apply to non-parties, 41 and thus will have no effect in
traditional knowledge user countries that refuse to subscribe to them, the
449. Supra notes 31-112 and accompanying text.
450. Supra note 299 and accompanying text.
451. Steinberg, supra note 406, at 249.
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common principles they reflect could eventually form the basis for and
positively influence the development of a future international instrument for
the protection of traditional knowledge.
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